J & N Electric, Inc. v. Bharatlall

• Decision Date: 11 April 2018
• Docket Number: CV166064392S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: J & N ELECTRIC, INC. v. Gabriela BHARATLALL et al.

J & N ELECTRIC, INC. v. Gabriela BHARATLALL et al.

No. CV166064392S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

April 11, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Corradino, Judge

A

The complaint in this matter lies in three counts. The first count lies in contract, the second count makes a claim for unjust enrichment, and the third count lies in quantum meruit. The first and second paragraph of each count make the following allegations:

1. On or about and after August 30, 2012 through November 21 2013 the plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation with its principal place of business in East Haven, Connecticut provided licensed electrician services and materials to and for the defendants, individuals residing in Milford Connecticut.

2. The said services were requested by the defendants.

The contract count goes on to allege that the services requested by the defendants were performed by the plaintiff and the defendants therefore now owe the plaintiff $5,752.33 for the services and materials provided plus statutory interest and costs.

The unjust enrichment count claims the following:

3. The value of the services and materials provided by the plaintiff is substantial.

4. A benefit was conferred upon the defendants through the services and materials provided by the plaintiff.

5. The defendants unjustly failed to pay the plaintiff for said benefit.

6. The lack of payment for said benefit was detrimental to the plaintiff.

7. The defendants have been unjustly enriched by virtue of their failure to pay for the said benefit.

The Third Count is entitled (" Quantum Meruit As Alternative To Contract" ) and alleges the following:

3. The defendants knowingly accepted the plaintiff’s services and materials.

4. The defendants represented to the plaintiff that the defendants knew they were expected to pay for said services and materials.

5. The parties’ course of conduct implied a promise to pay for said services and materials.

6. The plaintiff is entitled to restitution from the defendants for said services and materials.

The plaintiff’s claim of monetary damages is based on its position that it has not been reimbursed for the wiring of the pool at the home of the defendants. As will be discussed this work was separate and distinct from another agreement to provide a 200 amp connection to the home which has been paid for in full. The defendants deny the plaintiff’s claim regarding the rewiring of the pool and argue that the $13,200 sum they paid to the plaintiff included an understanding that the plaintiff would do the work on the pool.

The complaint then alleges by way of judgment money damages, statutory prejudgment interest up to 10% per Section 37-3a of the general statutes, costs, postjudgment interest up to 10%; and any other relief deemed appropriate.

The court will discuss the facts in more detail after it briefly tries to set forth the general law. The factual setting of the case and therefore the appropriate analysis is somewhat complicated because the work on the defendant’s home involved the completion of two separate tasks performed separately.

B

(i)

In 17 Am.Jur.2d, there is a lengthy article on " Contracts." Section 1 defines the concept in two ways " (1) a contract has been defined as an agreement to do or refrain from doing a particular thing upon sufficient consideration" (2) " A contract is an obligation which arises from- actual agreement of the parties manifested by words, oral or written, or by conduct. The term ‘contract’ has been held to include every description, agreement or obligation, whether verbal or written, by which one party becomes bound to another to pay a sum of money to perform or commit to do a certain thing." The section cites Willamette Management Associates, Inc. v. Palczynski, 134 Conn.App. 58, 72 (2012).

There are basically three types of contracts, an express contract, and implied contract which are true contracts and a so-called implied in law contract which is created by the courts to avoid unjust enrichment. In 17 Am.Jur.2d, " Contracts" at Section 12, page 48 it states: " A contract is express if its terms are stated by the parties either orally or in writing, and it is implied if its terms are not so stated. In other words, an implied contract is one in which some or all of the terms are inferred from the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case, though not expressed in words," cf. Vertex, Inc. v. Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 571 (2006), Auto Glass Express v. Hanover Ins. Co., 293 Conn. 218, 233 (fn.7). In Janusauskas v. Fichman, 264 Conn. 796, 804 (2003), the court quoted from an earlier case and said " Whether (a) contract is styled express or implied involves no difference in legal effect, but lies merely in the mode of manifesting assent ... A true implied (in fact) contract can only exist (however) where there is no express one" ; this reflects the general law, see 17 Am.Jur.2d " Contracts," at Section 17, pp. 52-53; as said in Section 17 which cited Janusauskas ... " if there is an express contract, no recovery can be had on the theory of implied contract ... However, implication may be necessary and proper to determine the full and exact meaning of an express or oral contract," id. at pp. 52-53. Janusauskas quotes an earlier case, Rahmati v. Mehri, 188 Conn. 583 (1982), where the court said: " It is not fatal to a finding of an implied contract that there were no express manifestations of mutual assent if the parties by their conduct, recognized the existence of contractual obligations," 188 Conn. at page 587, see also Coruveau v. Jenkins Brothers, 144 Conn. 383, 387 (1957). It should be emphasized that " a contract implied in fact, like an express contract, depends on actual agreement," Reynolds v. Chrysler First Commercial Corp., 40 Conn.App. 705, 730 (1996). In other words " the test is whether the conduct and acts of the parties show an agreement," Brighent v. New Britain Shert Corp., 167 Conn. 403, 406 (1974). Also it should be kept in mind that, for example: " If A telephones a plumber to come to A’s house to fix a broken pipe, it may be inferred that A has agreed to pay the plumber a reasonable fee for the plumber’s services although the parties did not talk about compensation. The contract is partly express and partly implied in fact," Calamari & Perillo On Contracts, 6th ed., § 1.8, page 19. In other words " to establish the existence of an implied in fact contract, the plaintiff must prove that it rendered services with the reasonable expectation that the defendant would pay for the services and that the defendant accepted those services in a manner that reasonably would lead the plaintiff to believe that the defendant intended to pay for the services," Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Proctor, 158 Conn.App. 248, 255-56 (2015). As said in Williston on Contracts 4th ed., Vol 1, Section 1.6 an implied contract in fact is said to arise from a " mutual agreement and intent to promise when the agreement and promise have simply not been expressed in words."

(ii)

The court will discuss the concept of unjust enrichment. In Levinson v. Lawrence, 162 Conn.App. 548 (2016) the court quoting from earlier cases said that " ‘Unjust enrichment is a legal doctrine to be applied when no remedy is available pursuant to a contract ...’ A right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable ... With no other test than what, under a given set of circumstances, is just or unjust, equitable or unequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, it becomes necessary in any case where the benefit of the doctrine is claimed, to examine the circumstances and the conduct of the parties and apply this standard," id. at page 558.

An older case, Monarch Accounting Supplies, Inc. v Prezioso, 170 Conn. 659, 665-66 (1976) was a case dealing with the retention of property but its reasoning applies to a situation where one has received services from another. The court said that: " The doctrine of unjust enrichment is based upon the principle that one should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another but should be required to make restitution of or for the property received, retained or appropriated ... It is not necessary, in order to create an obligation to make restitution or to compensate, that the party unjustly enriched should have been guilty of any tortuous or fraudulent act. The question is: Did he, to the detriment of someone else, obtain something of value to which he was not entitled."

Perhaps more simply put in 66 Am.Jur.2d, " Restitution and Implied Contracts" at Section 15, page 612 it says that: " To establish unjust enrichment the plaintiff must show that the defendant voluntarily accepted a benefit which would be inequitable to retain without payment. Otherwise stated, an essential prerequisite to unjust enrichment liability is the acceptance by the one sought to be charged of the benefits rendered under circumstances as are reasonable to notify them that the one performing the services expected to be compensated for them." Also at Section 10 of the Am.Jur. article it states that it is fundamental that for a person to be entitled to restitution, there must not only be unjust enrichment but also the person sought to be charged must have wrongfully secured a benefit, or passively received one which it would be unconscionable to retain.

Finally two points should be made. Unjust enrichment is, as noted, an equitable doctrine and as noted in Polverari v. Peatt Jr. et al., 29 Conn.App. 191, 200 (1992) " One who seeks to prove that he is entitled to the benefit of equity must first come before the court with clean hands, Cohen v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 193, 201 ... (1980); Sachs v. Sachs, ...