Watson v. Rozum
| Decision Date | 23 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–3510,13–3510 |
| Citation | 834 F.3d 417 |
| Parties | Joseph Watson, Appellant v. Gerald L. Rozum, Superintendent; Daniel Gehlmann, Deputy Supt.; Joseph Dupont, Hearing Officer at SCI Somerset; Leo Glass, Major at SCI Somerset; Melissa Hainsworth, Major at SCI Somerset; Simosko, Security Captain at SCI Somerset; Snyder, Security Captain at SCI Somerset; Coutts, Security Officer at SCI Somerset |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Kathleen G. Kane, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Kemal A. Mericli (Argued), Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 564 Forbes Avenue, 6th Floor, Manor Complex, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, Counsel for Appellees
Benjamin R. Barnett, Ellen L. Mossman (Argued), Dechert, LLP, 2929 Arch Street, 18th Floor, Cira Centre, Philadelphia, PA 19104, Counsel for Appellant
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
McKee
Joseph Watson, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Somerset, Pennsylvania, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging prison officials violated his First Amendment rights by improperly issuing a misconduct against him, and by retaliating against him for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.
The District Court dismissed Watson's suit against some of the officials with prejudice, and granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining officials on Watson's surviving retaliation claims. Watson then filed this appeal. For the following reasons, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings on Watson's retaliation claim against Officer Coutts.
Watson's claims arise from the alleged mishandling and confiscation of his radio during a routine cell search conducted by Officer Kline at 8:30 A.M. on December 6, 2011. According to Watson, while inspecting Watson's radio, Kline pulled the antenna out so far that it broke off. Kline claims a portion of the antenna was already broken and had been secured with tape. Watson asserted that the antenna was merely loose and not broken, but agreed that it was secured with tape when Kline examined it. Watson accused Kline of breaking the radio and insisted that Kline have it repaired. According to Watson, he consented when Kline explained that a broken radio is considered contraband that had to be confiscated.1 Watson accompanied Kline to the officer's desk on the cellblock to fill out the paperwork required when an inmate's property is confiscated.
In completing that paperwork, Kline noted that the antenna was already broken when he found it. Watson claimed Kline actually broke the radio and was not pleased that Kline did not take responsibility. Watson asked Kline to prepare an incident report documenting that Kline broke the antenna. Kline refused. Watson then asked Captain Simosko for a grievance form, but Simosko refused to give him one.
Later that day Watson was summoned to the prison security office where Officer Coutts purportedly asked Watson about the broken radio. During this exchange, Coutts purportedly stated that Watson had given Simosko and Kline a “hard time” by asking for a grievance form and insisting that the radio be repaired rather than just dropping the matter. Coutts allegedly told Watson that, as a result, he was going to give Watson a misconduct. According to Watson, Coutts said that he (Watson) had not handled the situation “the polite way” because he had insisted on filing a grievance.
Watson did eventually fill out a grievance form that he obtained from another prisoner. However, before Watson could file his grievance, he was summoned to pick up a misconduct notice that had been prepared by Coutts and approved and signed by Security Captain Snyder. The misconduct notice cited Watson with a Class I misconduct and stated that the radio had been confiscated as contraband. The misconduct form indicated that it was received at 2:23 P.M., nearly six hours after the search of Watson's cell. After receiving the misconduct, Watson filed his grievance against Kline. Watson did not file a grievance against anyone else who had been involved with the confiscation of his radio or the misconduct that was filed against him.
Watson was ultimately found guilty of the charged misconduct at a hearing conducted by Hearing Officer Dupont. However, Dupont reduced the level of the misconduct from Class I to Class II. The penalty that was imposed was confiscation of Watson's radio. Watson's appeal of the imposition of a Class II misconduct was denied by the Department of Corrections' Program Review Committee. The Committee concluded that Dupont's decision was supported by the evidence at the hearing. Watson appealed that decision to the prison superintendent who sustained the prior decisions.
Thereafter, Watson filed the present lawsuit. The defendants were Gerald Rozum, Daniel Gehlman, Leo Glass, Melissa Hainsworth, Coutts, Dupont, Synder, and Simosko. The District Court dismissed all of Watson's claims with prejudice, with the exception of Watson's retaliation claims against Dupont, Simosko, Snyder and Coutts.
Thereafter, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendations and granted summary judgment in favor of each of the remaining defendants and against Watson. The District Court agreed that summary judgment was appropriate even if the record established that Watson had made out a prima facie case of retaliation, because prison officials would have issued the misconduct regardless of Watson's protected activity (the “same decision” defense). This appeal followed.
We exercise plenary review over a District Court's grant of summary judgment.2 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3 The judge's function at the summary judgment stage is solely to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.4
Watson alleged due process violations, an unconstitutional search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment, prison policy violations, state law violations and retaliation for engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment. As noted, all of Watson's initial claims were dismissed with prejudice, except for his claim for relief based on the alleged retaliation. Watson now appeals the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the retaliation claims. Therefore, we need only decide if Watson's retaliation claims survive summary judgment.
Our analysis is guided by our decision in Rauser v. Horn
.5 In order to establish illegal retaliation for engaging in protected conduct, Watson must prove that: (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials;6 and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to discipline him.7 Because motivation is almost never subject to proof by direct evidence, Watson must rely on circumstantial evidence to prove a retaliatory motive. He can satisfy his burden with evidence of either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link.8
However, even if Watson establishes a prima facie case, prison officials may still prevail if they establish that “they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”9 This is often referred to as the “same decision defense.” For purposes of this appeal, the named prison officials assume that Watson engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that he suffered an adverse consequence. They argue that Watson cannot establish the required causal nexus between the two and that, even if he could, the same decision defense applies. However, since we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment as to Coutts, we will explain why we believe Watson satisfied the first two prongs of his prima facie case rather than merely relying on the defendants' assumption that he has.
Watson claims that he engaged in constitutionally protected activity when he filed a grievance against a corrections officer, and that defendants illegally retaliated by citing him for misconduct. In Mitchell v. Horn
, we explained that filing such a grievance does “implicate[ ] conduct protected by the First Amendment.”10 Here, the allegedly retaliatory conduct occurred before he filed his grievance. However, we do not believe that chronology necessarily defeats Watson's retaliation claim because he informed prison officials of his intent to file a grievance and requested an appropriate form from Simosko before any misconduct was filed against him. For purposes of Watson's retaliation claim, we cannot discern a substantive distinction between retaliation for informing prison officials of an intent to file a grievance or requesting the necessary forms to do so on the one hand, and actually filing such a grievance on the other. Accordingly, the record is sufficient to establish the first prong of Watson's prima facie case of retaliation.
An adverse consequence “need not be great in order to be actionable[;]” rather, it need only be “more than de minimis .”11 Watson clearly suffered an adverse consequence when Coutts charged him with a Class I misconduct. Class I misconducts subject inmates to a range of sanctions, including a disadvantageous change in housing assignment, placement in restricted housing or restrictive confinement for up to 90 days, or a detrimental change in program level.12 They may also result in loss of the ability to participate in prerelease programs,...
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