Jaksa v. Regents of University of Michigan

• Decision Date: 21 November 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 83-6284.
• Parties: Christopher J. JAKSA, Plaintiff, v. The REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, University of Michigan President Harold T. Shapiro, and Dean Eugene W. Nissen; all individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

597 F. Supp. 1245

Christopher J. JAKSA, Plaintiff, v. The REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, University of Michigan President Harold T. Shapiro, and Dean Eugene W. Nissen; all individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 83-6284.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

November 21, 1984.

Kurt Berggren, Ann Arbor, Mich., for plaintiff.

Roderick K. Daane, University of Michigan, Peter A. Davis, Ann Arbor, Mich., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEIKENS, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, Christopher Jaksa, was suspended for one term from the University of Michigan for cheating on a final exam. Plaintiff argues that he was denied procedural due process, and brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) against the Regents of the University of Michigan, Harold Shapiro (University President), and Eugene Nissen (Assistant Dean of Student Academic Affairs). This case is currently before me on cross-motions for summary judgment. Two evidentiary hearings have been held. For reasons stated herein, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently enrolled at the University of Michigan. By letter dated April 30, 1982, plaintiff's statistics professor, Prof. Rothman, filed charges with the Academic Judiciary accusing plaintiff of cheating on his statistics final exam. Rothman brought these charges after receiving an anonymous telephone call from a student who said he saw plaintiff switch exam cover sheets, and submit his cover sheet with a classmate's exam. Rothman's inspection of the exams revealed that plaintiff's cover sheet was attached to another student's exam, though plaintiff denied having any knowledge of how this happened.

Before the University took any action on Prof. Rothman's charges, the following procedures were followed: Plaintiff was provided with a copy of Prof. Rothman's charges, and met several times to discuss these charges with Dean Nissen, Assistant Dean of Student Academic Affairs. Dean Nissen gave plaintiff the Manual of Procedure for the Academic Judiciary (Manual), and a hearing was held on June 16, 1982. After the hearing, a four-member panel consisting of two students and two professors unanimously found plaintiff guilty of cheating, and recommended a two-semester suspension. After seeking the advice of counsel, Jaksa wrote a letter to the Academic Judiciary Appeal Board seeking leniency. Jaksa confessed that his cheating was "a spur of the minute act and a glaring error in judgment." Plaintiff also found "it difficult to express in words his sincere regret and shame at having involved himself in this cheating incident." Apparently moved by this confession, the Appeal Board reduced Jaksa's penalty to a one-semester suspension.

Plaintiff argues that the proceedings against him were fundamentally unfair and that he was denied procedural due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Defendant argues that the procedural protections afforded plaintiff satisfied the requirements of the due process clause. I find that plaintiff was treated fairly, and that the University's procedures satisfied the fourteenth amendment.

II. DISCUSSION

The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.Const. amend. XIV, § 1. While it is not always clear when a constitutional claim has been raised, plaintiff's suspension from the University involves a sufficient "liberty" interest to entitle him to the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575, 95 S.Ct. 729, 736, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) ("Liberty" interests implicated where high school student was suspended for 10 days since suspensions "could seriously damage the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment."); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 510, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) ("Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Plaintiff may also have a "property" interest in continuing his education at the University of Michigan. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574, 95 S.Ct. at 736. Whether plaintiff's interest is a "liberty" interest, "property" interest, or both, it is clear that he is entitled to the protection of the due process clause.

"Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). While due process is a flexible concept and will vary with the facts of each case, the Supreme Court has articulated criteria for determining what process is due in a particular setting:

Our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally require consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902-03, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See also Frumkin v. Board of Trustees, 626 F.2d 19 (6th Cir.1980).

In the context of school suspensions, the starting point is Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1974), where the Supreme Court considered the constitutional requirements for suspending a high school student for 10 days. After finding that a suspension from high school implicated a protected interest, the Court held that a student facing suspension "must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." Goss, 419 U.S. at 579, 95 S.Ct. at 738. To determine the sort of notice and hearing¹ to which a student is entitled, the Court balanced the student's interest in avoiding unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process against the school's interest in maintaining discipline.² In accommodating those competing interests, the Court held that in order to suspend a high school student for 10 days, he must be "given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts after being told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is." Goss, 419 U.S. at 582, 95 S.Ct. at 740. The Court recognized that the due process clause affords high school students facing brief suspensions only "rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school." Goss, 419 U.S. at 581, 95 S.Ct. at 739-40. The Court, however, made it clear that its holding was limited to short suspensions, and that "longer suspensions or expulsions ... may require more formal procedures." Goss, 419 U.S. at 584, 95 S.Ct. at 741.

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930, 82 S.Ct. 368, 7 L.Ed.2d 193 (1961), which the Supreme Court acknowledged as a "landmark decision,"³ bears a greater resemblance to this case. There, students were expelled from Alabama State College for disciplinary reasons.⁴ After holding that due process requires a state university to give its students notice and the opportunity to be heard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit articulated standards for the nature of the requisite notice and hearing.

The notice should contain a statement of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion under the regulations of the Board of Education. The nature of the hearing should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. The case before us requires something more than an informal interview with an administrative authority of the college. By its nature, a charge of misconduct, as opposed to a failure to meet the scholastic standards of the college, depends upon a collection of the facts concerning the charged misconduct, easily colored by the point of view of the witnesses. In such circumstances, a hearing which gives the Board or the administrative authorities of the college an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable detail is best suited to protect the rights of all involved. This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. Such a hearing, with the attending publicity and disturbance of college activities, might be detrimental to the college's educational atmosphere and impractical to carry out. Nevertheless, the rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved without encroaching upon the interests of the college.

Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158-59. See also Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, 514 F.2d 622, 625 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898, 96 S.Ct. 202, 46 L.Ed.2d 131 (1975) (Due process satisfied where there "was an adequate hearing on the charge with a meaningful opportunity given to plaintiff to participate, to present his position, and to hear the witnesses presenting the facts they had knowledge of."); Jones v. Snead, 431 F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir.1970) ("Procedural due process must be afforded a student on the college campus `by way of adequate notice, definite charge, and a hearing with opportunity to present one's own side of the case and with all necessary protective measures.'") (Quoting Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965, 90 S.Ct. 2169, 26 L.Ed.2d 548 (1970)).

Although plaintiff was...