Jackson v. Clark

• Decision Date: 02 October 1961
• Docket Number: No. 7079,7079
• Citation: 351 S.W.2d 292
• Parties: Bobby Wayne JACKSON v. Ronnie W. CLARK et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 292

351 S.W.2d 292

Bobby Wayne JACKSON v. Ronnie W. CLARK et al.

No. 7079.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Amarillo.

Oct. 2, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 6, 1961.

Albert Smith, Lubbock, for appellant.

Shaver, Hurley & Sowder, Crenshaw, Dupree & Milam, Lubbock, for appellees.

DENTON, Chief, Justice.

Ronnie Clark and wife June Clark, along with D. L. Peterson, sued Tony L. Gibson and wife Donna Gibson and appellant Bobby Wayne Jackson for property damage to Peterson's automobile and the Clark's automobile air-conditioner which resulted from a collision involving three automobiles on February 24, 1959 near the intersection of 34th Street and Orlando Avenue in the City of Lubbock. No claim for personal injuries was made by any of the parties hereto. Trial was to a jury and based on the jury's answers to the special issues submitted, the trial court entered a judgment for plaintiffs against Jackson for the sum of $1,750.

Prior to the collision appellant Jackson was driving his father's 1951 Ford pickup in a westerly direction in the inside or center lane of 34th Street. Donna Gibson, one of the appellees, was driving her 1953 Chevrolet in the same direction and in the same lane that Jackson was driving. Her testimony was that she had followed the pickup for some two blocks prior to the collision. She further testified she was approximately one and one-half car lengths behind Jackson's pickup. Jackson testified he did not see the Gibson car until the two cars came in contact. As the two cars approached a point just beyond the intersection of 34th and Orlando Avenue the speed of the pickup was decreased. When Mrs. Gibson attempted to pass the pickup on the left the Gibson car struck the pickup in the left side. After this impact the Gibson car veered to the left and proceeded into the private parking area of a grocery store, and there struck the parked 1959 Chevrolet owned by Peterson. Mrs. Clark had driven the Peterson car to the parking lot, but no one was seated in this car at the time it was struck.

Appellant's first two points of error complain of the trial court instructing counsel and all witnesses to refrain from mentioning that State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, insurer of the Gibsons, had entered into any agreement with Bobby Wayne Jackson following the collision; and of the trial court sustaining Gibson's exception to Jackson's pleadings which pleaded that State Farm had paid Jackson some damages sustained by him. It is appellant's contention the settlement made by State Farm and Jackson is admissible as an admission or declaration against interest. He argues that State Farm and not the Gibsons is the real party in interest, and that by making the settlement with Jackson, the Gibsons could not be prejudiced by the admission of the settlement. Appellant also places a great deal of importance on the fact the Gibsons were not seeking a recovery of damages. Appellant relies principally on McEntire v. Baygent (Tex.Civ.App.) 229 S.W.2d 866, 20 A.L.R.2d 300 (no writ history) and Skelly Oil Co. v. Carter (Tex.Civ.App.) 316 S.W.2d 87 (no writ history). These cases, along with others therein cited, simply reaffirm the established rule of law that it may be shown that the defendant has paid the claims of other persons whose damages resulted in the same manner as the plaintiff. See also 'Texas Law of Evidence,' McCormick & Ray, 2d Ed. Sec. 1150. This principle is not controlling under the facts and circumstances of the instant case, but applies where a settlement was made to another claimant by the named defendant in the case under consideration.

In the instant case State Farm made the settlement with Jackson. No effort was made to introduce the alleged settlement agreement, but appellant contends the allegations and pleadings must be accepted as true. We are aware of the rule that this Court must assume that the allegations are true in testing their sufficiency by a special exception; however, the pleadings make no assertion that the settlement was made with the knowledge or consent of the Gibsons. In our opinion knowledge and consent on the part of the insured is essential before evidence of a settlement of a claim by the insurance company with another claimant would be admissible in a suit where the insured and the other claimant are parties. Appellant contends that the allegation 'Thereafter, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, acting for itself and as the representative of Tony L. and Donna Gibson' implies knowledge and consent of the settlement on the part of the Gibsons.

The insurance policy gave State Farm the authority to settle the claim with Jackson but to say the company, in making the settlement, was acting as the agent of Gibson and as the agent its act was that of the principal is not supported by the authorities. City Transportation Co. of Dallas v. Vatsures (Tex.Civ.App.) 278 S.W.2d 373, 375 (error dismissed) is very similar to the instant case. There Vatsures brought suit against the transportation company and one John Thomas Taylor for injuries sustained as a result of a collision involving a taxicab owned and operated by the transportation company and an automobile owned and operated by Taylor. Vatsures was a fare-paying passenger in the cab. The trial court excluded evidence of a payment on behalf of Taylor to the transportation company in full settlement of that company's claim against Taylor for their damages arising out of the collision. In holding that such evidence was not admissible, the court used the following language:

'It is settled law that the payment of a claim in full can be offered as an admission against interest or of liability against the party paying the claim. However, the point here involved is not that proposition of law, but whether a payment by an insurance company of a claim against their insured may be used as an admission against interest or of liability against the insured upon the trial of a claim arising out of the same accident. The reason that the payment of a claim in full becomes admissible as evidence of an admission against interest or of liability against the party paying the claim is that the payment indicates that the party paying the claim felt himself liable, or otherwise he would not have paid the claim in full, but would have resisted it or at least compromised the claim. Such reasoning cannot apply to the situation here involved. This suit is a suit against Taylor which the Allstate Insurance Company, under the terms of its policy, undertook to defend. The Allstate Insurance Company is not a party to the suit and could not become a party to the suit. Defendant Taylor is the party at interest in the suit and is the only one against whom there can be admissions against interest or admissions of liability. Yet the record reflects that Taylor had absolutely nothing to do with the $53.38 paid to the City Transportation Company. Certainly, it cannot be said that actions taken without his knowledge or consent can constitute admissions against interest or of liability as to him.'

See also Hurley v....