Jackson v. H.L. Bouton Co., Inc.

Decision Date12 January 1994
Docket NumberNo. 92-3411,92-3411
Citation630 So.2d 1173
Parties19 Fla. L. Weekly D126 Jody Lloyd JACKSON, Appellant, v. H.L. BOUTON CO., INC., Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Robert L. Hinkle and Howard E. Burgess, Jr., Aurell, Radey, Hinkle, Thomas & Beranek, and Donald M. Hinkle, Fonvielle & Hinkle, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Nancy Staff Slayden and Bruce W. Robinson, Brannon, Brown, Haley, Robinson & Cole, Lake City, for appellee.

KAHN, Judge.

In this products liability action, appellant Jody Lloyd Jackson seeks damages from appellee H.L. Bouton Company, Inc. (Bouton for the tragic loss of an eye. From an adverse summary judgment on his strict liability count, and a defense verdict on his negligence count, Jackson brings this appeal. Jackson contends that the trial court (1 erred in granting the motion for summary judgment on strict liability, and (2 abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the absence of prior complaints involving Bouton's 9800 series safety glasses in the negligence action. We reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment on strict liability and affirm the jury verdict on the negligence count.

In his suit against Bouton, Jackson alleged he suffered the eye injury while working for SportCraft, Inc., a manufacturer of fiberglass boats in Lafayette County. The amended complaint in this case contains no allegation as to the specific activity being engaged in by Mr. Jackson at the time of the injury. At trial, Jackson testified he was using a sledge hammer and a cold chisel to remove fiberglass boat decks from molds when a piece of the chisel broke off and struck his left eye. Jackson further testified he was wearing 9800 safety glasses, manufactured by Bouton at the time of the injury. Other than the plaintiff, no witnesses to the accident appeared at trial.

With the pretrial motion for summary judgment, Bouton filed the affidavit of its engineering manager, Kenneth Duffie, Jr. Duffie's affidavit, which turned out to be substantially similar to his testimony later at trial, established that Bouton did not sell its glasses directly to SportCraft and was unaware of the usage to which they would ultimately be put. He noted, however, that the glasses were packaged with a warning and complied with industrial standards as set forth under ANSI Z87.1. 1

In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Jackson produced the affidavit of Charles Benedict, Ph.D., a forensic engineer, who stated that the glasses are defective and unreasonably dangerous in that they do not provide adequate protection for the eyes. He stated that "where it is foreseeable that front eye protection would be necessary, vertical and horizontal protection from debris should also be provided." Dr. Benedict found the design of the glasses defective, and concluded the injury would not have occurred had the manufacturer equipped the glasses with horizontal and vertical protection. He also noted that sales literature allegedly inserted with the product packaging failed to adequately warn of the risk of serious injury.

The trial court entered an order granting summary judgment on the strict liability claim and denying the motion as to the negligence claim. This was error.

The movant for summary judgment bears the burden of showing, by competent evidence, the nonexistence of any question of material fact. The movant's proof must be conclusive, such that all reasonable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the opposing party are overcome. Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1979, Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40, 43-44 (Fla.1966, and Lenhal Realty, Inc. v. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp., 615 So.2d 207, 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993. "[I]f the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue might exist, summary judgment is improper." Holland v. Verheul, 583 So.2d 788, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991. Here, there was a genuine factual dispute as to whether the design of the glasses, and the warnings provided to the user were defective. See Light v. Weldarc Co., Inc., 569 So.2d 1302 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990 (summary judgment on strict liability claim improper because a genuine factual dispute existed as to the unreasonably dangerous condition of the safety glasses used. Jackson correctly points out that just as a violation of industry standards is merely evidence of negligence, Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Clark, 491 So.2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986, compliance with industry standards is merely evidence that a product was not defective. See, e.g. Schroth v. Norton Co., 185 Ill.App.3d 575, 133 Ill.Dec. 644, 647, 541 N.E.2d 855, 858 appeal denied, 127 Ill.2d 641, 136 Ill.Dec. 607, 545 N.E.2d 131 (Ill.1989 (evidence that safety glasses conformed to federal standards would not preclude a determination that the glasses were defective. We conclude that Bouton did not meet its burden of proving the non-existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Holl, supra, at 43-44. The summary judgment must be reversed. 2

In order to analyze the issue concerning admission of certain testimony, we set out in some detail the factual scenario against which the trial court made the ruling now challenged by Mr. Jackson. We first look at the complaint filed by Jackson.

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that Bouton's "safety spectacles ... failed to adequately protect Mr. Jackson's eyes," and that as a result "debris generated by plaintiff in the course of his employment was allowed to strike and penetrate his eye." Plaintiff further alleged, "The safety spectacles failed to meet a reasonable consumer's expectations as to safety."

At trial, plaintiff's case as to product defectiveness was largely advanced through the testimony of Charles Benedict. Dr. Benedict, offered by plaintiff as an expert in the field of product design and safety, was of the general opinion that the 9800 series glasses are defective because they do not provide adequate protection for the eyes during foreseeable uses in the workplace. In particular, the 9800 glasses do not provide sufficient vertical and horizontal protection from debris. Benedict made the following comments, which we find instructive in our consideration of the evidentiary issue presented to use:

"The whole purpose of safety glasses is to keep particles out of your eyes. That's the only reason you wear them."

"So if my eyes can see daylight around these glasses then what that says is if something comes in between my glasses and there, it can go into my eye."

"So if anything can get into the eye, if its a set of safety glasses for that intended use, then the safety glasses should be ... redesigned ... to prevent that from occurring."

"These glasses are not safe for their intended use. They allow particles to get into the eyes."

Mr. Jackson testified on his own behalf during plaintiff's case in chief. He was born and raised in Lafayette County and has worked for SportCraft intermittently since the early 1970's. He identified the series 9800 glasses put into evidence and testified that SportCraft has used the same eye protection for employees since the early 1970's when he first worked for the company.

Bouton called Mr. Clyde Hendry, who was for nine years a purchasing agent for SportCraft in charge of buying safety eye wear. Hendry testified that the job of pulling...

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11 cases
  • Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • 6 Octubre 2014
    ...stated that proof of compliance with a standard is merely non-conclusive evidence of a lack of negligence. See Jackson v. H.L. Bouton Co., 630 So.2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); St. Louis–San Francisco Ry. Co. v. White, 369 So.2d 1007, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Although P & W argues that......
  • Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • 6 Octubre 2014
    ...that proof of compliance with a standard is merely non-conclusive evidence of a lack of negligence. See Jackson v. H.L. Bouton Co., 630 So.2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ; St. Louis–San Francisco Ry. Co. v. White, 369 So.2d 1007, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Although P & W argues that no ad......
  • Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • 6 Octubre 2014
    ...that proof of compliance with a standard is merely non-conclusive evidence of a lack of negligence. See Jackson v. H.L. Bouton Co., 630 So.2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); St. Louis–San Francisco Ry. Co. v. White, 369 So.2d 1007, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Although P & W argues that no add......
  • Godfrey v. Precision Airmotive Corp.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • 10 Septiembre 2010
    ...Inc. v. Fulmer, 227 So. 2d 870, 873 (Fla. 1969); Hogan v. Gable, 30 So. 3d 573, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Jackson v. H.L. Bouton Co., 630 So. 2d 1173, 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Lasar Mfg. Co. v. Bachanov, 436 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Warn Indus. v. Geist, 343 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 197......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Using medical literature on direct examination to win the "battle of the experts".
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 77 No. 5, May 2003
    • 1 Mayo 2003
    ...(32) See 6 FLA PRAC., PERSONAL INJURY & WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS, [section] 24.10 (2001 -2002 ed.). See Jackson v. H.L. Bouton Co., 630 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1994) (industrial standards published by American National Standards Institute.); Lake Hospital and Clinic, Inc. v. Silversm......

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