T.D. v. State
| Decision Date | 31 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-JV-1016 |
| Citation | 198 N.E.3d 1197 |
| Parties | T.D., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorneys for Appellant: Amy E. Karozos, Public Defender of Indiana, Mark S. Koselke, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General, Evan Matthew Comer, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] T.D. admitted committing acts constituting Level 6 felony auto theft if committed by an adult, and the trial court found him to be a delinquent child and committed him to the Indiana Department of Correction. About a year later, T.D. filed an Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion to set aside, arguing his delinquency adjudication was void because the trial court accepted his admission without ensuring that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his statutory and constitutional rights as required by the juvenile waiver statute, Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1. The court denied the motion. Because the record shows that the court did not ensure that T.D. knowingly and voluntarily waived his statutory and constitutional rights when he admitted to auto theft, we find that his delinquency adjudication is void and should be set aside. We therefore reverse the trial court.
[2] In June 2020, the State filed a petition alleging T.D. was a delinquent child for committing acts constituting Level 6 felony auto theft and Class A misdemeanor theft if committed by an adult. T.D. was detained, and his attorney moved for his release. In the motion, T.D.’s attorney stated that he had spoken to T.D., who reported that he had "viewed [a] video on his rights" and had "no questions" about them. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28. The attorney also stated that he had informed T.D.’s mother of "her son's rights" and she had "no questions" about them. Id. The trial court denied T.D.’s motion for release. In the order, the court found that T.D. "has been advised of his rights, understands his rights, and has no questions regarding his rights." Id. at 30. The court also found that T.D.’s attorney had advised T.D.’s mother of "her rights" and she had "no questions" about them. Id.
[3] A virtual initial hearing was held on July 2. T.D.’s mother did not attend because her employer "would not allow her to join the hearing virtually." Id. at 37. A week later, on July 9, the trial court held an omnibus hearing, which T.D.’s mother attended. At the hearing, T.D.’s attorney told the trial court that T.D. and the State had reached an oral agreement1 under which T.D. would admit to the auto-theft allegation in exchange for the dismissal of the theft allegation and disposition would be left to the discretion of the court. The court then engaged in the following colloquy with T.D. and his mother:
Id. at 60. The court then asked T.D. about the offense, and he admitted that he "took the car" without permission. Id. The court did not discuss T.D.’s rights, reference a video, or explain that T.D. was waiving his rights by admitting to auto theft.
[4] Following the hearing, the trial court adjudicated T.D. a delinquent child. In its order, the court found that T.D. and his mother "understand the admission waives those rights explained in the video." Id. at 39. The court placed T.D. under the wardship of the DOC.
[5] A little over a year later, in September 2021, T.D. filed a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6).2 T.D. alleged that his admission "was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary" because the trial court "made no mention or inquiries into the rights that T.D. was waiving." Id. at 48, 49. In support of his claim, T.D. attached the transcript from the omnibus hearing. The State did not submit any evidence.
[6] The trial court denied T.D.’s motion:
The Court finds that the juvenile was represented by counsel at the detention hearing, and at the initial hearing, and all subsequent hearings including the hearing where the plea agreement was presented and disposition was argued. The juvenile was presented with a video that goes over his rights several times before each court hearing. The juvenile was represented by counsel at each hearing.... The Court finds that the juvenile's admission was voluntary and knowingly given with the adequate assistance of counsel.
[7] T.D. now appeals.
[8] T.D. contends the trial court erred in denying his Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. We first note that because a delinquency adjudication is civil in nature, post-conviction procedures are unavailable. A.S. v. State , 923 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh'g denied. According to our Supreme Court, Trial Rule 60 is the "appropriate avenue" through which a juvenile must assert any claims of error related to an agreed delinquency adjudication (which is the juvenile-law counterpart to an adult defendant's guilty plea). J.W. v. State , 113 N.E.3d 1202, 1204, 1207-08 (Ind. 2019).
[9] Here, T.D. relies on Trial Rule 60(B)(6). Under Rule 60(B)(6), a trial court may relieve a party from a judgment if "the judgment is void." To prevail, the party must prove that the judgment is void, not voidable. Koonce v. Finney , 68 N.E.3d 1086, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. "A void judgment is one that, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect." Stidham v. Whelchel , 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ind. 1998) (quotation omitted). Id. (quotation omitted). "A Rule 60(B) motion alleging a judgment is void requires no discretion by the trial court because the judgment is void or valid and, thus, our review is de novo." Chapo v. Jefferson Cnty. Plan Comm'n , 164 N.E.3d 131, 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), reh'g denied , trans. denied.
[10] T.D. argues his agreed delinquency adjudication is void and should be set aside because the trial court accepted his admission "without inquiring as to whether [he] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his statutory and constitutional rights" as required by the juvenile waiver statute, Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1.3 Appellant's Br. p. 17.
[11] Juveniles are entitled to many rights, both statutory and constitutional. According to Indiana Code section 31-37-12-5, trial courts must inform juveniles and their parents, guardians, or custodians (if present) that they have the following rights:
See also Ind. Code §§ 31-32-2-1, -2. These rights spring from the United States Constitution and are guaranteed to juveniles. See In re K.G. , 808 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. 2004) (); see also A.M. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 361 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied ; In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), abrogated on other grounds.
[12] The juvenile waiver statute provides "only" three ways to waive rights that state or federal law grants to juveniles—waiver by counsel; waiver by a parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem; or waiver by the juvenile:
[13] Under all three options, the juvenile's waiver must be knowing and voluntary. Juvenile admissions are equivalent to adult pleas of guilty. When an adult defendant pleads guilty, the record "must demonstrate that the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived them." Ponce v. State , 9 N.E.3d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2014) (quotation omitted). Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), "requires that a trial court accepting a guilty plea must be satisfied that an accused is aware of his right against self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers." Dewitt v. State , 755 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Ind...
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