Jackson v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 18-26 (JEB) |
| Citation | 456 F.Supp.3d 62 |
| Parties | Paul Eccleston JACKSON, Petitioner, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the UNITED STATES, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Joseph Patrick Archie, Sarah Magen, Dechert, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioner.
Hana Hani Shatila, Lauren Elizabeth Fascett, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
This immigration and citizenship controversy hinges on one very simple question: who is Petitioner Paul Jackson's biological father? Would that the answer were so easily found. Three years ago, the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered the Jamaican-born Jackson's removal from this county. He petitioned a federal appellate court for judicial review of that order, maintaining that he could not be deported because he is a U.S. citizen. More specifically, Petitioner alleged that he acquired citizenship via his putative American father — Herbert Jackson. The appellate court found that there were genuine issues of material facts as to Paul's citizenship status, and the case has made its way here for de novo consideration of that issue.
Following about a year and a half of discovery, he now moves for summary judgment on his citizenship claim or, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment on several elements of that claim. In rejoinder, the Government chiefly contends that the identity of Petitioner's natural father remains in dispute. Having combed through the record, the Court concludes that Paul has satisfied all but one part of his claim — that is, biological paternity. For that reason, it will grant only partial summary judgment and require a trial to finally determine Petitioner's true lineage.
To set the stage, the Court begins by laying out the uncontested facts bearing on Petitioner's progenitors before turning to those in dispute. It will then offer a few words on this case's procedural history.
Upon multiple facts do the parties agree. In October 1967, Eupheme Finlayson gave birth to Petitioner in Kingston, Jamaica. See ECF No. 25 (Appendix Volume II) at RESP624–25. She filled out a "Birth Registration Form" by hand, leaving blank the lines designated for the names of the child and the father. Id. at RESP624. Later that month, she amended the form and named the child "Paul Eccleston Matthews." Id. She did not, however, enter a name for the child's father. Id.
After a few months passed, in March 1968, she filed a summons in her country, seeking child support for the newborn and other relief from a Jamaican man named Fahrin Matthews. Id. at RESP106. That summons was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at RESP102–12. Before the end of the year, in November 1968, Eupheme came to the U.S. as a legal permanent resident, leaving her infant son with her relatives in Jamaica. Id. at RESP21–22, 27–28; see ECF No. 26 (Appendix Volume III) (Deposition of Paul Jackson) at 34–37.
Within three years of arriving in this country, in 1971, Eupheme married Herbert Jackson — an American citizen — in Maryland. See Vol. II at RESP12, 16; ECF No. 24 (Appendix Volume I) at PET1. Two years later, the couple moved to Jamaica. See ECF No. 31-2 (Resp. Statement of Facts) at 17, ¶ 37; Vol. II at RESP14; Vol. I at PET36. Upon returning to the island, Eupheme legally changed her son's surname from "Matthews" to "Jackson." See Vol. II at RESP708–13.
For a number of years, the Jacksons resided in Jamaica, but they eventually made their way back to Maryland. See Resp. SMF at 17–18, ¶¶ 39–40. Herbert and Eupheme returned first, see Vol. I at PET36 (Herbert returned in 1979); Vol II at RESP2 (Eupheme returned in 1980), and in 1981, Paul joined them, entering this country as a legal permanent resident. Id. at RESP613–17. With the assistance of a relative, he filled out his immigration paperwork and identified Herbert as his father. Id. Further, an application for a social-security number the following year stated the same thing. See Vol. I at PET49.
The path now turns more crooked. Because Herbert passed away decades ago, the foolproof method of determining whether he is Paul's birth father — i.e. , a DNA test — is not available. See Vol. I at PET239 (Herbert died in 1992); see also id. at PET237–38 (Eupheme died in 1986). That being so, Petitioner must rely on a variety of circumstantial evidence — all of which the Government contests — to make his case. For example, he points to the deposition testimony of a family friend who alleged that Herbert and Eupheme were in a romantic relationship before she gave birth to Paul. See Vol. III (Deposition of Clive Gifford) at 8, 27–29. As evidence, this witness testified that, on several occasions, Herbert visited Eupheme in Jamaica while she was pregnant with Petitioner. Id. at 22–26. During those visits, the two allegedly were physically affectionate with one another. Id. at 22 ().
The Government, however, maintains that this testimony is wholly unreliable, riddled with inconsistencies, and directly contradicted by other witness accounts. See Resp. SMF at 11, ¶ 22. Those people aver that Herbert met Eupheme long after Paul had been born. See Resp. Opp. at 5; Vol. III (Deposition of Leonard Jackson) at 23 (). More telling still, the Government points out that Herbert could not legally travel to Jamaica until 1973 — when he first applied for a U.S. passport. See Resp. SMF at 11, ¶ 22; Vol. I at PET172–73. As such, Herbert and Eupheme could not have been together at the time of Paul's conception. The Government posits, in short, that the timelines simply do not add up.
Since the late 1980s, Petitioner has had multiple encounters with law enforcement that have landed him in prison and subject to removal. See Vol. II at RESP72–83 (). Indeed, he has been deported to Jamaica several times. Id. at RESP74 (). As a result of his latest criminal episode in 2012, an immigration judge once again ordered Paul's removal from this country following the completion of his prison sentence. See Jackson v. Att'y Gen., 3d Cir. No. 17-1318, Doc. 3112588204. After serving out his sentence, Paul moved to reopen this removal decision, but an IJ denied his request. See Jackson v. Att'y Gen., 663 F. App'x 245, 246 (3d Cir. 2016). The case then wound its way through the administrative-appeals process, culminating with the Board of Immigration Appeals’ affirming that order in January 2017. See Jackson, Doc. 3112588204.
Undeterred, Paul sought review before the Third Circuit pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). Id.; see also id. (). That statute permits a would-be deportee to challenge his removal order on the basis that he is a U.S. citizen and therefore not subject to deportation. See Ricketts v. Att'y Gen., 897 F.3d 491, 492 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) ). Petitioner argued that he could not be deported because his alleged biological father (Herbert) was an American citizen, which makes him one, too.
The Third Circuit identified a genuine issue of fact underlying his acquired-citizenship claim. See Jackson, Doc. 3112808615. It therefore transferred the proceeding to a federal district court in Pennsylvania for a de novo hearing. Id. (invoking 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B) ). That court, in turn, transferred the case here when Paul moved to the District of Columbia. See Docket Entry Jan. 9, 2018.
With discovery having concluded, Petitioner has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on his citizenship claim. In the alternative, he moves for partial summary judgment on several elements of that claim. Briefing is now complete, and the Court is ready to rule on the Motion.
Upon a party's motion, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the Court to "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A fact is "material" if it can affect the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895.
When a motion for summary judgment is under consideration, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ); see also Mastro v. PEPCO, 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (same). Courts, moreover, must apply the same evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at trial. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (). They, however, must "eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
To defeat summary judgment, an opposition must be supported by affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The non-movant is required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Laningham v. U.S....
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