Jaber v. Wayne State Univ. Bd. of Governors

• Decision Date: 07 March 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 09–11610.
• Citation: 788 F.Supp.2d 572,272 Ed. Law Rep. 437
• Parties: Hanna JABER, Plaintiff,v.WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF GOVERNORS, and Dr. Paula C. Wood, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

788 F.Supp.2d 572

272 Ed. Law Rep. 437

Hanna JABER, Plaintiff,

v.WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF GOVERNORS, and Dr. Paula C. Wood, Defendants.

Case No. 09–11610.

United States District Court,E.D. Michigan,Southern Division.

March 7, 2011.

Felicia R. Duncan, I.A.B. Attorneys at Law, Dearborn, MI, for Plaintiff.Amy L. Stirling, Wayne State University, Office of the General Counsel, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VICTORIA A. ROBERTS, District Judge.I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff, Hanna Jaber, alleges Defendants Wayne State University (“WSU”), WSU Board of Governors (“Board”), and WSU's College of Education Dean Paula C. Wood, violated her Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights by revoking her doctoral degree in education after Dean Wood concluded she plagiarized a substantial portion of her dissertation. Defendants contend that the procedures used to sustain the charges against Plaintiff, and to revoke her degree, were constitutionally adequate.

Oral argument was heard on March 2, 2011.

The Court finds that the process afforded Plaintiff was sufficient to meet the minimal requirements of procedural due process. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The Complaint, along with the parties' motions and exhibits attached, sets forth the relevant facts. In April 2008, Plaintiff completed her doctoral dissertation. In June 2008, she orally defended her dissertation and was awarded a degree of Doctor of Education in August 2008. In November 2008, Assistant Dean for Teacher Education in the College of Education, R. Craig Roney, notified Plaintiff that she was accused of plagiarizing her dissertation. Plaintiff had been brought up on academic misconduct charges once before; in 2008 she admitted to, and was found guilty of, falsifying a test score, after undergoing a formal hearing pursuant to Section 15 of WSU's Student Code of Conduct (“Student Code”).

Dean Roney's notice came after he conducted a three-week investigation which was prompted by Professor Stephen Hillman, who was on the Hearing Committee for Plaintiff's test score falsification charge. Professor Hillman suspected that Plaintiff plagiarized her dissertation. Dean Roney used two plagiarism detection software programs to assist in deciding whether Jaber should be formally charged with plagiarism. During Dean Roney's investigation, he found numerous instances of plagiarism, as well as several instances of appropriate citation format, indicating to him that Plaintiff knew how to correctly cite work of other authors.

Plaintiff was formally charged with a violation of Section 4.1 of the Student Code, which prohibits all forms of academic misconduct, including plagiarism. Pursuant to the Student Code, when a student is charged with academic misconduct, the Student Conduct Officer must initiate a fact-finding investigation which includes a fact-finding conference with the student charged with violating the school's rules. (Doc. # 52, Ex. 6 at 12). Officer Earnest sent Plaintiff a letter informing her of the pending charges and that if found guilty, the Dean of the College of Education could impose “the full range of sanctions available to her.” The letter did not list any specific sanctions.

Officer Earnest held a fact-finding conference on December 3, 2008. Plaintiff contends that this conference was constitutionally deficient because Mr. Earnest did not contact Plaintiff's academic advisor or the members of her doctoral committee. After Officer Earnest concluded that further action was warranted, Dean Wood sent Plaintiff a letter giving her the option to participate in an informal disciplinary conference with the Dean, or a formal hearing, pursuant to Sections 14 or 15 of the Student Code. Dean Wood also sent Plaintiff a copy of the Student Code. The letter informed her that if she chose the informal conference with Dean Wood, the full range of sanctions authorized by the Student Code would apply, and that she would lose her right to an appeal.

Plaintiff says she elected the informal procedure “at the recommendation of Mr. Earnest and the staff at the Ombudsperson's Office.” (Doc. # 41, Second Amended Complaint at 3). She admits she was told a potential sanction, if the charges were sustained, was revocation of her degree. However, she argues WSU officials led her to believe it would not impose this sanction.

Dean Wood held an informal conference with Jaber on February 19, 2009. Jaber says the meeting lasted less than one hour. During the conference Jaber presented evidence against the plagiarism charges, including letters from her dissertation committee members and a power point presentation. Dean Wood made written findings. She discounted the incorrect citations Plaintiff contested during the conference, and only took the remaining instances of plagiarism into account. Dean Wood sustained the plagiarism charges and notified Plaintiff, in March 2009, that she would revoke Jaber's doctoral degree. Dean Wood did not meet with the Defendant Board to discuss her conclusion or proposed sanction.

Plaintiff alleges that the degree revocation process violated her procedural due process rights because she had a constitutionally protected property interest in her degree, and Defendants (1) did not conduct the appropriate investigation into the plagiarism charges; (2) revoked her degree after holding an informal disciplinary conference rather than a formal hearing; (3) failed to contact Jaber's dissertation advisor and/or dissertation committee regarding her mastery of the subject and the appropriate penalty for the pending charge; and (4) proceeded with revocation through Dean Wood, who lacked the authority to revoke Jaber's degree, rather than through the Defendant Board. The complaint alleges various other violations but these were all dismissed by a Court Order dated August 26, 2010, 2010 WL 3385523. (Doc. # 37). The only remaining claim is Plaintiff's procedural due process claim, grounded in her § 1983 count.

III. ANALYSIS

The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party if that party establishes that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “[W]hen a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court views the evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Leahy v. Trans Jones, Inc., 996 F.2d 136, 138 (6th Cir.1993). Summary judgement analysis “requires the district court to determine ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” In re Dollar Corp., 25 F.3d 1320, 1323 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). In the Sixth Circuit, the Due Process Clause is implicated by higher education disciplinary decisions. Flaim v. Med. College of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F.Supp. 1245 (E.D.Mich.1984), aff'd, 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir.1986)). “The Due Process Clause ... sets the floor or lowest level of procedures acceptable.” Id. at 636. The amount of process due varies from case to case according to the facts and is evaluated within the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Mathews. Id. at 634; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 (“[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” (citation an internal quotation marks omitted)); Jaksa, 597 F.Supp. at 1248 (“[D]ue process is a flexible concept and will vary with the facts of each case....”).

In Mathews, the Supreme Court stated:

[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. The Sixth Circuit applied this balancing test to the university discipline context. In Flaim, It described the appropriate factors as: (1) the seriousness of the charge and potential sanctions; (2) the danger of an error and the benefit of alternate procedures, and (3) the public or governmental burden of these alternate procedures. 418 F.3d at 635.

Notice and an opportunity to be heard remain the basic requirements of procedural due process. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Flaim, 418 F.3d at 635. In Goss, the Supreme Court opined “that the timing and content of the...