Jackson v. Houston
| Decision Date | 08 January 1946 |
| Docket Number | 15304. |
| Citation | 37 S.E.2d 399,200 Ga. 399 |
| Parties | JACKSON v. HOUSTON. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1946.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where to a murder indictment a plea of not guilty was entered, and a verdict reading, was returned, such verdict could have no meaning except that the jury had found a verdict of guilty with a recommendation to mercy, and a sentence to life imprisonment predicated thereupon is a valid judgment.
2. The applicant seeking discharge, after conviction, under a writ of habeas corpus, and the sentence which he attacked being a valid judgment, it was demanded that the court remand him to the custody of the warden; therefore it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the other questions presented by the writ of error.
James Jackson filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus before the judge of the superior court of Fayette County. A writ was issued directed to Roy Houston, warden of that county. The applicant insisted that he was being illegally restrained of his liberty, and was 'confined in the county chain-gang camp' by the warden under a void verdict and an illegal sentence of the superior court of Fulton County. It was alleged that this confinement was in violation of the due-process clauses of the constitutions of the United States, Amendment 14, Code, § '1-805' [1-815] and of Georgia, article 1, § 1, par. 3, § 2-103, and also of the Code, § 27-2509, providing that punishment may be inflicted only upon a legal conviction.
On the hearing the applicant introduced a copy of the Fulton County indictment together with all entries thereon. The indictment charged him with the murder of Sarah Jackson in Fulton County by shooting her with a pistol. Upon the back of the indictment was a return of a 'true bill' signed by the foreman, a plea of not guilty signed by the solicitor-general and attorneys for the accused, and the following verdict: On the back of the indictment the words, 'Consent verdict,' were written. The applicant also introduced the sentence of the court, which after stating the case and the number thereof was headed, 'Verdict of guilty rec.,' and was followed by a sentence to life imprisonment signed by the judge.
The warden introduced the entry shown on the bench docket, which after stating the case and number, contained the following: 'H.M.D. Murder Consent Verdict of Guilty & Rec. Mercy-Life. 10-7-41'; and also a certificate of authority to hold the prisoner, issued by the State Department of Corrections. The warden also introduced two affidavits from the attorneys who represented the applicant under the murder charge, which affidavits, in substance, set forth that when the case was called for trial in Fulton superior court, the solicitor-general, the attorneys, and the applicant all agreed, with the consent of the court, to permit the jury to return a verdict of guilty with a recomendation of mercy in said case. The affidavits of the attorneys further set forth that though the verdict, by oversight, omitted the word 'guilty,' this was unknown to the attorneys and applicant at the time it was signed by the foreman and at the time the sentence was imposed, and that upon the return of the verdict the assistant solicitor-general stated in open court that the jury had returned a verdict of guilty and recommended the defendant to the mercy of the court. The applicant objected to the admission in evidence of these two affidavits.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court remanded the applicant to the custody of the warden. The exception is to this judgment.
Lester Dickson, of Fayetteville, for plaintiff in error.
J. W Culpepper, of Fayetteville, and T. Grady Head, Atty. Gen Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., and R. A. McGraw, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
ATKINSON, Justice (after stating the foregoing facts).
1. A discharge under a writ of habeas corpus, after a conviction can not be granted unless the judgment is absolutely void. Aldredge v. Williams, 188 Ga. 607(1), 4 S.E.2d 269; Stewart v. Sanders, 199 Ga. 497(1), 34 S.E.2d 649. The question presented for determination is whether a valid sentence may be imposed in a criminal case where the verdict does not specifically specify the word 'guilty.' 'Verdicts shall have a reasonable intendment, and shall receive a reasonable construction, and shall not be avoided unless from necessity.' Code, § 110-105; Carter v. State, 8...
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Citizens Bank of Ball Ground v. Johnson
...most importantly, consistent with the appellate principles above cited, it allows this verdict and judgment to stand. See Jackson v. Houston, 200 Ga. 399, 37 S.E.2d 399. The majority asserts that "Johnson was damaged by the ... fraud only to the extent that Johnson could not collect this in......
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King v. Cox
...v. Cofer, 161 Ga. 587, 131 S.E. 362. A verdict is certain which can be made certain by what it contains or by the record. Jackson v. Houston, 200 Ga. 399, 37 S.E.2d 399.' Powell v. Moore, 202 Ga. 62, 66, 42 S.E.2d 110, 3. In the absence of a transcript of evidence we cannot consider the sec......
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Patterson v. Loggins
...v. Cofer, 161 Ga. 587, 131 S.E. 362. A verdict is certain which can be made certain by what it contains or by the record. Jackson v. Houston, 200 Ga. 399, 37 S.E.2d 399.' Powell v. Moore, 202 Ga. 62, 66, 42 S.E.2d 110." King v. Cox, 130 Ga.App. 91, 92, 202 S.E.2d 216, There is nothing uncer......
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