Jackson v. Florence Thread Co.

• Decision Date: 17 May 1935
• Docket Number: No. 52.,52.
• Citation: 178 A. 729
• Parties: JACKSON v. FLORENCE THREAD CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

178 A. 729

JACKSON

v. FLORENCE THREAD CO.

No. 52.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

May 17, 1935.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The act of 1931 (P. L. c. 280, p. 708 [N. J. St. Annual 1931, § **236-46]) is ineffective to establish a period of limitation as to existing rights of action under the Workmen's Compensation Act in which the employer is forbidden by the "Accident Reporting Act" (P. L. 1924, c. 187, p. 401 [Comp. St. Supp. 1924, § **236—94 et seq.]) to plead the limitation because of failure to file the reports thereby required.

2. Title of chapter 187 of P. L. 1924, p. 401 (Comp. St. Supp. 1924, § **236—94 et seq.), held sufficient on the authority of Massie v. Court of Common Pleas, 108 N. J. Law, 199, 156 A. 377.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Samuel Jackson, employee, opposed by the Florence Thread Company, employer. From an adverse judgment (12 N. J. Misc. 774, 175 A. 96) the employer appeals.

Affirmed.

Henry M. Hartmann, of Trenton, for appellant

Joseph Beck Tyler, of Camden, for appellee.

PARKER, Justice.

We conclude that the judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed, and in the main for the reasons stated in the per curiam opinion of that court.

The accident was in 1928. At that time the act of 1924 (P. L. c. 187, p. 401 [Comp. St Supp. 1924, § **236—94 et seq.]) was in force, based on a limitation of one year in the original act of 1911. The act of 1921 provided that failure to file the reports it required should bar the defense of limitation (foot of page 403 [Comp. St Supp. 1924, § **236—99]). Frasier v. L. Bamberger & Co., 110 N. J. Law, 447, 166 A. 101, cited by the Supreme Court Up to the enactment of chapter 280 of P. L. 1931 (P. L. p. 708 [N. J. St Annual 1931, § **236—46]), the respondent clearly could not have invoked the limitation. The petition was not filed, however, until July, 1932, and by that time the act of 1931 (N. J. St Annual 1931, § **236 —46), amending section 5 of the 1918 Act, which supplemented the original act, was in force. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, it enlarges the period of limitation to two years, and seems to contain no reference to section 6 of the act of 1924 (Comp. St. Supp 1924, § **236—09), barring that defense in default of reports. It is not, however, an amendment in form of the act of 1924. As a matter of statutory construction it might perhaps be argued that the clause in section 6 of the act of 1924 applies to section 5 of the 1911 act (P. L. 1911, p. 135) as amended in 1931, and containing the two years' limitation. But even assuming this, we are clear that the act of 1931 did not bar the right of the employee to file a petition after one year, or two years, as the case might be, immune to the limitation for failure to report. The limitation of 1931 is not in terms applicable to right of action already existing; and, if so considered, it fails to provide a reasonable time within which to begin suit after its passage. See Barnaby v. Bradley & Currier Co., 60 N. J. Law,158, 37 A. 764. We agree, therefore, that the act of 1931 is ineffective to cut off the right of action...