Jachim v. KUTV INC.

• Decision Date: 18 February 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 91-C-720W.
• Citation: 783 F. Supp. 1328
• Parties: Aleksander JACHIM, Plaintiff, v. KUTV INC., Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, Amy Cobbledick, Tom Mitchell, and Does 1-30, Inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

783 F. Supp. 1328

Aleksander JACHIM, Plaintiff, v. KUTV INC., Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, Amy Cobbledick, Tom Mitchell, and Does 1-30, Inclusive, Defendants.

Civ. No. 91-C-720W.

United States District Court, D. Utah, C.D.

February 18, 1992.

Rex P. Burgon, Richard C. Taggert, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff.

Patricia M. Leith, Marvin D. Bagley, Salt Lake City, Utah, Patrick A. Shea, West Valley City, Utah, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

WINDER, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on Defendant KUTV Inc.'s ("KUTV") Motion to Dismiss. The court heard this motion on January 22, 1991. Plaintiff, Aleksander Jachim ("Jachim"), was represented by Rex P. Burgon and Richard C. Taggert. KUTV, Amy Cobbledick and Tom Mitchell were represented by Patricia M. Leith, Patrick Shea and Marvin D. Bagley. Before the hearing, the court carefully reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties and all other pertinent papers in the file of this case. After the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement. Having further considered the law and the facts, this court now renders the following memorandum decision and order.

BACKGROUND

Jachim filed the Second Amended Complaint in this action on December 24, 1991, and the parties stipulated to its filing on December 31, 1991.¹ In the Second Amended Complaint, Jachim names as defendants KUTV; Amy Cobbledick, KUTV's Manager of Human Resources; Tom Mitchell, Jachim's former supervisor at KUTV; and, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah ("Blue Cross"), the insurer of KUTV's group health plan.² At the hearing, the parties also stipulated to joining as a defendant the Standard Employees Welfare Benefit Plan Administrative Committee, the administrator of KUTV's group health plan.

Jachim alleges forty-one claims for relief in the Second Amended Complaint. These include seventeen³ federal claims based on alleged violations of certain provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 that are popularly known by the acronym "COBRA." See Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-272, Title X, § 10002, 100 Stat. 227 (1986) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161 to 1168 (West Supp.1991)). Jachim also alleges twenty-four state law claims based on KUTV's alleged wrongful termination of Jachim's employment.

Of the federal claims, eight are directed against KUTV, three⁴ are against Cobbledick, and six are against Blue Cross. There are no federal claims against Mitchell. The essence of Jachim's federal claims is that KUTV and the other defendants violated COBRA by failing to provide Jachim with notice of his rights under that act. Specifically, Jachim alleges that there were six "qualifying events" that triggered KUTV's obligation to provide Jachim with such notice. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1163, 1166 (West Supp.1991). Jachim also alleges that KUTV and Blue Cross failed to provide him with notice of his COBRA rights when his coverage under KUTV's group health plan commenced. See id. § 1166.

On November 25, 1991, KUTV moved to have the Complaint dismissed on three grounds.⁵ First, KUTV argues that Jachim's federal claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Second, KUTV requests that if Jachim's federal claims are dismissed, this court should also dismiss Jachim's state law claims because there is no independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Third, KUTV asks that even if Jachim's federal claims are not dismissed, the court should exercise its discretion and dismiss the state law claims because the federal and state claims do not derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, and the state law claims predominate over the federal claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although this matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss, the parties have submitted numerous affidavits and other papers. Therefore, the motion will be considered as a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

In applying this standard, the court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288 (10th Cir.1991). Once the moving party has carried its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by ... affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Gonzales v. Millers Casualty Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 1419 (10th Cir.1991).⁶ The nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3186, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552).

In considering whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, the court does not weigh the evidence but instead inquires whether a reasonable jury, faced with the evidence presented, could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir.1991).⁷ Finally, all material facts asserted by the moving party shall be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by the opposing party. D.Utah Civ.R. 202(b)(4).

DISCUSSION

A. Jachim's Federal Claims

For the purposes of this motion, Jachim's federal claims can be viewed as raising three essential questions. These include:

1. Did KUTV provide Jachim with timely and adequate notice of his rights under COBRA upon the commencement of his coverage under KUTV's group health insurance plan?

2. Which of the events that Jachim alleges occurred on or after February 13, 1991, are actually "qualifying events" for the purposes of COBRA?

3. Did KUTV comply with its obligation to provide notice to Jachim of his rights under § 1166(a)(2) of COBRA upon the occurrence of the qualifying event(s)?

1. The Initial Notice Question.

Jachim's first and ninth claims for relief allege that KUTV and Blue Cross, respectively, did not provide Jachim with timely and adequate notice of his rights under COBRA upon the commencement of his coverage under KUTV's group health insurance plan. Section 1166(a)(1) of COBRA, which sets forth the act's notice requirements, provides that group health plans "shall provide, at the time of commencement of coverage under the plan, written notice to each covered employee and spouse of the employee (if any) of the rights provided under this subsection." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1166 (West Supp.1991). Section 1166(a)(1) was enacted in 1986, and it became effective for "plan years beginning on or after July 1, 1986." COBRA, Pub.L. 99-272, Title X, § 10002(d)(1), 100 Stat. 227 (1986). Jachim's employment with KUTV, as well as his participation in KUTV's group health plan, began on May 24, 1984.

KUTV has submitted two affidavits and a document establishing that on October 10, 1986, KUTV provided a copy of a memorandum to each of KUTV's employees and their spouses. This memorandum, which was prepared by Paul R. Ripplinger, then Vice President of Finance of the Standard Corporation (KUTV's parent company), informed KUTV employees and their beneficiaries of their right to continue participation in KUTV's group health care plan after their coverage would ordinarily cease. The memorandum described who was eligible for continued coverage, the length of time that coverage could be continued, the cost of continued coverage, and how the election to continue coverage could be made.

Jachim has made no showing, either through the production of affidavits, documents or other proof, that disputes KUTV's evidence. Moreover, the memorandum circulated by KUTV to each of its employees appears to be adequate under § 1166(a)(1) of COBRA. See Dehner v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 713 F.Supp. 1397, 1400 (D.Kan.1989). Thus, as a matter of law, this court finds that KUTV satisfied its obligation under § 1166(a)(1) to provide Jachim with notice of his COBRA rights upon commencement of Jachim's coverage under KUTV's group health insurance plan.

The court concludes, therefore, that Jachim's first and ninth claims for relief must be dismissed as a matter of law.

2. Qualifying Events.

Jachim's remaining federal claims all evolve around the fundamental question: Which of the events that Jachim alleges occurred on or after February 13, 1991, are actually "qualifying events" for the purposes of COBRA?

Section 1166(a)(2) of COBRA provides that an employer of an employee covered under a plan must notify the administrator of the plan of certain "qualifying events" within 30 days of the event. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1166(a)(2) (West Supp.1991). Section 1166(a)(4)(A) requires the plan administrator in turn to provide notice of COBRA rights to the employee. Id. § 1166(a)(4)(A). Section 1163 defines the relevant qualifying events as

any of the following events which, but for the continuation coverage required under this part, would result in the loss of coverage of a qualified beneficiary:

(1) The death of the covered employee.

(2) The termination (other than by reason of such employee's gross misconduct), or reduction of hours, of the covered

...