Johnson v. Carroll
| Decision Date | 01 September 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 88 C 733.,88 C 733. |
| Citation | 694 F. Supp. 500 |
| Parties | Ronald JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. Paul CARROLL, James Gildea, Robert Elmore, Charles M. Thomas, Anthony Graffeo, Richard Cauble, Francis O'Connor and Garritt E. Howard, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
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Hope F. Keefe, Brunswick, Keefe & Deer, Blue Island, Ill., for plaintiff.
Richard M. Daley, State's Atty. of Cook County by Harold E. McKee, III, Asst. State's Atty., Chicago, Ill., for defendant Howard.
Judson Miner, Corp. Counsel, City of Chicago by Stanley J. Sacks, Paul M. Sheridan, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for defendants Carroll, Gildea, Elmore, Thomas, Graffeo, Cauble, and O'Connor.
As part of a police investigation into the shooting of his roommate, plaintiff underwent a lengthy interrogation in January 1986. Plaintiff now claims that during his interrogation, seven Chicago police officers and an Assistant State's Attorney physically abused him and violated his constitutional rights. Based on these allegations, plaintiff brings suit against his interrogators pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also raises various state law claims against the eight defendants. At this stage of the lawsuit, this court must consider two motions — one by the seven police defendants, the other by the Assistant State's Attorney — to dismiss certain portions of plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons stated herein, defendants' motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part.
For the purpose of ruling on a motion to dismiss, this court must accept as true all facts pleaded in the complaint. See Greene v. Finley, 749 F.2d 467, 468 (7th Cir.1984). Therefore, the following depiction of the facts reflects plaintiff Ronald Johnson's portrayal of the events leading up to this lawsuit.
On the evening of January 26, 1986, Johnson discovered that his roommate, Dennis McCullough, had been shot in the basement of the Chicago building where they lived.1 At 11:45 p.m. that evening, Johnson reported the shooting to the Chicago Police Department. Responding to Johnson's report, two Chicago police officers, defendants Robert Elmore and James Gildea, came to Johnson's home. Shortly after midnight on January 27, 1986, Elmore and Gildea took Johnson into custody and drove him to a police station.
When they arrived at the station, the officers began to question Johnson about the McCullough shooting without giving the suspect his Miranda warnings.2 For the next 30 hours, Johnson endured an intense and brutal interrogation session. Seven Chicago police officers3 took turns questioning Johnson, who repeatedly denied knowledge of or participation in the crime. In the course of the interrogation, the officers subjected the suspect to extreme mental and physical cruelty. The police deprived Johnson of food for the entire 30-hour period. They called him offensive names. They denied his repeated requests to call his mother so that she could contact an attorney. In addition, the interrogating officers kicked, punched, and choked Johnson. They even threatened him with a gun. In the early morning hours of January 28, 1986, defendant Garritt E. Howard, an Assistant State's Attorney, joined in the interrogation. Adopting the officers' tactics, Howard also physically abused and threatened Johnson.
After 30 hours of "interrogation," Johnson, who was bleeding and in great pain, feared that he would suffer further injury if he did not confess to shooting McCullough. Consequently, at 5:30 a.m. on January 28, 1986, Johnson agreed to sign a confession prepared for him by Howard. Even after Johnson confessed, however, his interrogators continued to deny him medical treatment for the injuries they had inflicted.
The State's case against Johnson never went to trial. On March 30, 1987, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Stephen Schiller granted Johnson's motion to suppress his January 1986 confession. Judge Schiller found that Johnson made the confession involuntarily. Less than three months later, the State of Illinois terminated its prosecution of Johnson.
The lawsuit currently before this court stems from the alleged misconduct of the seven police officers and the Assistant State's Attorney who interrogated Johnson. Seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Johnson claims that his interrogators violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He is suing the eight defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Johnson also asserts a host of state law claims against defendants. These claims include assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and willful and wanton conduct. In addition to asking for compensatory and punitive damages, Johnson seeks attorneys' fees and costs.
The police defendants have moved to dismiss most (but not all) of Johnson's many claims. While adopting most of his codefendants' arguments, Howard raises some additional issues in his own motion to dismiss. In evaluating these motions, this court will first examine defendants' challenges to Johnson's federal claims. The court will then analyze defendants' attacks on Johnson's state law claims.
Howard contends that the complaint's allegations fail to establish his liability in an official capacity. This court agrees. To maintain an official-capacity suit under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that his injury resulted from the execution of an official policy, custom, or practice. Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-2038, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir.1985). Johnson's complaint makes no effort to demonstrate that Howard acted in accordance with an official policy or custom when he allegedly violated Johnson's constitutional rights. For this reason, the court dismisses all § 1983 claims against Howard in his official capacity.
Howard also argues that he has not infringed Johnson's Fourth Amendment rights because he did not participate in Johnson's arrest. This argument mistakenly assumes that in the case of an improper arrest, a Fourth Amendment violation occurs only at the time the suspect is seized. The courts have taken a much more expansive view of the Fourth Amendment: "While an arrest and, therefore, a possibly unconstitutional invasion might be a `fait accompli,' the Fourth Amendment's protection extends beyond the initial seizure to continuing detention...." United States v. Fernandez-Guzman, 577 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954, 99 S.Ct. 351, 58 L.Ed.2d 345 (1978). Because Johnson was arrested without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment entitled him to a prompt judicial determination that probable cause existed to justify his continued detention. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed. 2d 54 (1975). The record contains no indication that defendants ever sought such a probable cause determination. If they did not obtain a neutral judicial assessment of probable cause, defendants violated Johnson's Fourth Amendment rights by detaining and interrogating him for 30 hours. As a participant in the interrogation, Howard must share responsibility for any Fourth Amendment violation stemming from Johnson's prolonged detention. Consequently, this court denies Howard's motion to dismiss Johnson's Fourth Amendment claim.
The Fifth Amendment forms the basis for three of Johnson's § 1983 claims: due process, self-incrimination, and inadequate Miranda warnings. All eight defendants seek dismissal of these claims. After reviewing defendants' arguments, this court concludes that none of Johnson's Fifth Amendment claims can survive defendants' motions to dismiss.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies only to federal officials. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954); Jackson v. Elrod, 655 F.Supp. 1130, 1133-34 (N.D.Ill. 1987). Therefore, Johnson cannot assert a due process claim based on the Fifth Amendment because defendants do not work for the federal government. Nonetheless, Johnson can bring an identical claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to state and municipal employees such as defendants.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. This privilege against self-incrimination has no relevance to Johnson's case against defendants. Johnson never received an opportunity to testify against himself; once Judge Schiller suppressed the January 1986 confession, the State dropped all criminal charges against Johnson. Since Johnson did not incriminate himself during a criminal proceeding, he cannot now claim that defendants violated his right to avoid self-incrimination.4
Johnson contends that defendants' initial failure to give him his Miranda warnings entitles him to relief under § 1983. This argument misconstrues the nature of the remedy provided by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). That remedy entails nothing more than the suppression of evidence at a criminal trial. A Miranda violation cannot form the foundation for an independent civil action because there is no constitutional right to Miranda warnings. Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 874 (7th Cir.1968); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 596 F.Supp. 13, 18 (N.D.Ill. 1984). Thus, Johnson cannot base a claim for damages on the mere fact that defendants did not immediately inform him of his rights.5
Several times during his interrogation, Johnson asked defendants if he could call his mother so that s...
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