Jackson v. General Metals Refining Co.

• Decision Date: 08 December 1931
• Docket Number: No. 21828.,21828.
• Parties: JACKSON v. GENERAL METALS REFINING CO. et al.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

43 S.W.2d 865

JACKSON v. GENERAL METALS REFINING CO. et al.

No. 21828.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

December 8, 1931.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Moses Hartman, Judge.

"Not to be officially published."

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Carrie Jackson, claimant, for injuries, opposed by the General Metals Refining Company, employer, and the Union Indemnity Company, insurance carrier. From a judgment reversing the award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, and directing the commission as to the award to be made, the employer and insurance carrier appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Leahy, Saunders & Walther, of St. Louis, for appellants.

Karl Kimmel, of St. Louis, for respondent.

HAID, P. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court reversing the award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in which the circuit court made its own finding that the employee is entitled to compensation, and directing the commission as to the award to be made.

Upon appeal to the circuit court from the award of the commission, where the circuit court has before it only the record upon which the award was made, it may determine whether there was competent evidence to sustain the finding of the commission and whether the facts found by the commission will support its award. That court, however, cannot try the case de novo on such record nor pass judgment on the weight of the evidence. Hammack v. West Plains Lumber Co. (Mo. App.) 30 S.W.(2d) 650, 651; State ex rel. v. Haid (Mo. Sup.) 38 S.W.(2d) 44, loc. cit. 48.

If the evidence before the commission is sufficient to warrant its finding, such finding, like the verdict of a jury, is binding on appeal. De Moss v. Evens & Howard F. B. Co. (Mo. App.) 37 S.W.(2d) 961, loc. cit. 962, and cases cited. In considering the question whether the evidence sustains the finding made by the commission, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the finding. De Moss v. Evens & Howard F. B. Co. (Mo. App.) 37 S.W.(2d) 961, loc. cit. 962, and cases cited. So that, where the facts are in dispute, the finding of the commission is conclusive and binding on appeal, if there is substantial evidence to support it. Bise v. Tarlton (Mo. App.) 35 S.W. (2d) 993, loc. cit. 994; Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co. (Mo. Sup.) 40 S.W.(2d) 601, loc. cit. 604; McComosh v. Shapleigh Hardware Co. (Mo. App.) 40 S.W.(2d) 728, loc. cit. 729; Lamkins v. Cooper-Clad M. Range Co., 42 S.W. (2d) 941, decided by this court November 3, 1931; Sanders v. Central Building Materials Co., 43 S.W.(2d) 863, decided by this court December 8, 1931.

The facts as shown by the record are in substance as follows:

The claimant testified that she was sixteen years of age, and that on August 20, 1929, she was employed by the General Metals Refining Company; that, while working with rags, a piece of raveling got in her eye; that she immediately notified the forelady, who sent her to the first-aid department; that the one in charge of such department placed some drops in the eye, but did not discover the raveling until the next day when it was found and taken out; that it was a colored raveling that looked like a string and about half as long as a straight pin; that she worked the following day and for several days thereafter, when she quit because her eye was hurting; that during the winter following she went back and worked three or four days, but could not continue because her eye would not allow it; that, as she was leaving, Saul Mathes was standing at the time clock, and asked her why she was going home and she told him her eye was hurting; that at the time of the hearing she could just discern things and could do no reading at all, that her eyes were treated by Dr. Kayler of Granite City, Dr. Weggens; that she went to Barnes Hospital, to Dr. Moore in East St. Louis; that her eyes were examined by Dr. Norris, an eye specialist, and by Dr. Mason in St. Louis; that her other eye began hurting her, and on the day following the one on which she quit she went to Barnes Hospital for treatment and continued for about two months; that she gave birth to a child on June 21, 1928; that she never talked to any one at the factory about paying her for her sore eyes; that on the day she was injured she was handling dirty rags.

The forelady of the claimant testified that claimant had been working two or three days when she complained of having gotten something in her eye, and she sent claimant to the first-aid department; that at the time claimant claims she was injured she was working with colored wipers right out of the laundry; that they did not work with dirty rags.

The mother of claimant testified that it was some three or four weeks before the right eye began getting bad; that on April 24, 1930, she sent a letter to the company concerning compensation for the claimant.

Dr. Roy E. Mason testified for claimant that he examined claimant's eyes on June 21, 1930; that he did not think she had any vision which would enable her to...