Jackson v. O'Brien

• Decision Date: 27 July 2021
• Docket Number: 1:18-cv-00032-RAL (Erie)
• Parties: RHONSHAWN JACKSON, Plaintiff v. SGT. O'BRIEN, et al. Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

RHONSHAWN JACKSON, Plaintiff v. SGT. O'BRIEN, et al. Defendants

No. 1:18-cv-00032-RAL (Erie)

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

July 27, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

ECF No. 84

RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Rhonshawn Jackson seeks reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum Opinion at ECF No. 82, which granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Jackson's motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Court will amend its summary judgment order to permit Jackson to pursue a retaliation claim against Sgt. O'Brien for allegedly denying Jackson yard privileges and law library access. In all other respects, Jackson's motion is denied.

II. Standard of Review

Although a district court has the “inherent power to reconsider prior interlocutory orders, ” State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Cty of Camden, 824 F.3d 399, 406 (3d Cir. 2016), the purpose of this power is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or allow for the presentation of newly discovered evidence. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Accordingly, a party seeking reconsideration normally must demonstrate at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court entered judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). A motion for reconsideration is also appropriate in instances where the court has “patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.” Rohrboach v. AT & T Nassau Metals Corp., 902 F.Supp. 523, 527 (M.D. Pa. 1995), vacated in part on other grounds on reconsideration, 915 F.Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (citation omitted). Such motions may not be used to reargue unsuccessful theories or argue facts or issues that were not presented to the court in the context of the previously decided matter. Drysdale v. Woerth, 153 F.Supp.2d 678, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2001). In other words, a motion for reconsideration is not a means to get a “second bite at the apple.” Kropa v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 716 F.Supp.2d 375, 378 (M.D. Pa. 2010). “Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly.” Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F.Supp. 937, 943 (E.D.Pa.1995) (citation omitted). And, while the standard for granting reconsideration of an interlocutory order is more liberal than for a final judgment, “the movant must still establish good cause for why the court should revisit its prior decision.” Qazizadeh v. Pinnacle Health. Sys., 214 F.Supp.3d 292, 295 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Confer v. Custom Eng'g Co. Emp. Health Benefit Plan, 760 F.Supp. 75, 77 (W.D. Pa. 1991)). “Each step of the litigation process should build upon the last and, in the absence of newly discovered, non-cumulative evidence, the parties should not be permitted to reargue previous rulings made in the case.” Confer, 760 F.Supp. at 77 (citation omitted). This standard applies to an order which grants in part and denies in part a motion for summary judgment. See Qazizadeh, 214 F.Supp.3d at 294 (order granting partial summary judgment is an interlocutory order).

III. Analysis

Jackson argues that the Court improperly granted summary judgment on his retaliation claim against Hearing Examiner Szelewski based on his refusal to hear from Jackson's two witnesses at the misconduct hearing held about Jackson's sexual harassment of Dr. Ziegler, a non-party. ECF No. 84, p. 1. The Court's Opinion reasoned that the record evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Jackson showed that Szelewski may have acted with a mixed motive during the misconduct proceedings (based on some statements evincing retaliatory intent) but that the “quantum of evidence” adduced at the hearing in support of the sexual harassment misconduct charge was sufficient to sustain the charge. ECF No. 82, Opinion, p. 25-26 (citing Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2016)). Jackson presents no newly discovered evidence in support of this claim. Instead, although Jackson's complaint squarely called this a “retaliation” claim, he reframes it as a claim that Szelewski violated his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Jackson relies on two Supreme Court cases as authority that Szelewski violated his right to call witnesses at his misconduct hearing. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) & Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997); ECF No. 84, p. 2. Wolff held that for inmates facing revocation of “good time credits” affecting their criminal sentences, prison officials must (in most circumstances) provide the inmate “advance written notice of the claimed violation, ” “a written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken, ” and the inmate “should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. At 564-66. Balisok addressed an issue regarding the scope of relief available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a prisoner challenges the validity of the procedures used to deprive him of good-time credits.

Construing Jackson's claim against Szelewski as one for a violation of his right to procedural due process, Szelewski is still entitled to summary judgment. To implicate protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state actor must deprive the plaintiff of either a property interest or a liberty interest. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Jackson's motion asserts that Szelewski implicated a liberty interest when he imposed sanctions on him for the misconduct charge. The Supreme Court said in Sandin v. Conner that punishment other than the loss of good time credits constitutes a deprivation of liberty requiring due process protections only if the deprivation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship.. .in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). The determination of what is “atypical and significant” is based on the range of conditions an inmate would reasonably expect to encounter. See Asquith v. Dep't of Corrs, 186 F.3d 407, 412 (3d Cir. 1999). In Sandin itself, the Court held that a 30 day punitive segregation in the prison was not an atypical or significant hardship for an inmate, so there was no liberty interest implicated, and thus, the protections of the Due Process Clause did not apply. Sandin, 487 U.S. at 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293.

Here, Szelewski did not find Jackson guilty of the indecent exposure charge but found Jackson guilty of “sexual harassment.” ECF No. 58-1, p. 25 (Exhibit 4). Szelewski sentenced him to thirty days of disciplinary custody-a form of solitary confinement. Id. This is a sanction a prisoner would reasonably expect to encounter. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (7 months solitary confinement was not an atypical or significant hardship); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997) (15 months administrative segregation). His is not an “atypical or significant hardship” on a protected liberty interests which would trigger Due Process Clause protection under Sandin. Thus, Jackson has failed to demonstrate a basis for reconsideration of the Court's entry of summary judgment for Szelewski.

Jackson also seeks reconsideration of the Court's Opinion to allow him to proceed against

Brown on a claim that he called him a “rat” and “a snitch.” ECF No. 84, p. 3. The Court held that,

Jackson also alleged that Brown retaliated against him by calling him names and threatening to kill him. The weight of legal authority holds that while name calling is offensive and unnecessary (and even counterproductive to sound prison administration and inmate rehabilitation), insults by themselves are not adverse actions to establish retaliation. But, threats of violence do constitute an adverse action for retaliation. Moreover, Jackson has established a genuine issue of material fact that Brown retaliated against him by threatening to harm him.

ECF No. 82, p. 21 (footnote omitted). Brown calling Jackson a rat and a snitch could be construed as a failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment. Inasmuch as this claim was not addressed in the Court's previous opinion, the Court will consider it now as an Eighth Amendment claim and grant Defendant Brown summary judgment on this claim. Such reconsideration is appropriate in instances where the court has “patently misunderstood a party.. .or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.” Rohrboach, 902 F.Supp. at 527.

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution imposes a duty on prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.” Hudson v Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). This includes the general duty to “protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). To state a viable failure-to-protect claim, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) he...