Jaar v. University of Miami

Decision Date12 February 1985
Docket NumberNo. 83-485,83-485
Citation474 So.2d 239,10 Fla. L. Weekly 2128
Parties27 Ed. Law Rep. 422, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2128 Miguel JAAR and George Jaar, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Salim Jaar, Deceased; Paola Jaar, a minor; Roberto Jaar, a minor; and Marcos Jaar, a minor, by and through their guardians and next friends, Miguel Jaar and George Jaar, Appellants, v. The UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, C. Gillon Ward, M.D., Alejandro Soler, M.D., Craig Lovett, M.D., Scott McFarland, M.D., Public Health Trust of Dade County d/b/a Jackson Memorial Hospital, Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Daniels & Hicks and Mark Hicks, George, Hartz, Burt & Lundeen, for appellants.

Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Strickroot and Henry Burnett, Thompson, Parenti & Falk and Michael Parenti, Miami, for appellees.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.

BASKIN, Judge.

The estate and children of Salim Jaar [Jaar] appeal judgments entered in favor of the University of Miami [University], a doctor on its medical school faculty, and three residents at Jackson Memorial Hospital, absolving them of liability for negligent medical care administered to Jaar at the hospital. In addition, appellants contest the application of sovereign immunity, limiting the amount recoverable from the Public Jaar was admitted to the hospital's burn unit as a private, paying patient for treatment of burns on his hands and toes. Dr. C. Gillon Ward was the attending physician in charge of Jaar's care. Jaar suffered the burns as a result of a fire at his home in Haiti. One of Jaar's children died in the fire, and Jaar's wife died while undergoing treatment for injuries sustained during the fire. Because Jaar's surviving children were receiving treatment for severe burns at the hospital, and Jaar wished to be with them, he was admitted to the hospital for treatment of his relatively minor burns. On a Sunday morning, three medical residents decided to remove the dead skin from Jaar's hands; neither Dr. Ward nor an anesthesiologist was present. Unfortunately, the residents administered an excess amount of anesthetic and, after lingering in a coma, Jaar died.

Health Trust of Dade County d/b/a Jackson Memorial Hospital [the Trust] and totally relieving the doctors of liability. Upon review of the record, we hold that the University is liable for the negligent medical care administered by the residents under the supervision of the doctor, a University employee working at the hospital pursuant to a contract between the University and the Trust. We find no error in the application of the sovereign immunity statutes.

The personal representatives of Jaar's estate and his children filed an action to recover for Jaar's wrongful death. They sued the Trust, Dr. Ward, the three residents who administered the anesthetic, and the University. They included the University in the action because Dr. Ward was a member of its medical school faculty and worked at the hospital pursuant to a contract between the University and the Trust. Pursuant to the contract, Dr. Ward treated patients, served as head of the hospital burn unit, and supervised residents. In response to the complaint, the Trust admitted that Dr. Ward and the three residents he supervised were its employees or agents and were acting within the scope of their employment or agency at the time of the incident. The hospital, Dr. Ward, and the residents admitted that Jaar received negligent care.

At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the three residents on the ground that as employees or agents of the Trust, they were afforded immunity under section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980). The trial court submitted for jury determination interrogatories questioning whether Dr. Ward and the residents were also acting as employees or agents of the University. The jury found that Dr. Ward and the three residents were not employees or agents of the University when they treated Jaar, and pursuant to the verdict, the trial court entered judgments in favor of Dr. Ward and the University. The jury also returned a verdict of $2,000,000 against the Trust. The trial court limited appellants' recovery from the Trust to the $100,000 maximum permitted under the applicable sovereign immunity statute, section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes (1979). 1 Having determined that Dr. Ward and the residents were not employees or agents of the University, the jury, in accordance with the court's instructions, did not reach the question whether the University was an agent of the Trust and thus entitled to sovereign immunity protections.

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury questions pertaining to the agency or employment relationships of the doctors, the University, and the hospital. They claim that they are entitled to a directed verdict against the University, arguing that, as a matter of law, the doctors were acting within the scope of their employment with the University at the time of the incident. In addition, they challenge the sovereign immunity protections afforded Dr. Ward and the residents. We address these issues in turn.

As to the first point, we find merit in appellants' argument that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the issue of Dr. Ward's relationship to the University at the time of the incident. Our review of the record and applicable case law reveals, as a matter of law, that Dr. Ward was an employee or agent of the University, working within the scope of that employment or agency relationship at the time of the incident.

The existence and scope of an agency relationship are generally questions of fact to be resolved by the factfinder, Dade County Police Benevolent Association v. City of Homestead, 444 So.2d 465, 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), unless the evidence is susceptible of only one interpretation. Amerven, Inc. v. Abbadie, 238 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). See Eberhardy v. General Motors Corp., 404 F.Supp. 826 (M.D.Fla.1975). However, the evaluation of employment contracts and employment status is a question of law to be resolved by the trial court. Sosa v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 435 So.2d 821 (Fla.1983) (news carrier who had employment contract with newspaper and was killed in accident while soliciting subscriptions as part of subscription contest was, as matter of law, employee of paper working within scope of employment at time of accident); Phillips v. Unicare Amelia Island, 458 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (plaintiff injured on employer's premises when she returned, several days after resigning, to pick up paycheck was, as matter of law, employee on date of accident).

Furthermore, the construction of a written document, such as the contract before us, presents a question of law, Peacock Construction Co. v. Modern Air Conditioning, 353 So.2d 840, 842 (Fla.1977); Quayside Associates v. Harbour Club Villas Condominium Association, 419 So.2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), if its language is clear and unambiguous. Friedman v. Virginia Metal Products Corp., 56 So.2d 515, 516 (Fla.1952); Reliance Insurance Co. v. Brickenkamp, 147 So.2d 200, 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). The existence of a clear and unambiguous contract is the best evidence of the intent of the parties, and its meaning and legal effect are questions of law for determination by the court. Innkeepers International v. McCoy Motels, 324 So.2d 676, 678 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 336 So.2d 106 (Fla.1976).

The contracts between Dr. Ward and the University and between the University and the Trust set forth the duties and obligations of the parties and define their legal relationships. Dr. Ward is employed by the University as a full-time medical faculty member. 2 The University assigned Dr. Ward to head the hospital's burn unit pursuant to the terms of contracts between the University and the Trust. 3 The contracts require the University to provide medical care to hospital patients and to supervise residents in their treatment of patients. 4 The University assumes additional responsibility in the treatment and care of fee paying patients. 5 The indemnification clause contained in the contract provides Trust indemnification of the University for claims arising out of the treatment of non-paying patients. 6 Conversely, the indemnification clause establishes the parties' intent to delegate sole responsibility to the University for the care of paying patients, such as Jaar.

Based upon our review of the clear and unambiguous language contained in the contract and its apparent objectives, we conclude, as a matter of law, that Dr. Ward served as an employee and agent of the University. 7 See J & S Coin Operated Machines v. Gottlieb, 362 So.2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). There is no question that at the time the tragic incident occurred, Dr. Ward was acting in accordance with the duties he assumed under the express and intertwining terms of his contracts with the University and the University's contracts with the Trust. Dr. Ward's care of Jaar and his supervision of the residents constituted the type of conduct both he and the University were obligated to perform. Thus, the University is liable for the negligent acts of its agent, Dr. Ward, see Weiss v. Jacobson, 62 So.2d 904 (Fla.1953); Stinson v. Prevatt, 84 Fla. 416, 94 So. 656 (Fla.1922); Weiss v. Culpepper, 281 So.2d 372 (Fla.3d DCA 1973), cert. denied, 290 So.2d 62 (Fla.1974), and appellants are entitled to a directed verdict against the University as a matter of law.

There is additional support for our holding that the University is liable for Dr. Ward's negligence. An employer may not escape liability by delegating performance of its contractual duties to its employees or to an independent contractor. Irving v. Doctors Hospital of Lake Worth, 415 So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 422 So.2d 842 (Fla.1982) (where emergency room physician negligently...

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