J.N.M., Matter of
Citation | 1982 OK 153,655 P.2d 1032 |
Decision Date | 14 December 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 51761,51761 |
Parties | In the Matter of J.N.M., S.T.M., female children under the age of eighteen (18) years; and W.J.M., a male child under the age of eighteen (18) years. |
Court | Supreme Court of Oklahoma |
An appeal from the District Court of Woodward County; Ray Don jackson, judge.
Appeal by natural parents of three children previously adjudicated deprived from judgment terminating their parental rights.
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
Jim Harkins, Holcomb, Holcomb & Harkins, Buffalo, for appellant Edmund C. Miller.
Michael W. Mitchel, Annis & Mitchel, Woodward, for appellant Deanna L. Miller.
L. Jack Barton, Dist. Atty., John F. Reichenberger, Asst. Dist. Atty., Woodward, for the State.
Appellants seek to have the order permanently terminating their parental rights to their three children, JNM, STM, and WJM, reversed and remanded. The appeal raises numerous issues regarding the constitutionality of 10 O.S.1981, § 1130; however, because we reverse on the ground of insufficient evidence, we do not need to reach the constitutional questions raised.
The essence of the chronology of events leading to the order terminating the appellant's parental rights is as follows: the District Court of Woodward County directed the Department of Institutions, Social and Rehabilitive Services [hereafter DISRS] 1 to conduct an investigation of the home conditions of the appellants, an emergency was found to exist and the court ordered the children placed in the temporary custody of DISRS. The sheriff of Woodward County filed a verified petition alleging in part that "the natural father ... and the natural mother ... are mentally incompetent and are both under treatment at this time for mental disorders and therefore, because of the mental incapabilities of both natural parents, the above three (3) children do not have the proper parental care or guardianship."
At the hearing on the petition the children were declared dependent and neglected, "for the reasons that they do not have the proper parental care or guardianship by reason of the fact that the natural father ... and the natural mother ... are mentally incompetent and are both under treatment at this time for mental disorders." [Journal Entry]
Ultimately the State of Oklahoma filed a verified motion to terminate parental rights "for the reason of the parents mental incapabilities that the children do not have the proper parental care or guardianship, and that the home of the aforesaid children is an unfit place for them to live." At the termination proceeding held two years after the children came to the court's attention, the court found (1) that the parents had not corrected the conditions that led to the adjudication of the children as dependent and neglected; (2) that the statutory period allowed for such corrections had expired; (3) that it was in the best interests of the children that the parental rights be terminated.
Appellant's major challenge to the order terminating parental rights is to the lower court's treatment of their mental illness as grounds for termination under 10 O.S.Supp.1977, § 1130. While conceding that their mental illness caused conditions that justified the court's placement of their children in temporary custody of DISRS, appellants urge that mental illness alone is not a ground for permanent termination of parental rights under § 1130.
The court's termination order was based on its reading of 10 O.S.Supp.1977, § 1130 2 to include mental illness as a ground for terminating parental rights, a reading which is arguably justified because of the lack of specificity in the termination statutes. 10 O.S.Supp.1977, § 1130, which is unchanged in 10 O.S.1981, § 1130, authorizes termination of parental rights under the following findings relevant to this action:
A deprived child is defined in 10 O.S.Supp.1977, § 1101(d):
Our statute does not provide for the situation of mentally ill parents. Even allowing a broad and flexible reading of the statutory language, we agree with appellants that the parents' mental illness alone is not a ground for permanent termination of parental rights under our statute. Were it construed as such, the statute would be unable to withstand a constitutional attack on the basis of vagueness. 3 It would make the discretion vested in judges so broad that arbitrary and discriminatory parental terminations would be inevitable.
It is a great misfortune that our termination of parental rights statute does not explicitly address itself to the situation of mentally ill parents. The legislatures of other states have included detailed provisions in their termination statutes. See discussions of such statutes in Matter of Swartzfager, 290 Or. 799, 626 P.2d 882 (1981); In Interest of DLH., 198 Neb. 444, 253 N.W.2d 283 (1977); In re David B., 91 Cal.App.3d 184, 154 Cal.Rptr. 63 (1979). 4
Evidence of the existence of mental illness, without more, is inadequate to order a permanent termination of parental rights. As we stated in Matter of Sherol, Okl., 581 P.2d 884 (1979):
This standard has not been met by the evidence presented by the state. 5 The mental illness of the two parents was not explained in other than a perfunctory manner; the significance of the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenic was never examined; the effect of the parents' illnesses on the emotional and physical wellbeing of the children was never explained in any detail; no evidence as to a prognosis was offered nor was any evidence of the likelihood of successful treatment. The trial court was given no evidence as to whether these parents were likely to be mentally ill for their entire lives or if some treatment offered the probability of only short term incapacity. In short, the mere label of mental illness was allowed to replace an adequate investigation into the effect of the behavior of these particular parents on these particular children, 6 and the length of time these parents would probably be incapacitated. The fundamental nature of parental rights to their children demands that attention be shifted from attaching a label to the parent to a showing of how that condition affects the fitness of the parent, the manner in which the condition is detrimental to the child, 7 and the likelihood of correction or control of the condition so...
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