Jackson v. Hutchinson
| Decision Date | 24 April 1970 |
| Citation | 453 S.W.2d 269 |
| Parties | Edward L. JACKSON et al., Appellants, v. Edward HUTCHINSON, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
David Kaplan, Edwin I. Baer, Louisville, for appellants.
Bill V. Seiller, Raleigh Jones, Jones, Ewen, MacKenzie & Peden, Louisville, for appellee.
CLAY, Commissioner.
This is a suit brought by two employees of the International Harvester Company against a fellow employee for personal injury damages arising out of an automobile collision on a parking lot maintained by the employer exclusively for the benefit of its employees. The essential facts (other than those on the issue of negligence) are not in dispute and the trial court granted defendant a summary judgment. The basis of this ruling was that, regardless of negligence, he was immune from suit because of his fellow-employee status.
The place of the accident was on the 'operating premises' of the employer and all three employees would have been entitled to workmen's compensation for any disabling injuries under our ruling in Harlan Appalachian Regional Hospital v. Taylor, Ky., 424 S.W.2d 580 (1968). In Miller v. Scott, Ky., 339 S.W.2d 941 (1960), we held that if an employee has a valid claim for workmen's compensation for injuries suffered in an accident caused by a fellow employee who was also acting in the course of his employment, the former has no common law cause of action against the latter for such injuries.
Plaintiffs' basic contention is that even though the defendant was a fellow employee, he falls within the category of 'some other person' under KRS 342.055. That statute gives the injured employee the right to proceed by civil action against 'some other person' legally liable therefor. In Miller v. Scott, above cited, we held the quoted phrase did not encompass a fellow employee, but refers 'to a third person having no connection with the general work being performed and whose act of negligence was wholly disconnected with that work'.
It is plaintiffs' position that this principle should not be extended to immunize a fellow employee who was not actually engaged in his employer's work so as to make the employer liable under the doctrine of 'respondeat superior'. It is said that if allowing a suit against a fellow employee does not expose the employer to liability, there is no reason to grant this immunity. It is pointed out that if the fellow employee was on vacation, he would be liable for negligent injuries inflicted on another employee...
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