Jackson v. Everett

• Decision Date: 07 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2359.,97-2359.
• Citation: 140 F.3d 1149
• Parties: Robert JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Savell EVERETT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

140 F.3d 1149

Robert JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Savell EVERETT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-2359.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted December 8, 1997.

Decided April 7, 1998.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied May 29, 1998.

Jonathan D. Perez, Little Rock, AR. argued (Winston Bryant and Rick D. Hogan, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant.

Mark L. Ross, Little Rock, AR, argued, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before BOWMAN, LOKEN and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Arkansas Inmate Robert Jackson filed this § 1983 action against prison security officer Savell Everett. In the claim at issue on this appeal, Everett is accused of violating Jackson's Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from being stabbed by another inmate. Everett appeals a district court order denying him qualified immunity against this damage claim. We reverse.

In reviewing Everett's pretrial motion for qualified immunity, we accept as true the facts alleged by Jackson, the nonmoving party. Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 444 n. 1 (8th Cir.1995). On August 22, 1994, Jackson and inmate Jerry Hamilton were housed in a barracks at the Cummins Unit of the Arkansas Department of Corrections, where they slept head to head. That night, another inmate delivered to Everett an unsigned note stating that Hamilton planned to kill Jackson in his sleep. Jackson and Hamilton were summoned to Everett's office where Everett interviewed them, first separately and then together. In the separate meeting, Everett relayed the substance of the note to Jackson, who responded he was sure he had no problems with Hamilton. After interviewing Hamilton separately, Everett brought the two inmates together and asked whether they had problems; both responded no. Jackson and Hamilton were returned to the barracks, where the night passed without incident. The next morning, Everett gave the note and an oral report to his supervisor before going off duty at 8:00 a.m. At 3:30 p.m., Hamilton stabbed Jackson and another inmate in the prison cafeteria. The other inmate died, and Jackson was hospitalized with a serious stomach wound. Everett was not in the prison at the time of the stabbing. He returned to work at 8:00 p.m. that night.

Jackson's complaint alleges that Everett showed deliberate indifference to Jackson's safety by failing to protect him from Hamilton. Everett filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity under Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir.1996), where we reversed the denial of qualified immunity in an inmate assault case. The district court denied the motion on the ground that "Everett's alleged failure to offer to separate the two inmates and his failure to search the inmates for weapons, if credited, would be sufficiently unreasonable to lower the shield of qualified immunity." This interlocutory appeal followed. We have jurisdiction to determine whether, in view of the facts the district court deemed adequately supported for summary judgment purposes, Everett's conduct meets the qualified immunity standard of "objective legal reasonableness." Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, 842, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996). Qualified immunity is a question of law which we review de novo. See White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 279 (8th Cir.1994).

Qualified immunity protects a government official from damage liability unless his performance of a discretionary function violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In determining the objective legal reasonableness of the official's action, the contours of the right he is alleged to have violated "must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who willingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); see Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227-29, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536-37, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991).

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), decided some months before Jackson was stabbed, "confirmed that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment if he is deliberately indifferent to the need to protect an inmate from a substantial risk of serious harm from other inmates." Newman v. Holmes, 122 F.3d 650, 652 (8th Cir.1997). This Eighth Amendment claim has an objective component, whether the situation presented a substantial risk of serious harm, and a subjective component, whether the prison official was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. at 1977. In this appeal, the issue is deliberate indifference.

Deliberate indifference is the reckless disregard of a known, excessive risk of serious harm to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-38, 114 S.Ct. at 1978-80. Thus, the first question is whether an excessive risk to Jackson's health or safety was known or obvious to Everett. This element of deliberate indifference must be viewed from Everett's perspective at the time in question, not with hindsight's perfect vision. See Williams v. Nebraska State Penitentiary, 57 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir.1995). Without question, Everett perceived a substantial risk when he received the anonymous note warning that Hamilton would kill Everett that night. Everett investigated that risk. Both Jackson and Hamilton denied any problems, the night passed without incident, and Everett reported the incident when his shift ended the next morning. Many hours later, the risk became reality, in another part of the prison, when Everett was off duty and Jackson and Hamilton were under the supervision of other prison officials.

The district court concluded that this element of deliberate indifference was satisfied because Everett received the anonymous note and Jackson was stabbed the next day. But "threats between inmates are common and do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm." Prater, 89 F.3d at 541. Furthermore, because prisons are dangerous places, "[h]ousing the most aggressive among us [and placing] violent people in close quarters," McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 345 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 907, 112 S.Ct. 1265, 117 L.Ed.2d 493 (1992), "prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from claims arising out of a surprise attack by one inmate on another." Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir.1995). Here, Everett took steps to protect Jackson from the known...