Jackson v. City of Grand Forks

• Decision Date: 03 March 1913
• Docket Number: 81912
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

140 N.W. 718

24 N.D. 601

JACKSON et al. v. CITY OF GRAND FORKS, a Municipal Corporation

No. 81912

Supreme Court of North Dakota

March 3, 1913

Appeal from the District Court for Grand Forks County; Templeton, J.

Action against the City to recover damages resulting from personal injuries sustained in slipping and falling on an icy sidewalk. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

J. B Wineman, for appellant.

A municipal corporation is held only to the exercise of ordinary care to make and keep its streets in reasonably safe condition. Leonard v. Butte, 25 Mont. 410, 65 P 425; Dill. Mun. Corp. 5th ed. 1697; 28 Cyc. 1358.

City has reasonable time, after notice of obstructions to sidewalks, to remove same. 28 Cyc. 1378.

It must appear that sufficient time has elapsed after notice, to permit city to act, before it can be held liable. 28 Cyc 1362; Dill. Mun. Corp. 5th ed. 1718.

The facts stated and relied upon must show that city is guilty of a legal wrong in failing to act with reasonable diligence. McEnaney v. Butte, 43 Mont. 526, 117 P. 894; Corey v. Ann Arbor, 124 Mich. 134, 82 N.W. 804; McDonald v. Toledo, 63 F. 60.

City charter and ordinances, if material as evidence in such actions, must be pleaded. Blanchard v. Lake Shore & M. S R. Co. 126 Ill. 416, 9 Am. St. Rep. 630, 18 N.E. 803; Richter v. Harper, 95 Mich. 221, 54 N.W. 770.

Such pleading is necessary in order to give defendant (city) notice of the claim. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 83; Gardner v. Detroit Street R. Co. 99 Mich. 182, 58 N.W. 51, 4 Am. Neg. Cas. 163; West Jersey R. Co. v. Paulding, 58 N.J.L. 178, 33 A. 381.

A city being bound to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition, it cannot shift that duty by requiring the abutting owners to remove ice and snow, and upon failure to do so, create a civil liability in favor of anyone injured by the violation of such ordinance. Kan.--Jansen v. Atchison, 16 Kan. 358; Md.--Flynn v. Canton Co. 40 Md. 312, 17 Am. Rep. 603; Mass.--Kirby v. Boylston Market Asso. 14 Gray, 249, 74 Am. Dec. 682; Mo.--Norton v. St. Louis, 97 Mo. 537, 11 S.W. 242; St. Louis v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 107 Mo. 92, 17 S.W. 637, 28 Am. St. Rep. 402; Ohio--Vandyke v. Cincinnati, 1 Disney (Ohio) 532; R. I.--Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 456, 23 Am. Rep. 502.

One who voluntarily attempts to walk over a sidewalk, knowing same to be in a dangerous condition by reason of ice upon it, and which might have been avoided, cannot be regarded as exercising ordinary care and due prudence. Quincy v. Barker, 81 Ill. 300, 25 Am. Rep. 278; Chicago v. Bixby, 84 Ill. 82, 25 Am. Rep. 429; Schafler v. Sandusky, 33 Ohio St. 246, 31 Am. Rep. 533; Evans v. Utica, 69 N.Y. 166, 25 Am. Rep. 165; Muncie v. Hay, 164 Ind. 570, 74 N.E. 250, 18 Am. Neg. Rep. 51; Evans v. Philadelphia, 205 Pa. 193, 97 Am. St. Rep. 732, 54 A. 775; Aurora v. Pulfer, 56 Ill. 270; Belton v. Baxter, 54 N.Y. 245, 13 Am. Rep. 578; Wilson v. Charlestown, 8 Allen, 137, 85 Am. Dec. 693.

Municipal corporation is only required to guard against such dangers in its streets, which include sidewalks, as can or ought to be anticipated or foreseen, in the exercise of reasonable prudence and care. Braats v. Fargo, 19 N.D. 538, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1169, 125 N.W. 1042; Jones, Neg. Mun. Corp. Sec. 100, p. 100; 4 Dill. Mun. Corp. 5th ed. p. 2968; Dapper v. Milwaukee, 107 Wis. 88, 82 N.W. 726; Hyer v. Janesville, 101 Wis. 371, 77 N.W. 729; Cook v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 270, 1 Am. Rep. 183; 27 Wis. 191; Grossenbach v. Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 31, 56 Am. Rep. 614, 26 N.W. 182; Chamberlain v. Oshkosh, 84 Wis. 289, 19 L.R.A. 513, 36 Am. St. Rep. 928, 54 N.W. 618; Hausmann v. Madison, 85 Wis. 187, 21 L.R.A. 263, 39 Am. St. Rep. 834, 55 N.W. 167; Beaton v. Milwaukee, 97 Wis. 416, 73 N.W. 53; Cooper v. Waterloo, 98 Wis. 424, 74 N.W. 115; Kleiner v. Madison, 104 Wis. 339, 80 N.W. 453; De Pere v. Hibbard, 104 Wis. 666, 80 N.W. 933; Harrington v. Buffalo, 121 N.Y. 147, 24 N.E. 186; McNally v. Cohoes, 127 N.Y. 350, 27 N.E. 1043; Lichenstein v. New York, 159 N.Y. 500, 54 N.E. 67, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 332; Salzer v. Milwaukee, 97 Wis. 471, 73 N.W. 20; Gagan v. Janesville, 106 Wis. 662, 82 N.W. 558; West v. Eau Claire, 89 Wis. 31, 61 N.W. 313; Perkins v. Fond du Lac, 34 Wis. 435.

The trial court should have granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. McKellar v. Detroit, 57 Mich. 158, 58 Am. Rep. 357, 23 N.W. 621; Cooper v. Waterloo, 98 Wis. 424, 74 N.W. 116; Jefferson v. Sault Ste. Marie, 166 Mich. 340, 130 N.W. 610, 1 N.C. C. A. 598.

The duty resting upon municipal corporations to remove accumulations of ice and snow as it falls from time to time upon their streets is a qualified one, and becomes imperative only when dangerous formations or obstacles have been created, and sufficient notice of their existence has been received by the corporation. Hunt v. New York, 109 N.Y. 134, 16 N.E. 320; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N.Y. 136, 6 Am. Rep. 52; Taylor v. Yonkers, 105 N.Y. 209, 59 Am. Rep. 492, 11 N.E. 642; Kaveny v. Troy, 108 N.Y. 571, 15 N.E. 726; Kinney v. Troy, 108 N.Y. 567, 15 N.E. 728; Johnson v. Glens Falls, 41 N.Y. S. R. 820, 16 N.Y.S. 585; Winne v. Albany, 39 N.Y. S. R. 603, 15 N.Y.S. 423; Gram v. Greenbush, 20 N.Y. S. R. 370, 3 N.Y.S. 76; Kleng v. Buffalo, 72 Hun, 541, 25 N.Y.S. 445; Quincy v. Barker, 81 Ill. 305, 25 Am. Rep. 278; Chicago v. McDonald, 111 Ill.App. 436; Gardner v. Philadelphia, 221 Pa. 247, 70 A. 721; Hendrickson v. Chester City, 221 Pa. 120, 70 A. 553; Henkes v. Minneapolis, 42 Minn. 530, 44 N.W. 1027.

Geo. A. Bangs, for respondent.

Objection to the introduction of evidence on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action should point out, and specify in particular, wherein the complaint is so defective. Such specification should be reproduced in the statement of the case. Rule 14, 10 N.D. XLVI, 91 N.W. VIII; Flora v. Mathwig, 19 N.D. 4, 121 N.W. 63; Larson v. Hanson, 21 N.D. 411, 131 N.W. 229.

Under such objection, the particular reason or reasons why the complaint does not state facts sufficient should be stated, so that the trial court and counsel may be informed as to the precise questions raised. The general objection is not sufficient. Chilson v. Bank of Fairmount, 9 N.D. 96, 81 N.W. 33; Schweinber v. Great Western Elevator Co. 9 N.D. 113, 81 N.W. 35; James River Nat. Bank v. Purchase, 9 N.D. 280, 83 N.W. 7; Pine Tree Lumber Co. v. Fargo, 12 N.D. 384, 96 N.W. 357.

The ordinances of a city, properly passed, and within the scope of its authority, are statements, expressions, or admissions of the city, touching the subject-matter in which it is charged as having been negligent. Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161, 15 L.Ed. 72; McNerney v. Reading, 150 Pa. 611, 25 A. 57; Meyers v. Kansas City, 108 Mo. 480, 18 S.W. 914; Reed v. Mexico, 101 Mo.App. 155, 76 S.W. 53; Columbus v. Ogletree, 102 Ga. 293, 29 S.E. 749, 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 37; Pomfrey v. Saratoga Springs, 104 N.Y. 459, 11 N.E. 43; Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S. 436, 440, 38 L.Ed. 224, 226, 14 S.Ct. 387; McLeod v. Spokane, 26 Wash. 346, 67 P. 74; Levy v. Salt Lake City, 5 Utah 302, 16 P. 599; Flater v. Fey, 70 Mich. 644, 38 N.W. 656; Smith v. Pella, 86 Iowa 238, 53 N.W. 226; Shumway v. Burlington, 108 Iowa 424, 79 N.W. 123; Herries v. Waterloo, 114 Iowa 374, 86 N.W. 306; McCartney v. Washington, 124 Iowa 382, 100 N.W. 80.

Ordinances are admitted, in action against city, under the rule which allows proof of the acts and declarations of the parties concerning the matter in controversy. 6 Thomp. Neg. Sec. 7868, p. 763; Blanchard v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 126 Ill. 416, 9 Am. St. Rep. 630, 18 N.E. 799; Richter v. Harper, 95 Mich. 221, 54 N.W. 768; Gardner v. Detroit Street R. Co. 99 Mich. 182, 58 N.W. 49, 4 Am. Neg. Cas. 163; West Jersey R. Co. v. Paulding, 58 N.J.L. 178, 33 A. 381.

Where a city ordinance is introduced merely as one of the circumstances, or to show declarations or admissions of city, it need not be pleaded. Ordinances are evidentiary facts,--ultimate facts is the defendant's negligence. In such cases, they need not be pleaded. Flater v. Fey, 70 Mich. 644, 38 N.W. 656; Blickley v. Luce, 148 Mich. 233, 111 N.W. 752; Putnam v. Detroit United R. Co. 164 Mich. 342, 129 N.W. 860.

Evidence of a statute or ordinance and its violation is admissible under a general averment of negligence. Watson, Damages, p. 361; Faber v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 29 Minn. 465, 13 N.W. 902; Klotz v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 68 Minn. 341, 71 N.W. 257, 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 201; Meek v. Pennsylvania Co. 38 Ohio St. 637; McGrath v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 63 N.Y. 530; Massoth v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. 64 N.Y. 531; Correll v. Burlington, C. R. & M. R. Co. 38 Iowa 120, 18 Am. Rep. 22; Robertson v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 84 Mo. 119; Bragg v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. 192 Mo. 331, 91 S.W. 527; Union P. R. Co. v. Rasmussen, 25 Neb. 810, 13 Am. St. Rep. 527, 41 N.W. 778; Omaha Street R. Co. v. Larson, 70 Neb. 591, 97 N.W. 824, 15 Am. Neg. Rep. 380; Borneman v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 19 S.D. 459, 104 N.W. 211; Interstate & G. N. R. Co. v. Lee, Tex. Civ. App. , 34 S.W. 160; St. Louis & S.E. R. Co. v. Mathias, 50 Ind. 68; Johnson v. Thomas, Cal. , 43 P. 578; Harrison v. Sutter Street R. Co. 116 Cal. 156, 47 P. 1019, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 403; Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa 321, 79 N.W. 134; Brasington v. South Bound R. Co. 62 S.C. 325, 89 Am. St. Rep. 905, 40 S.E. 665; Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 140.

A person can only be said to be guilty of contributory negligence, when the danger is so great that no reasonable person would have pursued the same course. The verdict of the jury must not be disturbed if there is any reasonable inference or deduction to be drawn from the evidence, to sustain it. Grand Trunk R....