Jackson v. City of Oklahoma, M-83-530
Decision Date | 20 March 1984 |
Docket Number | No. M-83-530,M-83-530 |
Citation | 678 P.2d 725 |
Parties | Dale L. JACKSON, Appellant, v. The CITY OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee. |
Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Dale L. Jackson, appellant was convicted of Speeding in the Municipal Court of Oklahoma City. He was fined $30 and appeals. AFFIRMED.
Dale L. Jackson, pro se.
Walter M. Powell, Municipal Counselor, Wiley Williams, Asst. Municipal Counselor, Oklahoma City, for appellee.
Dale L. Jackson was tried in a non-jury trial in the Municipal Criminal Court of Oklahoma City for the offense of speeding. Evidence was introduced that appellant was driving at a rate of forty-five miles per hour in a thirty miles per hour zone. He was found guilty and a fine of $30 was imposed.
Appellant first assigns error of the trial court in admitting evidence of speed as detected by a radar device. He claims such evidence is not admissible in Oklahoma. Appellant completely overlooks our opinion endorsing such evidence in Shears v. State, 648 P.2d 841 (Okl.Cr.1982). We held there that the readout of a radar device, which happened to be the same type of unit as used in the present case, was admissible if the device was shown to be operating accurately and that the officer using it was properly trained in its operation. Officer Richardson testified that he calibrated the hand-held K-15 radar device internally and externally at the beginning of his shift the day he issued a citation to appellant. He also testified that he received on the job training in the use of this equipment for six months. This information was sufficient to introduce evidence of appellant's speed as measured by the radar device.
In addition, the officer said he had been trained to, and actually did on this day, estimate speed by visual observation. He had estimated appellant's speed to be in excess of forty miles per hour before he observed the radar unit's readout. This evidence tends to corroborate the accuracy of the radar unit.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of Officer Richardson regarding details of the calibration tests he performed on the unit and of environmental conditions which may have affected the radar device. The officer testified to the subjects noted, but the trial judge limited the extent of cross-examination.
It is the general rule that the scope of cross-examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Only in cases of clear abuse of this discretion, resulting in manifest prejudice, will this Court reverse the trial court's decision. See e.g., Wells v. State, 559 P.2d 445 (Okl.Cr.1977). This rule prevails in the present case; and, finding no manifest prejudice, this assignment must fail.
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