Jackson v. Gen. Motors
Decision Date | 25 June 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 4:18-CV-1243 RLW,4:18-CV-1243 RLW |
Parties | DATHAN JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This employment discrimination matter is before the Court on Defendant General Motors, LLC's ("GM") Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 95.) Plaintiff Dathan Jackson ("Plaintiff") opposes the Motion and it is fully briefed. Because GM has established that no genuine issues of material fact remain as to any of Plaintiff's claims, its Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted in all respects.
Plaintiff is an African-American male who was employed as an hourly, union employee on the assembly line at GM's Assembly Plant in Wentzville, Missouri from January 12, 2015, through June 28, 2018. Plaintiff sustained a back injury at work on June 28, 2016. Thereafter, Plaintiff's work restrictions imposed by his doctor left him unable to work his usual position. Plaintiff had periods of paid and unpaid leave and attempted to work in multiple other positions to which GM reassigned him, but those positions either hurt his back or were not available to Plaintiff on a permanent basis. GM terminated Plaintiff's employment on June 28, 2018, for the stated reason that he violated the terms of its collectively bargained, mandatory six-step attendance policy.
Plaintiff filed this action claiming that GM terminated him for discriminatory reasons. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31) ("Complaint") asserts federal and supplemental state law claims of disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. ("ADA") (Count I), and the Missouri Human Rights Act, §§ 213.010, et seq., Mo. Rev. Stat. (2017) ("MHRA") (Count III); retaliation in violation of the ADA (Count II) and MHRA (Count IV); discrimination based on Plaintiff's exercise of rights under the Missouri Worker's Compensation Law, § 287.780, Mo. Rev. Stat. ("MWCL") (Count V); and race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") (Count VI), and the MHRA (Count VII).1 GM moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims.
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Id. Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts demonstrating there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson,477 U.S. at 248. "The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials," but rather "must substantiate [his] allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in [his] favor on more than mere speculation or conjecture." Carter v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 956 F.3d 1055, 1059 (8th Cir. 2020) ( ). "Small factual disputes about the underlying events . . . could only create the 'metaphysical' kind of doubt that the Supreme Court decried in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)." Main v. Ozark Health, Inc., 959 F.3d 319, 327 (8th Cir. 2020) ( ).
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331. The Court's function is not to weigh the evidence but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "'Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.'" Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).
The Court denied GM's Motion to Strike on the grounds that a motion to strike is properly directed only to pleadings, Rule 12(f), Fed. R. Civ. P., and when ruling on a motion for summary judgment a Court should ignore inadmissible evidence instead of striking it from the record. (ECF No. 130.)
GM filed a Reply in Support of Statement of Undisputed Facts (ECF No. 127), a 149-page document that sets forth each of GM's Facts, Plaintiff's Responses, and argument as to why the Court should not credit the denials or the additional, allegedly non-responsive, information contained in Plaintiff's Response. Thus, the Court has been presented with a total of 255 pages of facts, disputes, and argument with respect to the facts.
The "concision and specificity required" by rules such as Local Rule 4.01(E) "seek to aid the district court in passing upon a motion for summary judgment, reflecting the aphorism that it is the parties who know the case better than the judge." Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 2007) (cited case omitted). The local rule Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Here, the parties have eluded Local Rule 4.01(E)'s requirements of concision and specificity and forced the Court to undertake a cumbersome review of the record. Plaintiff disputes many of GM's Statement of Undisputed Facts, often by lengthy explanations and arguments, some of which are non-responsive, and many of which add extraneous information that appears intended to obscure and confuse rather than clarify the record. The Court disregards these where they do not raise genuine disputes of material fact, but does not specifically address each one. Plaintiff often refers to his verified Declaration (ECF No. 109, Ex. 9), but some of the averments therein contradict Plaintiff's prior deposition testimony, are not supported by citations to record evidence, or reflect Plaintiff's frequent testimony that he does not remember events documented in GM's employment records.2 Where Plaintiff establishes a genuine dispute as to a material issue of factor that a justifiable inference may be drawn in his favor, the Court accepts Plaintiff's version of events as true.
GM operates an Assembly Plant in Wentzville, Missouri where it produces trucks and vans. Plaintiff was employed as an assembler at the Assembly Plant from January 12, 2015, through June 28, 2018. Plaintiff was hired as a temporary employee. On March 12, 2015, he accepted a position for regular, full-time employment. Plaintiff worked in General Assembly which includes the Trim and Chassis departments. He originally worked the third or midnight shift until he bid on and received a first shift position. Generally, the first shift consists of more senior employees than the second or third shift, because it is a better work schedule.
At all times during Plaintiff's employment with GM, a National collective bargaining agreement ("National CBA") between GM and the Local 2250 United Autoworkers Union (the "UAW" or ...
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