Jackson v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.

• Decision Date: 23 January 1899
• Citation: 76 Miss. 607,24 So. 874
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: JORDAN JACKSON v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO

24 So. 874

76 Miss. 607

JORDAN JACKSON v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 23, 1899

November 1898

FROM the circuit court, first district, of Hinds county, HON. J B. CHRISMAN, Judge.

Jordan Jackson, the appellant, was the plaintiff in the court below the Illinois Central Railroad Company, appellee, was defendant there. Appellant, Jackson, brought this suit in 1894 against the appellee for breach of a contract of employment for life, alleging that, having some eight years before lost a leg from being injured by a train of the railroad company, he was promised "a job for life" if he would not sue for damages for the injury. The railroad company denied the contract. Jackson was in the service of the company for several years, when he was discharged, as he says, without reasonable cause, but the railroad company pleads that he was discharged for good and sufficient cause. The court below gave a peremptory instruction and rendered judgment in favor of the railroad company. The plaintiff Jackson, appealed to the supreme court. Other facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Reversed and remanded.

W. R. Harper, for appellants.

It is clear from the reading of the testimony that all parties to the contract, if the testimony is to be believed, thought that there was a complete, binding contract, and plaintiff, in good faith, executed his part of the contract, and Turner, the superintendent of the road, who made the contract, as long as he was in charge, carried out his part in good faith. Since Turner, as superintendent of the operating department, was a general agent of the company to employ men in that department, he was, in fact and in law, vested with full power to agree to all the terms of such contract, and especially the length of the term of service. It is wholly immaterial whether Turner had the authority to make a contract of employment for life or not, for the contract sued on is not a contract of employment at all, but a contract in settlement of a personal injury, and the promise to employ for life was the consideration therefor. It cannot be questioned from the evidence that Head, the personal injury agent of the company, did arrange with Jackson to settle his claim against the railroad company by giving him a life employment. It is certain, too, that Head directed Jackson to the division superintendent to carry into effect such settlement, and it is certain from Turner's own statement that it was his habit and custom to give employment to men in settlement of personal injury claims against the railroad company, when directed by Head so to do. Pacific Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 19 Kan. 256; Alabama, etc., Railroad Co. v. Hill, 76 Ala. 303.

Mayes & Harris, for appellee.

The plaintiff himself and his sister, who was present when the alleged contract was made, state distinctly what occurred, and both state clearly that Turner not only did not make a contract with the plaintiff for life employment, but distinctly state that he informed them that such a contract must be made with the president of the road, and also show clearly that he (Turner) had no authority to make such a contract. The case, as made out by the plaintiff himself and his witnesses--Turner being one or them--shows, if anything, merely that the division superintendent of the railroad company was asked by him to make a contract for life with him, which the superintendent declined to do upon the ground that he did not have the authority, and that such a contract would have to be made with the president of the company.

Argued orally by W. R. Harper, for appellant, and by J. B. Harris, for appellee.

OPINION

WOODS, C. J.

That the appellant had a personal injury claim (whether good or bad we need not concern ourselves with), and was threatening suit against the railroad company, can hardly be said to be disputed. The only evidence having a semblance of contradiction is found in the deposition of Turner, the then division superintendent of the railroad company. But that is only to the effect that Turner now has no recollection of a threatened suit. This want of recollection on Turner's part is not in conflict with the other positive statements made by other witnesses. That the appellant was seen during his confinement to his house, after the amputation of his leg, necessitated by his injury, by the personal injury agent of the company, and was assured by him that the company would take care of him and give him a lifetime job, is not denied that he told Jackson, then and there, that the division superintendent at New Orleans was the official he would have to see about the matter, and that a pass would be given him to New Orleans, that he might...