Jack v. State

• Decision Date: 15 June 1937
• Docket Number: 26512.
• Citation: 82 P.2d 1033,183 Okla. 375,1937 OK 394
• Parties: JACK v. STATE.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

82 P.2d 1033

183 Okla. 375, 1937 OK 394

JACK v. STATE.

No. 26512.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

June 15, 1937

Dissenting Opinion September 28, 1937.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1937.

Application for Leave to File Second Petition for Rehearing Denied Sept 27, 1938.

A statute relating to persons or things as a class is a "general law" while one relating to particular persons or things of a class is "special." A statute in order to avoid a conflict with the prohibition against special legislation must be general in its application to a class and all of the classes within like circumstances must come within its operations. If it is limited in its operation to one person or thing, and is enacted for one purpose and for one person, it then becomes "special" in its subject matter and operation and is void. "Special laws" are those made for individual cases or for less than a class requiring laws to its peculiar conditions and circumstances. A "special act" is one which operates merely on one particular thing or on a particular class of things existing at the time of its passage.

Syllabus by the Court.

By the provisions of article 18, chapter 65, Session Laws 1935, a special legislative act, plaintiff was authorized to institute and maintain an action against the state to determine liability and recover the loss or damage sustained as a result of alleged negligence of the officers, agents and employees of the state highway department in failing to properly maintain a state highway. Held, that said act contravenes that portion of section 59, article 5, of the Constitution, Okl.St.Ann.Const. art. 5, § 59, which prohibits the enactment of a special law where a general law can be made applicable, and is unconstitutional and invalid.

Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Ben Arnold, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Iris Jack against the State of Oklahoma. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

WELCH and GIBSON, JJ., dissenting.

S. A Byers, E. F. Lester, and Charles Swindall, all of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., and Fred Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

OSBORN Chief Justice.

This action was instituted in the district court of Oklahoma county by Mrs. Iris Jack, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, against the state of Oklahoma, hereinafter referred to as defendant, wherein plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries received in an automobile wreck alleged to have resulted by reason of certain negligence of the officers, servants, and employees of the state highway department. From an order sustaining a demurrer to her petition, plaintiff has appealed.

Plaintiff relies upon the provisions of article 18, chapter 65, Session Laws 1935, a special legislative act, as her authority to institute and maintain this action. Said act is, in part, as follows:

"Whereas, on June 27th, 1930, while J. F. Jack was driving his automobile on the night of June 27, 1930, along and upon State Highway No. 14, at a point about one mile North of Snyder, Oklahoma he struck a certain large tree located in the main portion of said traveled highway and that as the direct and proximate result thereof, that J. F. Jack's automobile was destroyed, and Mrs. Iris Jack, his wife, was seriously and permanently injured and Bernice and Jeff Jack were seriously and mortally injured, from which injuries they thereafter died, and that J. T. Easum received serious and permanent injuries and Mrs. J. T. Easum received serious and permanent injuries and Clifford Easum received serious and permanent injuries and Mable Easum received serious and permanent injuries as a result of said accident; and as a direct and proximate result and were occasioned and brought about by the negligence of the officers, agents, servants and employees of the State Highway Department, in failing to maintain said highway at said point, in a reasonably safe condition of repair for public travel, on through, and across said highway. * * *

That the Legislature of the State of Oklahoma on behalf of the State of Oklahoma does hereby expressly waive the immunity of the State to be sued by J. F. Jack and Mrs. Iris Jack * * * and said persons in their personal or representative capacity are authorized to prosecute an action in their own name or for the benefit of the minors, be and each of them are hereby authorized to bring suit against the State of Oklahoma in any court of competent jurisdiction in the said State, to determine liability, and to recover the amount of loss and damage, if any, sustained by them by reason of the failure and neglect of the State Highway Department of the State of Oklahoma and its officers, servants, agents and employees in failing to maintain State Highway No. 14 at a point about one mile North of Snyder, Oklahoma, on the 27th day of June 1930, and to determine in said cause and said court if the State of Oklahoma by and through its officers, agents, servants and employees of the State Highway Department was negligent in its failure to maintain said Highway in a reasonable safe condition of repair or in a reasonably safe condition for persons traveling thereon."

The allegations of plaintiff's petition, in substance, are that she is one and the same person as the Mrs. Iris Jack named in the above-quoted act; that the state highway department is a part of the executive branch of the state government charged with the duty of maintaining all state highways including state highway No. 14; that said department had sufficient funds under its supervision and control to keep said highway in reasonably safe condition; that the officers, agents, and employees of the state highway department failed and neglected to perform its duties in this regard, but carelessly and negligently permitted a large tree, which was 12 inches in diameter at the bottom, to remain in the traveled portion of said highway; that on the night of June 27, 1930, she was riding in an automobile driven by her husband, J. F. Jack, as an invited guest; that said automobile was being driven in a cautions and prudent manner at a reasonable rate of speed; that said automobile struck said tree; that she was thrown against the parts of the car and upon the ground with great force thereby sustaining certain injuries. The prayer of the petition was for damages in the sum of $20,000.

The state, in the absence of an express statute creating a liability therefor, is not liable in a civil action for damages for the neglect of its officers or those they are obliged to employ, in improperly performing, or in failing to perform, their duties as such officers or employees. See Hazlett v. Board of Commissioners of Muskogee County, 168 Okl. 290, 32 P.2d 940, and cases therein cited. Plaintiff takes the position that the legislative act is effective not only to authorize the institution and maintenance of this action, but to waive the nonliability of the state for the negligence of its agents and employees.

The Attorney General, appearing in behalf of the state, contends that legislation of this nature is prohibited by certain provisions of the Constitution. One of these provisions is section 59, article 5, Okl.St.Ann.Const., which provides as follows: "Laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State, and where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted."

If this is a special law, and if a general law can be made applicable, then the act must fall, and the trial court did not err in sustaining a demurrer to the petition of plaintiff. It was the expressed intention of the framers of the Constitution that the abuses of granting special legislative favors to the few should not be tolerated, but that all citizens should receive equal rights, and none should have special privileges not granted to other citizens occupying the same status. That the act under consideration is a special act is unquestionable. Whether a general law can be made applicable is, in the first instance, a question presented for determination of the Legislature; but such determination is not conclusive on the judicial branch of government, as will hereinafter be pointed out by the cited authorities.

In the case of State ex rel. Roberts v. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., 32 Okl. 607, 123 P. 166, 167, it was said:

"In Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 3 Okl. 677, 41 P. 635, the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the syllabus are as follows:

'A statute relating to persons or things as a class is a general law. One relating to particular persons or things of a class is special. The number of persons upon whom the law shall have any direct effect may be very few by reason of the subject to which it relates, but it must operate equally and uniformly upon all brought within the relations and circumstances for which it provides.

A statute, in order to avoid a conflict with the prohibition against special legislation, must be general in its application to a class, and all of the class within like circumstances must come within its operations. If it is limited in its application to one person or thing, and is enacted for one purpose and for one person, it then becomes special in its subject-matter and operation, and is void."'

In the case of School District No. 85 v. School District No. 71, 135 Okl. 270, 276 P. 186, 189, it is said:

"Special laws are those made for individual cases, or for less than a class requiring laws to its peculiar conditions and circumstances. Vermont L. & T. Co. v. Whithed, 2 N.D. 82, 49 N.W. 318; Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 3 Okl. 677, 41 P. 635; Maxwell v. Tillamook County, 20 Or. 495, 26 P. 803; Healey v. Dudley, 5 Lans. (N.Y.) 115; 1 Bl.Comm. 186.

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