Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 35085
| Decision Date | 08 July 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 35085,No. 1,35085,1 |
| Citation | 83 S.E.2d 76,90 Ga.App. 352 |
| Parties | JACKSON v. COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORP |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
The petition stated a cause of action to recover usurious interest paid to the defendant in return for a loan of money, and the trial court erred in sustaining the general demurrer.
(a) In determining whether a transaction pleaded is a bona fide time price sale or a device to cloak usury, the courts will look to the substance of the transaction, and to that end parol evidence is admissible to show that the writing executed by the parties as a part of the transaction does not represent the true contract or agreement entered into between the parties.
This is a case in which the purchaser of an automobile brought suit against a finance company for damages. He alleged in his petition that he purchased an automobile from a certain vendor; that, prior to the consummation of the sale, he was informed by the vendor that the price of the automobile was $818; and that he was only able to pay $318, so that it was necessary, in order to close the sale, that the balance of the purchase price be financed. He further alleged that a certain agent, both of the vendor and of the credit company, informed him that he would have the credit company to finance the transaction provided a time price was placed upon the automobile by the vendor, and agreed to by the petitioner, of $1,100. This the petitioner said he agreed to, and on forms furnished by the defendant finance company gave to the seller of the automobile a conditional-sale contract for the amount of the time price. He stated in the petition that the defendant knew that the time price was being increased from $818 to $1,100 before he purchased the papers, and required the seller of the automobile and the plaintiff to agree to increase the price of the automobile to that amount as a condition to its purchasing the bill of sale. The petition alleges that the oral agreement to pay the $345.82 interest was made between the plaintiff and the defendant credit corporation. Paragraph 5 of the petition alleges: 'That before defendant furnished the said amount as the remainder of the said cash price, it required plaintiff and the said Shenton Nash Motors to enter into a conditional sale agreement wherein it would appear to all outsiders that the said automobile was sold for a time price, and where it would further appear that plaintiff would be paying said Shenton or his assigns, and that it would appear that if Commercial Credit Corporation entered the transaction at all, it would be doing so only as an innocent and bona fida purchaser for value of a negotiable instrument, and further that it would appear that defendant is not engaged in a loan business, but a financial institution in the business of buying and selling commercial paper.' The petition also alleges that the transaction was fraudulent and that the contract was consequently void. The plaintiff prayed for recovery of the interest paid or charged by the defendant and for $100 as attorney's fees.
Robert L. Cork, Valdosta, for plaintiff in error.
Franklin, Eberhardt & Barham, Valdosta, for defendant in error.
1. Where the vendor and the vendee agree upon a cash price in the sale of personal property, but later enter into a written conditional-sales contract fixing the time price at a much higher figure, under the holdings of this court the conditional bill of sale is valid. Richardson v. C. I. T. Corp., 60 Ga.App. 780, 5 S.E.2d 250.
2. In the event a credit company is aware that the seller of personal property is charging, and the vendee agrees to pay, a much higher credit price for personal property than was originally agreed upon by them as a cash price for the same, for the purpose of inducing the credit company to buy a conditional-sale contract from the vendor at the cash price, this without more would furnish no legal impediment for the collection from the vendee of the full credit or time price evidenced by the bill of sale.
3. The petition in the instant case does not merely allege that the defendant purchased and had transferred to it a bill of sale made by the plaintiff to the vendor of an automobile, with knowledge prior to the execution of the instrument that it was to be given for a time price higher than a cash price charged plaintiff by the vendor for the same automobile. It clearly avers that there was an agreement by the defendant to furnish a sum of money sufficient to pay the cash price of the automobile in consideration of plaintiff paying defendant an...
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Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co.
...of a loan between the buyer-borrower and the bank. See, Comment, 48 Wash.L.Rev. 479 (1973). Accord, Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corporation, 90 Ga.App. 352, 83 S.E.2d 76, 79 (1954). For other agency or 'close relationship' cases involving the seller's agreement to finance or obtain the fin......
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State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 33943
...numerous authorities, including those involving defendants' parent corporation, support those conclusions. See, Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 90 Ga.App. 352, 83 S.E.2d 76; United Tire & Investment Co. v. Trone, 189 Okl. 120, 113 P.2d 977; White v. Disher, 232 N.C. 260, 59 S.E.2d 798; ......
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Clay v. Oxendine
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Woods v. Evans Products Co.
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