J.A. v. Tex. Educ. Agency
| Decision Date | 21 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-CV-921-RP |
| Parties | J.A. B/N/F ALREDO ALVAREZ and on behalf of other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court are Texas Education Agency's ("TEA") First Amended Motion to Dismiss, filed December 18, 2019 (Dkt. 18); Plaintiffs' Response, filed January 2, 2020 (Dkt. 22); and TEA's Reply, filed January 9, 2020 (Dkt. 24). On May 15, 2020, the District Court referred the motion to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1(d) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. ("IDEA"), offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment to furnish a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") to all children with certain physical or intellectual disabilities. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 748 (2017). As defined in the act, a FAPE comprises "special education and related services"—both "instruction" tailored to meet a child's "unique needs" and sufficient "supportive services" to permit the child to benefit from that instruction. Id. An eligible child acquires a "substantive right" to such an education once a State accepts the IDEA's financial assistance. Id. Under the IDEA, an "individualized education program" ("IEP") serves as the primary vehicle for providing each child with the promised FAPE and spells out a personalized plan to meet all of the child's educational needs. Id.
Because parents and school representatives sometimes cannot agree on the FAPE, the IDEA establishes formal procedures for resolving disputes. Parents are given the authority to enforce their child's IDEA rights, but that authority transfers to the child when he or she turns 18 years old. See § 1415(m)(1)(B). To begin the process, a parent, or a child who has turned 18, may file a complaint as to any matter concerning the provision of a FAPE with the local or state educational agency, as state law provides. See § 1415(b)(6). That pleading generally triggers a "[p]reliminary meeting" involving the contending parties, id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i); or the parties may choose to pursue a full-fledged mediation process. Id. § 1415(e). The matter then proceeds to a "due process hearing" before an impartial hearing officer. Id. §§ 1415(f)(1)(A), 1415(f)(3)(A)(i). Any decision of the officer granting substantive relief must be based on a determination as to whether the child received a FAPE. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). If the hearing is initially conducted at the local level, the ruling is appealable to the state agency. Id. § 1415(g). A parent unhappy with the outcome of the administrative process may seek judicial review by filing a civil action in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
Although a child's rights flow from the federal statute, states are given authority to set up the enforcement procedures for achieving the IDEA's goals. Id. § 1415(a). In Texas, the legislature has mandated that TEA "develop, and modify as necessary, a statewide design, consistent with federal law, for the delivery of services to children with disabilities in this state." TEX. EDUC. CODEANN. § 29.001. The statewide design must include "rules for the administration and funding of the special education program so that a free appropriate public education is available to all of those children between the ages of three and 21." Id. TEA has developed such a design, which it implements through a set of detailed rules. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 89.61-89.1191.
J.A. is a student in the Corpus Christi Independent School District ("CCISD") who has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), learning disabilities, fetal alcohol syndrome, and significant cognitive impairments. J.A.'s impairments made him eligible to receive special education services under the IDEA. J.A.'s IEP permitted his father, Alfredo Alvarez, to make decisions on J.A.'s behalf and participate in his regularly scheduled Admission, Review & Dismissal ("ARD") Committee Meetings, even after J.A. turned 18 years old.
J.A. was born on November 28, 2000. On May 14, 2019, when he was 18 years old, Alvarez filed a request for a due process hearing with TEA, arguing that CCISD had failed to provide J.A. with a FAPE as required under the IDEA. Alvarez also requested that TEA hearing officer appoint him as J.A.'s next friend under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 44.
CCISD filed a motion to dismiss the due process proceeding, arguing that Alvarez did not have the legal authority or standing to prosecute the action because J.A. had turned 18 and only he had the authority to bring such an action. The hearing officer agreed with CCISD and dismissed the proceeding for lack of standing. The hearing officer also denied Alvarez's request to appoint him as J.A.'s next friend. Alvarez did not file an administrative appeal of the hearing officer's decision.1
On September 19, 2019, J.A. and Alvarez ("Plaintiffs") filed this action on behalf of J.A.2 and a proposed unnamed class of similarly situated individuals. Plaintiffs allege that TEA3 has discriminated against J.A. and the proposed class because of their disabilities, in violation of the IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Plaintiffs also assert constitutional claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, in their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that TEA has not developed a program or process to represent the legal needs of students like J.A. "who have turned 18 years old and do not have the mental capacity to make their own decisions or provide informed consent or complete a viable power of attorney or participate in a Due Process Hearing at all." Dkt. 17 ¶ 3. Plaintiffs complain that TEA has never implemented or developed a policy or directive "whereby such a cognitively impaired young adult could have someone represent them to assure they continue to receive FAPE and the ability to implement and enforce the procedural safeguards, even after their 18th birthday." Id. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.
TEA brings its motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). TEA argues that this case should be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction, lack of standing, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and failure to state a claim.
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may exercise only such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred by the Constitution and federal statutes. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over civil cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," and over civil cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and in which diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to assert lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a defense to suit. A federal court properly dismisses a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when it lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). "The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). "Ultimately, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief." Id. In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court may consider: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint plus undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint, undisputed facts, and the court's resolution of disputed facts. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008).
Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, and it is properly raised by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). See Mollis v. Lynch, 121 F. Supp. 3d 617, 626 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (noting that "whether a party has proper standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction" (citing Cobb v. Cent. States, 461 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2006)). The requirement of standing has three elements: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997). The injury cannot be merely "conjectural or hypothetical." Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). Causation requires that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant" rather than to "the independent action of some third partynot before the court." Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). Redressability requires that it is likely, "as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'" Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court "accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant]." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.,...
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