Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc. v. Gassaway, 9798.

• Decision Date: 09 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 9798.,9798.
• Citation: 353 A.2d 288
• Parties: JACK SPICER REAL ESTATE, INC., Appellant, v. Nora Bell GASSAWAY, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

353 A.2d 288

JACK SPICER REAL ESTATE, INC., Appellant, v. Nora Bell GASSAWAY, Appellee.

No. 9798.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued December 2, 1975.

Decided March 9, 1976.

Joseph H. Schneider, Silver Spring, Md. with whom Albert Ginsberg and Herbert D. Horowitz, Silver Spring, Md., were on the brief, for appellant.

Sherwin S. Kaplan, Legal Action Support Project, Bureau of Social Science Research, Washington, D.C., with whom Louis L. Joseph was on the brief, for appellee. Robert Beckerman, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for appellee.

Before KELLY, KERN and YEAG-LEY, Associate Judges.

KELLY, Associate Judge:

[1] Appellant, Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc., filed suit for possession of real property occupied by Nora Bell Gassaway as a tenant at sufferance.¹ The notice to quit on which the action was based,² however, failed to state a permissible reason for evicting appellee Gassaway as defined in Section 10 of District of Columbia Rent Control Regulation No. 74-20, governing eviction procedures under the District's rent control program.³ Because of this failure the trial court entered judgment for appellee after finding that Section 10 was constitutional and not in excess of the authority delegated to the then appointed District of Columbia Council by Congress under the District of Columbia Rent Control Act of 1973, D.C.Code 1975 Supp., § 45-1621 et seq. (hereinafter the Act).⁴ It is urged on appeal that the trial judge erred in both holdings.⁵ We disagree and affirm.

Appellant asserts that by eliminating the right of a landlord to evict a tenant by sufferance without stating any reason therefor in the notice to quit, the Council has created a new tenancy which has the effect of depriving the landlord of his property without due process of law. It argues in addition that Section 10 impairs the obligation of contracts in violation of U.S.Const. art. I, § 10, since it nullifies a common provision in lease agreements whereby the tenant waives the right of a thirty-day notice to quit.

As this court noted years ago in Walsh v. Cooper, D.C.Mun.App., 31 A.2d 883, 884 (1943), the per se constitutionality of rent control was settled in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921). There, in upholding an emergency rent control program enacted for the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court also upheld the imposition of necessarily correlative eviction controls, stating that:

If the tenant remained subject to the landlord's power to evict, the attempt to limit the landlord's demands would fail. [Id. at 157-58, 41 S.Ct. at 460.]

Thus, we view as settled that eviction controls in an emergency rent control program are constitutional.

Appellant asserts next that even if we acknowledge the constitutional power of Congress to enact the regulations in question, the necessary authority to do so was not delegated to the Council pursuant to the Act. It points out that Section 10 is in direct conflict with D.C.Code 1973, § 45-901 which provides that a tenant whose lease has expired may be evicted without the service of a notice to quit and § 45-904 which does not require that a notice to quit contain a reason therefor. Appellant contends that the failure of Congress to specifically authorize the Council to supercede a code provision pursuant to its rent control authority belies a congressional intent to allow such a result.

We evaluate the intent of Congress in light of the purpose it sought to achieve in delegating rent control authority to the Council. Jones v. District of Columbia, 212 F.Supp. 438, 443 (D.D.C.1962), aff'd, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 323 F.2d 306 (1963). In so doing, we note that the Act directed the Council to hold public hearings to determine if rent controls were needed⁶ and provided that if such a determination was made, the Council was authorized "[T]o adopt such rules as it determines necessary and appropriate to regulate and stabilize rents in the District of Columbia . . . ." D.C.Code 1975 Supp. § 45-1622(a). This language strongly suggests that Congress intended to delegate to the Council its full authority to control rents. A more restricted interpretation of the statute so as to exclude the authority to promulgate eviction controls would in our judgment be warranted only if the inclusion of such authority could be regarded as contrary to the obvious purpose of the statute or absurd. Maryland & D.C. Rifle and Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Washington, 142 U.S.App.D. C. 375, 378, 442 F.2d 123, 126 (1971), quoting Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510-11, 61 S.Ct. 368, 85 L.Ed. 303 (1941). We consider the challenged procedures as directly serving the stated congressional objective of stabilizing rents, see Block v. Hirsh, supra, 256 U.S. at 157-58, 41 S.Ct. 458, and are of the opinion that since appellant has not carried its burden of showing them to be unreasonable or oppressive, their validity is established. See Jones v. District of Columbia, supra, at 443.

In the context of a previous rent control program enacted by Congress the court in Myers v. H. L. Rust Co., 77 U.S.App.D.C. 218, 134 F.2d 417 (1943), held that conflicting sections of the District of Columbia Code must yield to more recently enacted rent control regulations.⁷ This principle applies with equal force where the rent control regulations are promulgated pursuant to the delegated authority of the Council.

Affirmed.

1. D.C.Code 1973, § 45-820 provides:

All estates which by construction of the courts were estates from year to year at common law, as where a tenant goes into possession and pays rent without an agreement for a term, or where a tenant for years, after the expiration of his term, continues in possession and pays rent and the like, and all verbal hireings by the month or at any specified rate per month, shall be deemed estates by sufference.

2. See D.C.Code 1973, § 45-904.

3. Section 10 provided:

(a) No tenant shall be evicted from his housing accommodation for any reason other than nonpayment of rent, unless he has been served with a notice to vacate specifying therein the reason for his eviction, and a copy of such notice has been served upon the Commission.

(b) No tenant shall be evicted from his housing accommodation,...