Jackson v. Bell

• Decision Date: 29 November 1920
• Parties: JACKSON v. BELL, FIRE PREVENTION COM'R.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

226 S.W. 207

143 Tenn. 452

JACKSON v. BELL, FIRE PREVENTION COM'R.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

November 29, 1920

Certiorari to Court of Civil Appeals.

Petition by George C. Jackson for certiorari and supersedeas seeking to review an order affirming an order of the Fire Prevention Commissioner, Walter B. Bell, requiring petitioner to destroy a certain building as a fire hazard. Judgment affirmed.

GREEN J.

This case is presented by a petition for certiorari and supersedeas to the circuit court of Blount county, seeking to review the action of that court in affirming an order of the fire prevention commissioner requiring the petitioner here George C. Jackson, to destroy as a fire hazard a certain building which he owned in the town of Maryville. The writs of certiorari and supersedeas have been heretofore granted and the case taken under advisement, after argument, by the court. A preliminary motion was made by the fire prevention commissioner to dismiss the petition for certiorari and supersedeas, because no brief was filed with the petition for lack of notice, and for certain other irregularities. We do not discuss these grounds of the motion to dismiss, since the questions here presented are of importance, and we prefer to rest our decision of the case on broader grounds.

Our attention is called in this motion to the fact that the record before us contains no bill of exceptions. This is true, and we cannot overlook this defect and undertake to review the evidence. A purported bill of exceptions is attached to the record filed here duly signed by the trial judge. It does not, however, appear that this bill of exceptions was ever filed in the court below. It does not appear when the trial judge signed the bill of exceptions. No order was made at the trial term granting any extension of time after adjournment for filing a bill of exceptions. It is obvious, therefore, that we cannot look to such a bill of exceptions as is presented here. It is no part of the record as it stands, and could not have been made a part of the record after the adjournment of court without some order to that effect (motion for new trial having been overruled) during the trial term.

A technical record, however, is before us which consists of Jackson's petition for certiorari filed in the circuit court to review the order of the fire prevention commissioner, the answer of the fire prevention commissioner and a number of orders made in the case in the circuit court. The record here, therefore, is sufficient to enable Jackson to make the constitutional objection, which he urges to the statute upon which this proceeding was based.

Chapter 131 of the Acts of 1915 is entitled:

"An act to create the office of fire prevention commissioner, and provide for the appointment of a fire prevention commissioner, deputy fire prevention commissioner and assistants, to define their powers and duties and to fix their compensation; and to provide ways and means for the enforcement of this act, and penalties for a violation thereof."

The statute is quite lengthy, and only such portions thereof will be set out in this opinion as are drawn in question by the petitioner.

Generally speaking, the act provides for the appointment of the officials named in the caption and confers upon them certain duties and fixes their compensation. It further undertakes to provide ways and means for securing compensation for these officials, and otherwise provides ways and means to enforce and make effective the act, as well as providing penalties for a violation of its terms. All these matters are set out with detail and particularity, but the whole seems to be harmonious and to fall well within the title above quoted.

The first objection to the statute is that it contains matter not within the purview of the caption in violation of section 17 of article 2 of the Constitution. We have not discovered any such infirmity.

It is urged by the petitioner that section 18 of the statute which required fire insurance companies transacting business in this state to pay a tax of one-half of 1 per cent. on the net premium receipts on their Tennessee business for the maintenance of the department of the fire prevention commissioner is beyond the title of this act. We do not think so. The title indicates that the act will fix the compensation of the officials of this department and will provide ways and means for the enforcement of the act. This levy on the insurance companies is but the means of enforcing that provision of the act fixing the compensation of such officers.

We do not see any suggestion of class legislation in the statute in violation of section 8 of article 11 of our Constitution. The act appears to bear alike on all citizens owning property "especially liable to fire, and which is situated so as to endanger life or property." Section 7.

Section 7 of this statute contains the following:

"The fire prevention commissioner, his deputies or assistants, upon the complaint in writing of any citizen, or whenever he or they shall deem it necessary, shall inspect any or all buildings or premises within their jurisdiction. When any such officer shall find any building or other structure which for want of repairs, lack of sufficient fire escapes, automatic or other fire alarm apparatus or fire extinguishing equipment or by reason or age or dilapidated condition, or from any other cause, is especially liable to fire, and which is situated so as to endanger life or property, and whenever such officer shall find in any building combustible or explosive matter or inflammable conditions dangerous to the safety of such buildings, he or they shall order the same removed or remedied, and such order shall be immediately complied with by the owner or occupant of such premises or buildings; if such order is made by a deputy or assistant to the fire prevention commissioner, such owner or occupant may, within twenty-four hours, appeal to the fire prevention commissioner, who shall, within ten days, review such order and file his decision thereon, and unless by his authority, the order is revoked or modified, it shall remain in full force and be

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