Wright v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.

• Decision Date: 13 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-6400,89-6400
• Citation: 925 F.2d 1288
• Parties: 55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 178, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,580, 59 USLW 2544, 59 USLW 2575, 13 Employee Benefits Ca 1597 Kenneth W. WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1288

925 F.2d 1288

55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 178,

55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,580, 59 USLW 2544,

59 USLW 2575, 13 Employee Benefits Ca 1597

Kenneth W. WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Corporation Defendant-Appellee.

No. 89-6400.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

Feb. 13, 1991.

Kenneth W. Wright, Midwest City, Okl., pro se.

Nancy L. Coats, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief, for defendant-appellee.

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges.

TACHA, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of plaintiff-appellant Kenneth Wright's claim for relief against Southwestern Bell (SWB) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or Act), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1132, 1140-41, and a grant of summary judgment on Wright's claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1988, 2000e et seq. ¹ On appeal, Wright argues the district court erred by: (1) finding the ERISA claim is barred by the statute of limitations and (2) granting SWB's motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claim because Wright knowingly and voluntarily released all claims against his former employer. We affirm the summary judgment decision and reverse and remand the ERISA claim for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Kenneth Wright was employed by SWB from February 19, 1972 until May 23, 1985. During that time, he was a member of the Communications Workers of America (CWA) and was covered by the collective bargaining agreement between the union and SWB. The union contract provides sick leave and short- and long-term disability benefits. From 1981 to 1985, Wright drew sick leave and short-term disability on several occasions. Wright testified he requested long-term disability benefits during the early part of 1985. SWB informed him he was not eligible for long-term disability benefits without the company doctor's recommendation. Wright claims he was given the choice of either returning to work or being terminated. After exhausting his vacation benefits, Wright returned to work in February 1985.

In April 1985, Wright was suspended for misconduct. On May 23, 1985, Wright was discharged for "misconduct, poor quality of work, and for refusing to do a job."

Wright twice filed written charges of discrimination against SWB with the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He filed the first charge on the day he was suspended and the second on the day he was terminated. In both complaints, Wright claimed SWB had discriminated against him based on his race.

In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, Wright presented his claims against SWB for discrimination in a grievance hearing. Before the grievance procedure was complete, the parties negotiated a settlement whereby SWB agreed to change the reason for Wright's dismissal from "misconduct" to "unsatisfactory service." SWB also agreed to pay Wright $13,902.

On November 1, 1985 SWB issued a check for $9,513 ($13,902 less federal and state withholdings) to Wright. The following statement was typed on the back of the check above the line for endorsement:

RELEASE

By endorsing and/or negotiating this instrument, employee covenants not to sue or arbitrate, and releases from all claims and/or demands of whatever kind or nature, the Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. and the Communications Workers of America.

Wright endorsed the check and deposited it in his bank account in early November 1985.

In September 1988, the EEOC concluded SWB had not engaged in any discriminatory employment practices. The EEOC issued Wright a right to sue letter, advising him he had until December 28, 1988 to file any Title VII claims in federal district court. Wright filed a complaint on December 28, 1988, alleging violations of ERISA and Title VII. The district court dismissed Wright's ERISA claim and granted SWB's motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claim. The court held Wright's ERISA claim was barred by the statute of limitations. It found that under section 1113 of ERISA, an action must be commenced within three years of the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation. The court granted SWB's motion for summary judgment based on a finding that Wright had released "all claims ... for relief under Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1988, and 2000(e) [2000e] et seq., and all common law claims for breach of contract."

Wright contends the district court did not apply the proper statute of limitations when dismissing the ERISA claim. We review a district court's ruling on the applicability of a statute of limitations de novo. Pierce County Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Health Trust v. Elks Lodge, B.P.O.E. No. 1450, 827 F.2d 1324, 1328 (9th Cir.1987). We hold the district court erred when it concluded that section 1113 was applicable to an action brought under section 1132. Section 1113 is, in fact, only applicable to actions arising out of violations of the portion of the Act addressing fiduciary responsibilities, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1101-12. See Wyoming Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 618 n. 8 (10th Cir.1988). Wright's claim does not involve fiduciary responsibilities regarding financial solvency or accountability as contemplated by section 1113. The focus of his complaint is on SWB's administration of the plan's benefits, specifically, the denial of his long-term disability benefits.

ERISA plan administration and enforcement are governed by sections 1131 to 1145 of the Act. Wright's claim was brought under section 1132, which authorizes private civil enforcement actions. This provision allows a plan beneficiary or participant to bring a civil action: (1) for the relief provided in section 1132(c) of the Act, Sec. 1132(a)(1)(A); (2) to recover benefits due under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan, Sec. 1132(a)(1)(B); (3) to obtain appropriate relief under section 1109 of the Act, Sec. 1132(a)(2); (4) to enjoin any act or practice that violates any portion of the Act concerning plan administration and enforcement or to obtain other appropriate equitable relief to redress such violations or enforce the Act's provisions or the terms of the plan, Sec. 1132(a)(3); and (5) to obtain appropriate relief for violations of section 1025(c) of the Act, Sec. 1132(a)(4).

Section 1132 does not contain a statute of limitations. A recent decision of this circuit Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir.1990), addresses the appropriate limitations period for actions brought under this provision. In a private civil action brought pursuant to section 1132, Held asserted his former employer had violated section 1140, which proscribes interference with protected rights. Id. at 1198. We noted in Held that because section 1132 does not contain a statute of limitations, we first must determine whether an analogous state statute or a statute of limitations from another portion of ERISA, such as section 1113, should apply. Id. at 1203 (citing Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 621, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989)).

To resolve this question, we turned to another recent decision in this circuit, Wyoming Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613 (10th Cir.1988). Morgen & Oswood addressed the question of what limitations period is applicable to an action under section 1132(a)(3) by trustees of employee benefit pensions and insurance funds against an employer for delinquent contributions. In Morgen & Oswood, we had considered several arguably applicable statutes of limitations, including the limitations period in section 1113 of ERISA. We concluded in Morgen & Oswood that "the Wyoming ten-year statute of limitations for actions based on written contracts is the statute of limitations 'most analogous' to the Trustees' ERISA action." See Held, 912 F.2d at 1201 (quoting Morgen & Oswood, 850 F.2d at 612). Following Morgen & Oswood, we decided in Held to apply an analogous state statute rather than an ERISA statute of limitations to ERISA claims for which there was no express limitation period. Held, 912 F.2d at 1201-02.

This court in Held next sought to determine the most analogous state statute. As a preliminary matter, the court characterized the appellant's claim. It found that the appellant had two distinct causes of action. His first action was brought under section 1132(a)(3) for declaratory and injunctive relief from his former employer's alleged violation of section 1140. Plaintiff also had claimed under section 1132(a)(1)(B) for benefits due under the plan.

After concluding that the appellant had two distinct claims for relief, the court next determined the most analogous state statute for each of these claims. Id. at 1204. We first concluded the limitation period for state employment discrimination actions should apply to the appellant's claim for injunctive relief under section 1132(a)(3) for his former employer's alleged violation of section 1140. Id. at 1205. The court then held the statute of limitations for claims on a written contract should be applied to the section 1132(a)(1)(B) claim for benefits due under the plan. Id. at 1206-07.

To determine the applicable statute of limitations in the present case, we first must characterize Wright's claim. Although Wright's amended complaint claims his action is based on sections 1132, 1140, and 1141, he does not ask for the declaratory and injunctive relief available under section 1132(a)(3). A review of the record reveals that Wright has never asked for declaratory or injunctive relief. In his prayer for relief, he seeks recovery of short- and long-term disability benefits that he claims were wrongfully...