Carter v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 24 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-1426,19-1426
• Citation: 956 F.3d 1055
• Parties: Marion CARTER Plaintiff - Appellant v. PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

956 F.3d 1055

Marion CARTER Plaintiff - Appellant

v.PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee

No. 19-1426

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: January 17, 2020

Filed: April 24, 2020

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant and appeared on the brief was Shawn Garrick Childs, of Little Rock, AR.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee and appeared on the brief was William Cody Kees, of Little Rock, AR. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellee brief; George Jay Bequette, Jr., of Little Rock, AR.

Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Marion L. Carter sued the Pulaski County Special School District for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)), the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ) and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 ( Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-107 ). The district court¹ granted summary judgment for the District, dismissing all of Carter’s claims. See Carter v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist. , 2019 WL 386173, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 30, 2019). She appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I.

Carter (an African-American woman) is a teacher at Joe T. Robinson High School in the Pulaski County Special School District. She also coached the cheer and dance teams, receiving $2,670 annual pay for each team. In March 2017, Principal Mary Carolyn Bailey (a Caucasian woman) recommended to District Superintendent Dr. Jerry Guess (a Caucasian man) that Carter’s cheer and dance duties be non-renewed for the 2017-2018 school year and that she be offered a teaching contract only. Principal Bailey gave three reasons: (1) lack of student participation in the cheer and dance programs the last two years; (2) inappropriate cheer routines at sporting events; and (3) inappropriate behavior of cheerleaders during out-of-town travel. Based on these recommendations, Dr. Guess sent Carter a non-renewal letter in April 2017. It stated the "reason for this action is ‘conduct unbecoming a professional employee ,’ " listing the following examples:

1. There has been a lack of participation on the cheerleading squad and dance teams at Robinson High for the last two years. For the 2015-2016 school year, thirteen (13) students tried out for the cheerleading squad and fourteen (14) students tried out for Dance Team. For the 2016-2017 school year, eleven (11) students tried out for the cheerleading squad and nine (9) students tried out for Dance Team. Try-outs for the 201[7]-2018 school year have not been held yet, but several girls have indicated they will not be trying out.

2. Parents have complained about you allowing the cheerleaders to perform what they consider to be an inappropriate cheer routine at sporting events.

3. Last year, Ms. Bailey received phone calls from witnesses alleging that the cheerleaders were very disorderly and combative to the staff at Chicken Express in Conway during travel for an out of town game. The witnesses also stated you did nothing to calm them down.

Carter requested a hearing before the District’s School Board pursuant to the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act. After a hearing, the Board accepted Dr. Guess’s recommendation to non-renew Carter’s cheer and dance contract. The District filled the cheer coach position with an African-American woman; it eliminated all dance teams district-wide.

Carter sued the District for race discrimination. The District moved for summary judgment, claiming that "[t]he non-renewal of Carter’s cheerleading and dance team supplemental contract had nothing to do with her race, but was based on the legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons outlined in the notice letter she received on April 18, 2017." The district court granted the motion. Carter appeals.

II.

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party. Gallagher v. Magner , 619 F.3d 823, 830 (8th Cir. 2010). "A grant of summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Macklin v. FMC Transp., Inc. , 815 F.3d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 2016), quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) .

"To survive a motion for summary judgment on a race discrimination claim, a plaintiff must either present admissible evidence directly indicating unlawful discrimination, or create an inference of unlawful discrimination under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)." Id. (cleaned up).

Carter did not provide direct evidence of unlawful discrimination, so this court analyzes under McDonnell Douglas . Under this framework, "a presumption of discrimination arises when the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination." Id. "To establish a prima facie case for race discrimination," a plaintiff must show: (1) she "is a member of a protected class," (2) she met her "employer’s legitimate expectations," (3) she "suffered an adverse employment action," and (4) "the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination (for example, similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently)." Id. "If a plaintiff establishes [a] prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action." Id. "If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the proffered non-discriminatory reason is pretextual." Id. at 427-28.

There is no dispute that Carter is a member of a protected class and suffered an adverse employment action. However, the parties dispute whether the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. Carter alleges they do because a similarly situated Caucasian cheerleading coach, Amber Populis, was treated differently. According to Carter, Populis allowed her cheer team to perform "a vulgar routine" during the 2012-2013 school year. Carter complained about the routine to Principal Bailey (then interim principal), but Bailey did nothing. Principal Bailey testified that she did not recall the complaints against Populis. Populis resigned at the end of the 2012-2013 school year.

Employees are similarly situated only when they are "similarly situated in all relevant respects" and "are involved in or accused of the same offense and are disciplined in different ways." Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. , 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994). Carter was removed from her cheer and dance duties, in part due to multiple complaints about the routines being inappropriate. At best, there is evidence of only one complaint against Populis’s routines, and that was from Carter. See Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 651, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) ("[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’ "), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) ("A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions.") But Carter was removed from her duties based on two other reasons—low participation rates and team misconduct while traveling. There is no evidence that Populis had similar issues. Thus, Populis was not similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Carter disagrees, maintaining that she and Populis were similarly situated because the two...