Jackson v. Elrod

• Decision Date: 11 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86 C 1817.,86 C 1817.
• Citation: 655 F. Supp. 1130
• Parties: Robert JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. Richard J. ELROD, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

655 F. Supp. 1130

Robert JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. Richard J. ELROD, et al., Defendants.

No. 86 C 1817.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

March 11, 1987.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert D. Allison, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Madeleine S. Murphy, Asst. States Atty., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PRENTICE H. MARSHALL, District Judge.

Defendants, the sheriff and various corrections officials in Cook County, Illinois, move to dismiss this civil rights suit by a pretrial detainee, arguing that it is time-barred and fails to allege any claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff Robert Jackson, who was detained at the Cook County Jail "from approximately August 22, 1980 to June 11, 1982 and from approximately January 22, 1985 to June 1986,"¹ has a "chronic alcohol addiction." Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 12.² The Cook County Department of Corrections, which operates the jail, provides neither treatment for alcoholism nor any alcoholism self-help materials. Between 1980 and 1982, plaintiff "submitted in excess of 40 form requests seeking, among other things, alcoholism counseling. None were answered or acknowledged by defendants or their agents." Id. at ¶ 12.

Frequently during his detention, plaintiff ordered alcoholism and self-help books, many from Alcoholics Anonymous and the Hazelden Center for Chemically Dependent Persons in Center City, Minnesota. With the help of the Church of God Evangel, Cleveland, Tennessee, plaintiff also ordered books to be sent to him directly from the Barnes & Noble publishing firm in New York.

When the books, most of them hardbacks, arrived at the jail, they were not delivered to plaintiff but were returned to the senders. Although they initially denied having returned the books, eventually jail "employees, including the mail room director, informed plaintiff that under Department policy hard cover books were `not acceptable' because of `reasons of security.'" Id. at ¶ 15.

Plaintiff filed "approximately 30" requests for access to alcoholism and other self-help books through the jail's general library, the only library containing the type of books he sought. Id. at ¶ 22. He received no response. Lt. Wilner did inform him in March 1981, however, that the general library was off-limits to the general population. Later, Wilner told plaintiff that only inmates twenty-one years and younger could use the general library.³

On April 28, 1981, plaintiff asked defendant John Blanks, then-superintendent of the jail's Division IV, the unit in which plaintiff was detained, to tear off the Barnes & Noble books' hard covers so they could conform to department policy. Blanks denied this request as "`too complex' and/or `time-consuming.'" Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff also asked Alcoholics Anonymous and others to tear off the hard covers before sending him books. Although the senders complied, these books too were rejected and returned.

Plaintiff repeatedly wrote to defendants Leon J. Cornelious, Blanks' successor in Division IV, and William Sullivan,⁴ superintendent of Division I, for permission to receive self-help books both from outside sources and through the jail library. In May 1981, he was transferred from Division IV to Division I, which he describes as "inferior ... more remote ... much older, dirtier, more poorly lit ... withmore sic overcrowding and gang violence." Id. at ¶ 23. Wilner, Officer Gallagher, and Sgt. Lewis told plaintiff he had been transferred as punishment.

Plaintiff's unsuccessful attempts to obtain self-help books continued. In May 1986, an Officer Otero told him, "`You can't have hard back books in your cell. It's not permitted.' Defendants did not provide an explanation as to why plaintiff never received various soft cover books that he had ordered" from Alcoholics Anonymous. Id. at ¶ 15.

Defendants never notified plaintiff that they were rejecting and returning books he had ordered, except for some sent by Barnes & Noble. That notification regarding the Barnes & Nobles books, plaintiff alleges, "was a departure from defendants' usual policy." Id. at ¶ 15.

Plaintiff alleges that throughout the time he was unable to obtain either hardback or softcover self-help materials, other inmates were permitted to receive "popular" or "`girly magazines'" such as Playboy, Penthouse, and Hustler. Id. at ¶ 18. This "inconsistent treatment," plaintiff asserts, negates the jail's claim that it was withholding plaintiff's books on security grounds. Id. at ¶ 19. He also alleges that convicted state prisoners were granted more access to the type of books he sought than were pretrial detainees like himself.

On March 14, 1986, plaintiff filed this damage suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), against Blanks; Cornelious; Sullivan; Philip H. Hardiman, the department's director; Robert N. Glotz, its assistant director of security; and Richard J. Elrod, then-sheriff of Cook County. In his second amended complaint he alleges that these defendants, either personally or by dint of their policy-making roles, refused him delivery of self-help books, without notifying him of such rejections. To punish plaintiff for having exercised his rights, he adds, defendants transferred him to an inferior part of the jail. These acts violated plaintiff's rights "to free speech, due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by" Section 1983. Id. at ¶ 29.

Before turning to defendants' arguments supporting their motion to dismiss, we strike sua sponte the second amended complaint's reference to the fifth amendment. That amendment does guarantee due process and equal protection rights—but only against intrusion by federal officials. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954). When the alleged deprivations occur at the hands of state officials, like the county corrections officials here, relief must be sought under the fourteenth amendment, through the statutory mechanism of Section 1983. See, e.g., Anderson v. Luther, 521 F.Supp. 91, 96 (N.D.Ill.1981). Rather than dismiss the second amended complaint on this ground, we grant plaintiff leave to amend it on its face. Thus we proceed, treating this as a suit alleging violations of the fourteenth rather than the fifth amendment.

Defendants first contend that this case should be dismissed as untimely. Apparently, they have fixed on 1980, the year plaintiff entered the jail, as the time all his claims accrued. Motion to Dismiss Def. Motion, ¶ 1. By filing his original complaint on March 14, 1986, they argue, plaintiff failed to adhere to the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff counters that the second amended complaint clearly alleges that his several claims were filed in time. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Plf. Mem. at 1-4.

A state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions determines the limitations period for Section 1983 suits. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Accordingly, actions brought in Illinois after Wilson was decided on April 17, 1985 must be brought within two years after the claim accrues. Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1142 (7th Cir.1986). Claims that accrued before the Wilson decision, however, receive partial retroactive effect: they must be filed within either two years after April 17, 1985 or five years after the accrual date, whichever comes first. Id. at 1141, 1146.

In this case, therefore, any claim occurring before Wilson was decided must have taken place no earlier than March 14, 1981—five years before plaintiff filed suit. Although plaintiff began ordering self-help books as early as August 22, 1980, none was rejected until April 1981. Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 12, 14. Patently, all book rejections and plaintiff's transfer fell within the five-year limitations period.

Some books were rejected in September 1985 and March and May 1986, after Wilson was decided. Id. at ¶ 14. To these rejections we must apply the two-year limitations period. Plaintiff filed suit five months after the first of these; thus, all of them are timely. We deny defendants' motion to dismiss on the limitations ground.

Defendants next argue for dismissal on the ground that the second amended complaint fails to attach liability to them. Def. Motion, ¶¶ 2, 3; Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Def. Reply at 6-9. Specifically, defendants contend, plaintiff inadequately alleges their personal involvement; at best, his allegations improperly attempt to hold them liable on a respondeat superior basis. Plaintiff maintains that he has alleged defendants personally took part in an unconstitutional policy, and does not allege respondeat superior liability. Plf. Mem. at 4-8.

Obscuring this issue is plaintiff's failure to allege whether he is suing defendants in their individual or official capacities. Both sides appear to consider this an individual-capacity suit, yet argue partly on officialcapacity grounds. Plaintiff, for example, denies that he has sued the corrections department, but adds, "even if he had, when execution of a government's policies or customs by its representatives inflicts the injury, the government is responsible under § 1983." Plf. Mem. at 7 (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 688, 694-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2034, 2038-39, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). We must therefore assess the second amended complaint as if it alleged that defendants acted in both their individual and their official capacities.

With regard to defendant Blanks, plaintiff specifically alleges that Blanks:

(1) with Cornelious and Sullivan, "deliberately prevented plaintiff from obtaining access to various self-help books dealing with alcoholism treatment and related self-help matters...." Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 11.

(2) refused plaintiff's request that he tear off

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