Jackson v. Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC

• Decision Date: 15 December 2021
• Docket Number: 21-0017
• Parties: Angela JACKSON, as surviving spouse of Max Jackson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS TIRE OPERATIONS, LLC, and Old Republic Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

973 N.W.2d 882

Angela JACKSON, as surviving spouse of Max Jackson, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS TIRE OPERATIONS, LLC, and Old Republic Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellees.

No. 21-0017

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Filed December 15, 2021

Mark T. Hedberg of Hedberg & Boulton, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Timothy W. Wegman and Joseph M. Barron of Peddicord, Wharton, Spencer, Hook, Barron & Wegman, LLP, West Des Moines, for appellees.

Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.

MULLINS, Presiding Judge.

Angela Jackson, as surviving spouse of Max Jackson, appeals the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the denial of workers’ compensation death benefits on her claim Max sustained a mental injury in the course of his employment with Bridgestone Americas Tires Operations, LLC (Bridgestone), resulting in his suicide. She essentially argues the agency and district court erred in finding she failed to meet her burden on the issues of factual and legal causation.¹

I. Background

Max began working for Bridgestone in the late 1980s. His job meant everything to him, and he missed only three days of work in twenty-eight years. In early August 2016, Max engaged in acts of insubordination—essentially disobeying supervisory directives concerning safety and quality—and was caught lying about those acts. Due to said insubordination, Max was suspended for a "cooling-off period," during which the matter was forwarded to human resources and an investigation was conducted. On the afternoon of August 8, Max was called into a meeting and was notified his employment was being terminated. Shortly after said notification, Max's son and fellow employee at Bridgestone, Kenneth, called Max. Max shared the news with Kenneth, who directed Max to not worry about it and work with his union representatives. Max also called Angela while she was on her way home shortly after 2:30 p.m. and advised her of the termination. Angela arrived home before Max, and when Max arrived, he went to the garage and did not enter the home. Angela went out to the garage because she heard something running, which turned out to be a vehicle, but Max had locked himself in the garage with a chain and padlock from the inside. Max agreed to come out, but when Angela stepped into the home for a moment, Max left. Angela called law enforcement.

Max was found dead at a nearby bridge shortly thereafter, mere hours after he learned of his termination, and law enforcement ruled his death a suicide by hanging. Max made statements around the time of his termination that he would take his own life if he lost his job. Angela opined in her testimony that Max's termination was "the only reason" he committed suicide.

Max had a history of substance abuse but had been sober for several years. Roughly eight months prior to the foregoing events, Max underwent a behavioral health consultation and was diagnosed with major depressive disorder

and anxiety disorder. In his initial consult, he reported hating people, listing various individuals, including Angela, Kenneth, his neighbor, and a dentist, but not anyone from his place of employment. He was recommended to attend psychotherapy and did, but he declined a referral for psychiatric treatment. He underwent an initial social history assessment later that month, at which he presented issues with anger and rage. He was additionally diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder. Max was discharged from treatment due to scheduling issues with his provider, but the counselor recommended he continue therapy. There is no evidence in the record that Max sought any further treatment for his diagnoses.

In January 2018, Angela filed an arbitration petition seeking death benefits with the workers’ compensation commissioner. Around the same time, Angela solicited an opinion from Dr. James Gallagher on "the issue of a possible causative linkage between work events and [Max] taking his own life in a rather abrupt fashion." Dr. Gallagher concluded:

It may be that [Max] was suffering psychologically and that work provided a considerable amount of structure for him and helped with mood self-regulation and, thus, his devotion to work. It seems his devotion to work was well-known along with the importance of his job. It may be that [Max] was suffering from emotional distress, but the timeline was very short between termination and ending his life. Offering a psychiatric diagnosis for his behavior would be speculative at this point. His suicide was more of an impulsive act designed to relieve extreme fear and psychological pain, which he apparently found unmanageable by any other means. From [Max]’s vantage point, the stressor of termination was obviously overwhelming and led to his death by hanging....

One could say that other employees would have managed termination differently, but such would still be quite a stressor for a longterm employee, especially one who had demonstrated such loyalty. Regardless, in [Max]’s case it was a catastrophic stressor that could have been avoided....

Thus, there appears to be a causative linkage between the behavior of his employer and [Max]’s swift decision to end his own life, probably out of fear and shame of losing his job. Despite [Max]’s counseling history, the abrupt termination without the due process as implied [by the union representative] was a substantial factor leading up to [Max]’s demise. It was clearly [Max]’s perception that his job loss was catastrophic.

The matter proceeded to an arbitration hearing in January 2019. In its ensuing ruling, a deputy commissioner concluded Max's ongoing "mental conditions appear[ed] to have been rooted in personal issues" outside of his employment, work was his place of solace, Max's fear of termination and psychological pain resulting therefrom were not injuries arising in the course of employment, the punishment fit the insubordinate acts, and, as such, his mental condition and suicide were not causally related to his termination. More succinctly, the deputy commissioner found the suicide could not be traced to an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.

Following the deputy commissioner's denial of benefits, Angela appealed to the commissioner, the commissioner affirmed, and Angela filed a petition for judicial review in the district court. In its ruling, the district court highlighted that Dr. Gallagher's opinion was based on incomplete information and concluded the evidence was insufficient to show any mental injury was related to stress from the job and factual causation was therefore lacking. The court also found legal causation lacking based on the absence of evidence that Max was treated differently than other insubordinate employees and thereby subjected to unusual job stress. The court affirmed the denial of benefits.

Angela appeals.

II. Standard of Review

"Judicial review of agency decisions is governed by Iowa Code section 17A.19" (2020).² Brakke v. Iowa Dep't of Nat. Res. , 897 N.W.2d 522, 530 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Kay-Decker v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Rev. , 857 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Iowa 2014) ); accord Warren Props. v. Stewart , 864 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Iowa 2015). The district court acts in an appellate capacity in judicial-review proceedings. Iowa Med. Soc'y v. Iowa Bd. of Nursing , 831 N.W.2d 826, 838 (Iowa 2013) (quoting City of Sioux City v. GME, Ltd. , 584 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1998) ). On appeal, this court "appl[ies] the standards of section 17A.19(10) to determine if we reach the same results as the district court." Brakke , 897 N.W.2d at 530 (quoting Renda v. Iowa Civ. Rts. Comm'n , 784 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa 2010) ); accord Des Moines Area Transit Auth. v. Young , 867 N.W.2d 839, 842 (Iowa 2015). Relief in a judicial-review proceeding is appropriate only "if the agency action prejudiced the substantial rights of the petitioner and if the agency action falls within one of the criteria listed in section 17A.19(10)(a) though (n)." Brakke , 897 N.W.2d at 530.

"Our review of a decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner varies depending on the type of error allegedly committed by the commissioner." Jacobson Transp. Co. v. Harris , 778 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 2010). Where the alleged "error is one of fact, we must determine if the commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence." Id. ; see Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). This court is not entitled to reweigh the evidence in a substantial-evidence review—we only determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency finding. Arndt v. City of Le Claire , 728 N.W.2d 389, 394–95 (Iowa 2007). "Evidence is substantial when a reasonable person could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings." Bearinger v. Iowa Dep't of Transp. , 844 N.W.2d 104, 106 (quoting Ludtke v. Iowa Dep't of Transp. , 646 N.W.2d 62, 65 (Iowa 2002) ). "If the agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence, those findings are binding upon us." Fed. Express Corp. v. Mason City Human Rights Comm'n , 852 N.W.2d 509, 510–11 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). "If ... the claimed error lies in the commissioner's application of the law to the facts, we will disturb the commissioner's if it is ‘[b]ased upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact.’ " Harris , 778 N.W.2d at 196 (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m) ).

III. Analysis

Angela argues "max suffered a mental injury in the course of his employment" and, as such, she should have been awarded death benefits as Max's surviving spouse. "Under workers’ compensation law employers shall pay compensation ‘for any and all personal injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of the employment....’ " Humboldt Cmty. Schs. v. Fleming , 603 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Iowa 1999) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 85.3(1) ). Compensation is available for dependents, such as a surviving spouse, for injuries resulting in death. Iowa Code § 85.31. "The words ‘injury’ or ‘personal injury’ " include ...