Jackson v. Dunn Constr. Co.
| Decision Date | 21 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:11–cv–00016–AKK. |
| Citation | 927 F.Supp.2d 1229 |
| Parties | Randy JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. DUNN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Cynthia F. Wilkinson, Larry R. Mann, Wilkinson Law Firm PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.
James A. Patton, Jr., Timothy A. Palmer, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.
Randy Jackson pursues claims against Dunn Construction Company (“Dunn”) for discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See doc. 1. Jackson also seeks relief under state law for alleged negligent supervisory practices which purportedly led to the discriminatory environment. Based on this court's review of the evidence and the law, Jackson has presented sufficient evidence to survive Dunn's motion for summary judgment, doc. 26, on his discriminatory discharge, retaliatory discharge, and hostile work environment claims, and, accordingly, the court DENIES the motion as it relates to these claims. The motion is GRANTED with respect to the state law claims and the federal discrimination claims based on disparate pay and denial of positions and uniforms.
Under Rule 56(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to “go beyond the pleadings” to establish that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (). Any factual disputes will be resolved in Plaintiffs' favor when sufficient competent evidence supports Plaintiffs' version of the disputed facts. See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1276, 1278 (11th Cir.2002) (). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir.1989)). Moreover, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
Dunn Construction is involved in road construction and other heavy construction projects. Doc. 28–11 at 5. Dunn hired Jackson, an African–American male, as a “tack driver” in September 2009. Doc. 28–1 at 9. Jackson made $13.00 per hour initially and later received a ten cent pay increase. Docs. 28–2 at 14, 28–5 at 2. As a “tack driver,” Jackson drove a truck that sprayed hot liquid on the ground to allow asphalt to stick to the surface. Doc. 28–1 at 9, 16. Although Jackson had no prior experience in the asphalt or construction industry, he had CDL and Hazmat certifications. Doc. 28–1 at 10; Doc. 28–2 at 25–27. As a new hire, Jackson underwent an orientation program that included training on Dunn's discrimination and harassment policies. Doc. 28–1 at 14; Doc. 28–2 at 3, 32, 38.
On Jackson's first day, General Superintendent Billy Nichols assigned Jackson to work on the tack truck with Milton Ray, a Caucasian male. Doc. 28–1 at 14, 16; Doc. 28–6 at 17; Doc. 28–7 at 4. Allegedly, although Ray informed Jackson that training would last two or three weeks, Jackson's training only lasted three days. Doc. 28–1 at 16. Thereafter, Ray told Nichols that Jackson seemed uninterested, often slept in the truck, and had difficulty operating the equipment. Doc. 28–6 at 17; Doc. 28–7 at 4. As a result, Nichols moved Jackson to a service driver position with assurances that he would eventually return Jackson to the tack truck. Doc. 28–1 at 16–17; Doc. 28–6 at 18. However, Nichols never returned Jackson to the tack driver position and instead gave the position to Van Mitchell, a Caucasian male who previously worked for Dunn. Doc. 28–7 at 4–5.
In the service driver position, Jackson reported directly to Foreman Eugene Sanders, a Caucasian male, who in turn reported to Superintendent Wayne Snell, an African–American male. Doc. 28–1 at 24. Snell, in turn, reported to Nichols. Id. As a service driver, Jackson filled the service truck tanks with water and fuel, delivered the crew to the job sites, filled the equipment with fuel and water at the job sites, flagged and directed traffic, shoveled, and performed other tasks as directed. Doc. 28–1 at 20, 23. Although Jackson describes himself as an excellent truck driver, Snell rated Jackson as an average driver who “did good,” but who received discipline for tardiness, a “no call/no show,” and forgetting to fuel the service truck. Doc. 28–1 at 24–25; Doc. 28–2 at 11, 39; Doc. 28–7 at 8–9.
Jackson alleges that Sanders denied him restroom breaks “numerous times,” called him “boy,” and cursed him. Doc. 28–1 at 27. As an example of the alleged mistreatment, Jackson contends that when he told Sanders it was unfair for Sanders to make Jackson “sit and wait just to use the restroom,” Sanders allegedly said “[y]ou mother fucker, you're going to wait until after I let you go to the bathroom, boy, and I hope you understand what I'm saying.” Id. at 30. On another occasion, Sanders allegedly said that Jackson “needed to hurry up and get the goddamned truck, why am I taking so damn long.” Id.
Jackson complained to Snell that Sanders directed profanity at him, made him wait to use the restroom, and called him “boy” several times. Id. at 31. Jackson also told Nichols about these incidents and added that he had second-hand information from an African–American employee named Greg, that Gerald, a Caucasian employee, “got mad at Sanders and told black employee Greg ... that Sanders is not going to treat him like a nigger.” Id. at 32. Also, Jackson purportedly asked Nichols to move him from Sanders and to assign him to one of several open dump truck driver positions.1 Doc. 28–1 at 33. Nichols allegedly refused and told Jackson that he needed Jackson in his current position and would eventually “try to do something.” Id.
Sometime in early April 2010, as a result of an employment application from Jackson, J & M Tank Lines contacted Dunn to request Jackson's safety performance history. Doc. 28–3 at 32; Doc. 28–5 at 7–10. Sometime thereafter, Jackson purportedly told Nichols that “if he couldn't get this situation between [Sanders] and I under control or move me ... I would consider leaving, but if he couldn't get it resolved that I will give a two-week notice and go, because, I mean, I was stressed out from this.” Doc. 28–1 at 34. That afternoon or the next day, Sanders told Jackson there was no need for him to work out his notice and for Jackson to remove his things from the truck. Doc. 28–1 at 34. Jackson contends that Dunn discharged him since he never resigned and had not decided to leave Dunn. Dunn disagrees and asserts that Jackson relayed to Nichols that he had accepted another job and wanted to turn in a notice, and that Nichols simply informed Jackson about Dunn's policy against allowing employees to work out notices. Doc. 28–6 at 7.2
Jackson filed his first charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 19, 2010 3, alleging discrimination based on (1) the decision to transfer him from the tack truck and to give the position to Larry, a Caucasian male, (2) Nichols' promise to return him to the tack truck but later giving an open position to Van Mitchell, (3) Sanders' racial harassment, (4) second hand information about a Caucasian employee using the “n” word and Sanders' failure to satisfactorily reprimand the employee, and (5) the failure to give Jackson uniforms or a raise after his 90 day probationary period. Doc. 28–5 at 1–2. Jackson subsequently amended his charge to add a retaliation claim. Doc. 28–5 at 3. Specifically, Jackson alleged that after Dunn received his first charge, Sanders harassed him constantly and Dunn terminated him in retaliation “for having complained of discriminatory employment practices of [Dunn], and for filing a charge of...
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