Jacka v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., COCA-COLA

• Decision Date: 11 June 1998
• Docket Number: COCA-COLA,No. C4-97-1418,C4-97-1418
• Parties: Edwin J. JACKA, Employee, v.BOTTLING COMPANY, Self-Insured, Employer, and Arvold Chiropractic Clinic, Minnesota Department of Labor & Industry, Intervenor, and Patrick KELLEY, Employee, v. VIKING AUTO SALVAGE and State Fund Mutual Insurance Company, Employer and Insurer, and Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry, Intervenor.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 27

580 N.W.2d 27

Edwin J. JACKA, Employee, v. COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, Self-Insured, Employer, and Arvold Chiropractic Clinic, Minnesota Department of Labor &

Industry, Intervenor, and Patrick KELLEY, Employee, v. VIKING AUTO SALVAGE and State Fund Mutual Insurance Company, Employer and Insurer, and Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry, Intervenor.

No. C4-97-1418.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 11, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Permanent treatment parameter rules 5221.6050, subp. 8 and 5221.6200, subp. 3 do not exceed the authority delegated to the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry under Minn.Stat. § 176.83, subd. 5 (1994).

2. Permanent treatment parameter rules 5221.6050, subp. 8 and 5221.6200, subp. 3 do not conflict with Minn.Stat. § 176.135, subd. 1 (1996) or the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.

3. Permanent treatment parameter rules 5221.6050, subp. 8 and 5221.6200, subp. 3 are to be used by compensation judges as standards which establish the limits of compensable treatment in all but the most exceptional circumstances.

4. Permanent treatment parameter rules 5221.6050, subp. 8 and 5221.6200, subp. 3 apply to all treatment provided after January 4, 1995, pursuant to Minn. R. 5221.6020, subp. 2, irrespective of the date of injury.

Mark J. Fellman, St. Paul, for Edwin J. Jacka.

John T. Thul, Cousineau, McGuire & Anderson, Chartered, Minneapolis, for Coca-Cola Bottling Company.

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Susan C. Gretz, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, for Minnesota Department of Labor & Industry.

Joseph J. Osterbauer, Minneapolis, for Patrick Kelley.

Andrew W. Lynn, Anne E. Kevlin, Lynn, Scharfenberg & Associates, Eden Prairie, for Viking Auto Salvage and State Fund Mutual Ins. Co.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

BLATZ, Chief Justice.

This case comes to us on a certification order issued by the chief administrative law judge of the Office of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 176.325, subd. 1 (1996). The four questions certified inquire broadly into the validity and proper application of the permanent treatment parameter rules promulgated by the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (D.O.L.I.) pursuant to its authority to institute rules establishing standards and procedures for health care provider treatment under Minn.Stat. § 176.83, subd. 5 (1994).

This case is the first to certify questions pursuant to section 176.325 of the Workers' Compensation Act. As such, this case presents the opportunity to set the requirements for future certified questions of workers' compensation law. ¹ A question may be certified only if it is important and doubtful. ² A question is doubtful if there is no controlling precedent and there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion. ³ A question's importance depends upon the likelihood that the resolution of the question will have statewide impact, the probability of reversal, the length of proceedings terminated by reversal, and the amount of harm that would be inflicted on the parties by an incorrect ruling. ⁴ The certification process is not a substitute for the normal appellate process nor a method for securing advisory opinions. ⁵ While it is the exceptional case that will meet the criteria set forth above, we accept the questions presented here as important and doubtful.

In framing the questions to be certified under the Workers' Compensation Act, the chief administrative law judge, or alternatively, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry, should be guided by the requirements we have established for other certified questions. For example, the certification order must specify the precise legal question and laws at issue and include specific findings of fact relevant to the question presented. ⁶ Otherwise, if such specificity is lacking, the question may request an impermissible advisory opinion. ⁷ In a contested proceeding, a legal question may examine the validity of a rule only as applied to the facts of the case. ⁸

The certified questions submitted in this case do not meet these requirements because they fail to designate the specific rules at issue in this contested proceeding or the specific statutory and constitutional grounds on which the rules are being challenged. ⁹ In the future, this court will hold certified questions to the standards enunciated in this opinion. However, because this is the first set of certified questions under the statute, this court has chosen instead to reframe the certified questions as follows:

I. Whether the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry exceeded its statutory authority under Minn.Stat. § 176.83, subd. 5 (1994) in promulgating permanent treatment parameter rules 5221.6050, subp. 8 and 5221.6200, subp. 3?

II. Whether permanent treatment parameter rules 5221.6050, subp. 8 and 5221.6200, subp. 3 conflict with Minn.Stat. § 176.135, subd. 1 (1996) or the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions? ¹⁰

III. If the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating permanent treatment parameter rules 5221.6050, subp. 8 and 5221.6200, subp. 3, whether and how compensation judges must apply these rules?

IV. If the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating permanent treatment parameter rules 5221.6050, subp. 8 and 5221.6200, subp. 3, whether the rules apply to all treatment provided after January 4, 1995, irrespective of the date of injury?

We answer questions one and two in the negative. We answer question three in holding that compensation judges must use permanent treatment parameter rules 5221.6050, subp. 8 and 5221.6200, subp. 3 as standards which establish the limits of compensable treatment in all but the most exceptional circumstances. We answer question four in the affirmative.

This action represents the consolidation of the workers' compensation cases of Edwin Jacka and Patrick Kelley. Edwin Jacka's case stems from a sprain he sustained to his lumbar back on June 22, 1993, in the course of his employment with Coca-Cola Bottling Company. On May 23, 1994, Jacka began treatment with chiropractor Dr. Jordan R. Arvold and continued treatment through the date of his hearing on June 19, 1996. The employer/insurer disputed liability for treatments rendered by Dr. Arvold from October 17, 1994 to June 19, 1996. Following a hearing, the compensation judge issued findings and an order determining, among other things, that the treatment rendered by Dr. Arvold provided significant relief for Jacka's condition, was consistent with accepted chiropractic practice, and was not excessive. During the disputed period of time, Jacka's chiropractic treatment was reduced to once every month or two. Additionally, while the judge found that the treatment rendered after April 3, 1995, was not authorized under the permanent treatment parameters of Minn. R. 5221.6200, subp. 3 and 5221.6010, subp. 2 he also found that the treatment was an appropriate departure from the parameters pursuant to Minn. R. 5221.6050, subp. 8D because it improved Jacka's subjective complaints and his functional status. On this basis, the judge awarded payment to Arvold Chiropractic Clinic for essentially all of Jacka's outstanding treatment expenses.

In the second case, Patrick Kelley injured his cervical spine in a car accident in the course of his employment with Viking Auto Salvage (Viking) on December 22, 1994. On January 5, 1995, he began receiving treatment from chiropractor Dr. Stephen Bappe for the injury and continued treatment through the date of his compensation hearing. On May 26, 1995, State Fund Mutual (State Fund), the insurer, notified Dr. Bappe of the permanent treatment parameters and requested documentation supporting the effectiveness of ongoing chiropractic treatment. Dr. Bappe did not respond. Thereafter, Viking and State Fund disputed liability for treatment rendered by Dr. Bappe from May 26, 1995, through July 31, 1996.

Following a hearing on July 31, 1996, the compensation judge found that the chiropractic care rendered by Dr. Bappe was reasonable and necessary to cure and relieve the effects of Kelley's work injury. Further, the judge found that the permanent treatment parameter rules did not apply to Kelley for the following reasons: the rules did not apply to Kelley's date of injury, the rules were in conflict with this court's decision in Hirsch v. Bartley-Lindsay Co., 537 N.W.2d 480 (Minn.1995), and the rules conflicted with the intent of Minn.Stat. § 176.135. The compensation judge then ordered Viking and State Fund to pay the outstanding balance due to Dr. Bappe.

On appeal, the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals bifurcated the issues relating to the permanent treatment parameters in Jacka from other issues of liability on appeal and, in an order dated March 17 1997, consolidated Jacka and Kelley and joined D.O.L.I. as an intervenor. The consolidated case was referred to a compensation judge for hearing at which the parties were to present evidence regarding the validity of the permanent treatment parameters. At a pretrial hearing, the judge received into evidence the records of the rulemaking proceedings concerning the permanent treatment parameters. Then, prior to any further proceedings, the chief administrative law judge issued the certification order to this court.

I.

We are first asked to determine whether, in promulgating the permanent treatment parameter rules at issue, D.O.L.I. exceeded its authority under Minn.Stat. § 176.83, subd. 5 by placing undue restrictions on the discretion of compensation judges to determine the necessity for medical treatment. The permanent treatment parameters at issue are Minn. R. 5221.6050, subp. 8 (listing reasons for departure from the treatment parameters) and Minn. R. 5221.6200...