Jackson v. Cochran

• Decision Date: 21 April 1910
• Citation: 67 S.E. 825,134 Ga. 396
• Parties: JACKSON v. COCHRAN.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

67 S.E. 825

134 Ga. 396

JACKSON v. COCHRAN.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 21, 1910

Syllabus by the Court.

While mandamus will lie to compel performance of specific acts where the duty to discharge them is clear, it is not an appropriate remedy to compel a general course of official conduct for a long series of continuous acts to be performed under varying conditions. Therefore the writ of mandamus will not issue at the suit of one of the duly elected bailiffs of a militia district to compel the justice of the peace elected in such district to make an apportionment of the papers writs, and other processes issuing from the justice's court or returnable thereto, and to turn over any particular part of them to the constable.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; J. T. Pendleton, Judge.

Application by W. A. Cochran for writ of mandamus against R. R. Jackson. From an order overruling a demurrer, defendant brings error. Reversed.

Moore & Branch, for plaintiff in error.

J. S James, for defendant in error.

BECK J. (after stating the facts as above).

While the writ of mandamus will issue to compel a due performance of official duties, it will not be granted to compel the performance of such a series of acts as that, in enforcing the observance of the writ, the court issuing the same would have to undertake to oversee and control the general course of official conduct of the party to whom the writ is directed. In the case of Patterson v. Taylor, 98 Ga 646, 25 S.E. 771, it was said: "Mandamus will not lie to compel a public officer to do an act not clearly commanded by law. 'It is only practicable by mandamus to compel performance of specific acts, where the duty to discharge them is clear and well-defined, and when no element of discretion is involved in the performance.' Where the officer has a discretion in the matter, the court may by this means compel him to exercise his discretion, but cannot direct in what manner he shall exercise it. 14 Am. & Eng Enc. of Law, art. 'Mandamus,' 104; Merrill on Mandamus, § 106 et seq." And in the case of Diamond Match Co. v. Powers, 51 Mich. 147, 16 N.W. 315, the court said: "When the case presents a single occasion, and calls for an act which is presently determinate, it is entirely practicable to direct the act by mandamus. But where the case contemplates something continuous, yet variable in its conditions and aptitudes, the remedy by that process seems...