Jackson v. Chelsea Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 16 May 1951
• Citation: 99 N.E.2d 73,327 Mass. 423
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: JACKSON v. CHELSEA HOUSING AUTHORITY.

Page 73

99 N.E.2d 73

327 Mass. 423

JACKSON v. CHELSEA HOUSING AUTHORITY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 8, 1951.

Decided May 16, 1951.

C. C. Worth, Boston, for plaintiff.

J. B. O'Hare, Boston, S. G. Brown, Chelsea, for defendant.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, SPALDING, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ.

COUNIHAN, Justice.

This is a suit in equity under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 231A, inserted by St. 1945, c. 582, § 1, for a declaratory decree and consequantial relief, where an actual controversy has arisen between the parties as to the rights of the plaintiff under a written contract dated February 21, 1949, between him and the defendant, hereinafter called the authority. By the terms of this contract the authority agreed to employ the plaintiff as its executive director for a period of four years at a salary of $4,000 a year payable weekly. The executive director was ex officio secretary of the authority. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 121, § 26N, as appearing in St. 1946, c. 574, § 1. On July 8, 1949, when the plaintiff was not in default and had faithfully and competently performed his duties, he was 'fired' by a majority vote of the authority. On June 12, 1950, a decree was entered that this contract was a valid and binding contract; that the authority improperly discharged the plaintiff in violation of the contract; that the authority owed the plaintiff the sum of $4,176.76 damages to June 12, 1950; and that the contract was still in force and effect. From this decree the authority appeals. The evidence is reported and the judge adopted his voluntary findings as a report of material facts. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 214, § 23, as amended.

Where there is a report of material facts and the evidence is reported, we must examine the evidence and decide the case according to our judgment as to the facts, giving due weight to the findings of the judge upon conflicting evidence, which will not be overturned unless plainly wrong. Berman v. Coakley, 257 Mass. 159, 162, 153 N.E. 463; Boyle v. Owens, 326 Mass. 163, 165, 93 N.E.2d 404.

From an examination of the evidence and the report of material facts we find as follows: The authority was organized as a housing authority under c. 121, § 26L, as appearing in St. 1938, c. 484, § 1, and on April 8, 1948, the plaintiff was confirmed as a member for a term of five years, c. 121, § 26L, as appearing in St. 1946, c. 574, § 1. On February 15, 1949, at a meeting of the authority, by a vote of four members, the plaintiff was appointed executive director to take effect at once. The plaintiff did not vote. The records of this meeting show that a contract was to be 'drawn up immediately covering this position--upon the signing of said contract--at a minimum starting pay of $4000.00 per annum--Mr. Jackson will resign as a member of the Authority.' The plaintiff was unwilling to resign until the mayor (who appointed him) assented and unless he was given a four year contract at a minimum salary of $4,000, with the approval of the chairman of the State housing board. The mayor became disturbed because of the failure of the authority to employ an executive director, and on February 21, 1949, conferred with the plaintiff and the chairman of the authority about it. The plaintiff told the major that he had been appointed but that he did not want to resign as a member if the mayor objected. The mayor replied that he had no objection to the plaintiff resigning and taking the new job. He said further, referring to the Chelsea Record, a local newspaper, 'Why don't you and Mr. Tigar [the chairman] go down and make the announcement?' The plaintiff replied 'I'll go down and make the announcement and, of course, I'll be resigning.' The plaintiff also testified that he said 'if I go down there, I'm resigning from the Authority.' Thereafter the plaintiff went to the newspaper and made an announcement that he had been appointed executive director. He started to work on the same day. On March 2, 1949, the plaintiff gave the authority a letter dated March 1, 1949, addressed to the plaintiff, in which the chairman of the State housing board stated that the board had no objection to the proposed contract with the plaintiff and its terms, with suggestions which were later incorporated in the contract. The minutes of a meeting of the authority on March 2, 1949, disclose that four members, Tigar, Keats, Malone and Martin, were present and none was absent. There were also present Mr. Brown, counsel for the authority, and the plaintiff, who took no part in the meeting. It appears that the plaintiff at this meeting submitted in writing to the authority his resignation as a member, dated February 21, 1949. Reference is made in the minutes of this meeting to the vote of February 15, 1949, appointing the plaintiff executive director, and thereafter the contract in issue was signed by all the members and the plaintiff. The plaintiff was then sworn in as ex officio secretary by Mr. Brown. On March 2 1949, the plaintiff sent the mayor a formal letter of resignation as a member. No appointment of a successor was made by the mayor until April 25, 1949, and the appointee qualified on April 27, 1949. On March 4, 1949, the plaintiff received a check for services for the weeks ending February 25, 1949, and March 4, 1949, in an amount the same as that provided by the contract. This check was signed by the chairman and treasurer of the authority with the approval of all the members. He continued to receive checks up to July 8, 1949, when the authority voted to 'fire' him.

The authority argues but two points; (1) that the plaintiff continued to be a member of the authority until his successor was qualified on April 27, 1949, because of c. 121, §§ 26L, 26N, 26O, and art. II, s. 8, of the by-laws of the authority adopted by virtue of c. 121, § 26P; and (2) that if this contention is not sustained, in any event the plaintiff did not resign in fact until after the contract is invalid.

We cannot agree with the position the...