J.W. v. State

• Decision Date: 09 January 2019
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 19S-JV-12
• Citation: 113 N.E.3d 1202
• Parties: J.W., Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

113 N.E.3d 1202

J.W., Appellant (Defendant),

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Supreme Court Case No. 19S-JV-12

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: April 20, 2018

Decided: January 9, 2019

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Cara Schaefer Wieneke, Wieneke Law Office, LLC, Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, J.T. Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 33A04-1708-JV-1934

Slaughter, Justice.

We held in Tumulty v. State , 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996), that an adult criminal defendant cannot challenge the validity of his guilty plea on direct appeal. He must, instead, pursue post-conviction relief and raise in that proceeding any claims of error concerning his plea.

At issue here is whether to extend Tumulty to the juvenile-law counterpart to a criminal plea—namely, an agreed delinquency adjudication. We hold that juveniles cannot immediately challenge on direct appeal any errors concerning their agreed adjudication. But because juveniles are not eligible for post-conviction relief, before pursuing their constitutional right to appeal, they must first assert any claims of error concerning their agreed judgment in a request for post-judgment relief filed with the juvenile court. Juveniles who seek that relief in post-judgment proceedings have a statutory right to counsel under Indiana Code article 31-32.

Factual and Procedural History

J.W., a juvenile, has a significant history with the juvenile-justice system dating to his early teens. In 2013, J.W. was adjudicated a delinquent at age 13 for committing criminal mischief, a class B felony if committed by an adult. While on probation, he assaulted a student at school and possessed weapons on several occasions. He was placed in foster care but then was relocated to secure detention because he stole from his foster family, ingested rubbing alcohol to become intoxicated, and possessed a handgun. Undeterred, he continued with various criminal behaviors until his probation was terminated in 2015 and he was placed with the Department of Correction. In 2017, he was released from the Department and reportedly moved back into his parents' home. But just a week later, he fled and was reported as a runaway.

In July 2017, the New Castle Police Department responded to a 911 call that a young man was threatening suicide. When police arrived, J.W. was running through a mobile-home park and heeded the officer's command to surrender. After he was detained, J.W. identified himself to police as his older brother M.W. and stated falsely that his birthdate was October 4, 1998, which would have made him 18 years old. The responding officer also spoke with J.W.'s girlfriend, who had called 911. She explained that J.W. became upset after she asked him to leave. He started punching himself in the face and chin, grabbed a kitchen knife, put it to his throat, and threatened suicide. Because of J.W.'s self-inflicted injuries and his suicide threat, the officer called for paramedics to administer treatment and to transport J.W. to the local hospital emergency room.

After J.W. was admitted to the hospital under the name of M.W., hospital staff received a phone call from a person identifying herself as J.W.'s sister. The nurses on duty told the caller they had no patient by that name, but later learned that J.W. was a juvenile and had provided the wrong name. Once medical staff learned that J.W. was not his 18-year old brother, they contacted J.W.'s parents to obtain consent to treat him. The parents consented and spoke with the officer when they got to the hospital. Upon learning of J.W.'s real age and identity, the officer contacted a Henry County probation officer who had previously encountered J.W. in the juvenile system. The police officer also arrested J.W. as a juvenile runaway and for false informing.

Both the police and probation officers testified at J.W.'s detention hearing in July 2017. The probation officer recommended that J.W. remain in secure detention, based on his failure to benefit from less restrictive services. The court adopted the recommendation and continued J.W.'s placement in secure detention. The following day, the court issued an order finding probable cause that J.W. was delinquent and that detention was "essential to protect the child or the community".

In August 2017, the court held an initial hearing that J.W., his counsel, and his mother attended. Counsel advised that the State and J.W. had agreed to settle the case and represented that J.W. would admit to Count 1, class B misdemeanor false informing if committed by an adult, Ind. Code §§ 35-44.l-2-3(d)(1), 31-37-1-2, in exchange for the State's dismissing Count 2, leaving home without the permission of a parent, guardian, or custodian, id. §§ 31-37-1-2, 31-37-2-2. Counsel also advised that J.W. would waive a pre-dispositional report and would accept placement in the Department of Correction.

During his colloquy with the court, J.W. admitted to providing a false name and birthdate at the hospital. The trial court accepted J.W.'s admission as made freely and voluntarily, found a factual basis for accepting the admission on Count 1, and the State, consistent with the parties' agreement, moved to dismiss Count 2. Because J.W. waived a pre-dispositional report, the court proceeded to disposition and ordered J.W. committed to the Department.

Despite the parties' consent judgment, entered in accordance with their settlement, J.W. appealed, arguing that his agreed delinquency judgment should be set aside for four reasons. First , he said, the court did not provide him with the statutory advisement of rights required by Indiana Code section 31-37-12-5 ; did not determine whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights; and did not provide him and his parents with the required opportunity to be heard during the proceedings. Second , the facts he admitted to during his colloquy do not constitute an offense. Third , the trial court abused its discretion in committing him to the Department of Correction without determining that he knowingly and intentionally entered into the agreed judgment and without providing him with an opportunity to be heard. Fourth , his counsel was ineffective for all the reasons outlined in the first three arguments.

Following its own precedent, the court of appeals dismissed J.W.'s appeal, concluding that "the appropriate remedy for relief that a juvenile defendant must seek is through the filing of a Trial Rule 60 motion". J.W. v. State , 95 N.E.3d 208, 2017 WL 6273184, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting favorably from J.H. v. State , 809 N.E.2d 456, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). And the court remanded the case to the trial court to allow J.W. to file a motion for relief from the judgment adjudicating him a delinquent.

Standard of Review

The procedural path a party must pursue to obtain appellate review is a legal question we review de novo.

Discussion and Decision

Trial Rule 60(B) respects the presumptive finality of a juvenile's agreed delinquency judgment while providing an efficient mechanism for an aggrieved party to vindicate claims that his adverse judgment was obtained unlawfully.

A. Our legal system respects litigants' ability to settle cases and supports the finality of agreed judgments.

Indiana's judicial policy strongly favors agreements to settle litigation disputes. Georgos v. Jackson , 790 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. 2003). Our judicial system counts on such settlements to occur in the lion's share of both civil and criminal cases. Otherwise, with more than a million cases filed in our trial courts each year, the system would grind to a halt.

For example, parties to civil suits may enter a consent judgment, thus contractually settling a dispute over any matter that may be the subject of litigation. State v. Huebner , 230 Ind. 461, 467, 104 N.E.2d 385, 387 (1952). After a court enters an agreed civil judgment, it cannot modify the judgment. Ryan v. Ryan , 972 N.E.2d 359, 362 (Ind. 2012). Once entered by a trial court, a consent judgment has the same "dignity" and "conclusiveness" as an "adjudication between the parties". Huebner , 230 Ind. at 468, 104 N.E.2d at 388. And if a party fails to perform its obligations under a consent judgment, the aggrieved party may obtain a decree enforcing the judgment from the court that approved it. Fackler v. Powell , 839 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Ind. 2005) (explaining that absent parties' contrary agreement, court accepting divorce property settlement as part of dissolution decree retains jurisdiction to interpret and enforce settlement's terms).

In criminal cases, the same principles apply to encourage parties to enter into—and for courts to enforce violations of—plea agreements. A plea agreement is a contract, and its terms are binding on the defendant, the State, and the trial court. Pannarale v. State , 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994). See also I.C. § 35-35-3-3(e). Choices have consequences. And as we held in Tumulty , one consequence of a defendant's choice to plead guilty and allow judgment to be entered against him is that he is foreclosed from challenging his conviction on direct appeal.

[A criminal] plea as a legal act brings to a close the dispute between the parties, much as settling civil parties do by submitting an agreed judgment. To permit appeal by settling parties would, of course, make settlements difficult to achieve in any litigation.

Tumulty , 666 N.E.2d at 396.

What we have said about agreed dispositions in the civil and criminal sphere is no less true of such dispositions in juvenile cases—which are, after all, civil proceedings. Bible v. State , 253 Ind. 373, 381, 254 N.E.2d 319, 322 (1970). The same concerns of finality and freedom of the parties to settle their disputes counsel in favor of encouraging and enforcing juvenile agreements, too—including the delinquency agreement at issue here. As with...