J.T. Hinton & Son v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp.
| Decision Date | 24 June 1933 |
| Citation | 62 S.W.2d 47,166 Tenn. 324 |
| Parties | J. T. HINTON & SON v. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, Limited. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Certiorari to Court of Appeals.
Suit by J. T. Hinton & Son against the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited. Judgment for complainants and defendant brings certiorari.
Reversed and suit dismissed.
Gilliland & Gilliland, of Memphis, for plaintiff in error.
Metcalf Metcalf & Apperson, of Memphis, for defendants in error.
J. T Hinton & Son, complainants, operate an automobile ambulance, in connection with an undertaking business. In response to a call, their ambulance was sent to the home of Mrs. Belle Hall, in the city of Memphis, for the purpose of conveying her to a local hospital. A stretcher, with which the ambulance was equipped, was carried into the house, and Mrs. Hall was carried thereon from her bed to the ambulance by the ambulance driver and his assistant, servants of complainants. One of the stretcher bearers slipped on a muddy terrace and fell to his knees, as they were approaching the ambulance, but before they had reached it, and the stretcher dropped about 6 inches. There was no immediate complaint of resulting injury, but subsequently Mrs. Hall suffered a miscarriage, which she attributed to a jolting she received when the stretcher bearer slipped and fell. Suits for damages were filed by Mrs. Hall and her husband, in the aggregate sum of $45,000. In these suits the plaintiffs claimed that the stretcher was permitted to strike the ground violently. The suits were successfully defended by complainants and their attorneys, whom they employed and paid.
Complainants sue to recover the expenses of defending said suits, $1,587, under a contract of automobile liability insurance, issued on their ambulance by the defendant corporation. The contract obligated the insurer to defend any suits alleging injuries covered by the contract, notwithstanding such suits might be "wholly groundless."
The chancellor and Court of Appeals have concurred in holding the complainants entitled to recover, and the cause is before us by certiorari heretofore granted on the petition of the insurer. Assignments of error present only two grounds for reversal: (1) That the contract of insurance does not cover the accident by which Mrs. Hall claimed to have been injured; and (2) that the fee of $1,500 paid by complainants to their attorneys for successfully defending the two damage suits was unreasonably large.
The contract of insurance consists of a printed form, with written additions and alterations. The principal clause provides that it covers bodily injuries accidentally sustained by any person or persons, "as the result of the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use" of the described automobile.
The contract described and identified the automobile insured as a "Cunningham Ambulance"; and a rider attached to the contract canceled the stipulations and agreements of the printed form which would have rendered the insurance inoperative while the automobile was being used "for renting or livery use or the carrying of passengers for a consideration." This cancellation was made "in consideration of the premium for which this policy is written."
The question we have for determination is whether the accidental injury claimed to have been inflicted by the driver or his assistant, of the insured automobile ambulance, upon a person being carried upon a stretcher for the purpose of becoming a passenger for hire in the ambulance, was an injury sustained as the result of the operation or use of the ambulance, within the purview and application of the insurance contract.
The contract contains no words expressly limiting the scope or application of the phrase "resulting from the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use" of the described automobile; and this general and broad language must be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the nature of the risk involved, with due regard to the objects and intentions of the parties as the same may be gathered from the whole instrument. 1 Couch, Cyc. of Insurance Law, § 174.
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...from an automobile. See Elliott v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 140 S.E.2d 524 (Ga. App. 1965); J.T. Hinton & Son v. Employer’s Liab. Assur. Corp., 62 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. 1933). In Hinton & Son, the court held that injuries sustained by a person while being carried on a stretcher did not arise out of t......
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...be "unloaded" from an automobile. (See Elliott v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 111 Ga. App. 49; Hinton & Son v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 166 Tenn. 324.) In Hinton & Son, the court held that injuries sustained by a person while being carried on a stretcher did not arise out of the "loading" ......