Jackson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. of Steamboat Rock

Decision Date23 January 1900
Citation81 N.W. 596,110 Iowa 313
PartiesJACKSON v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. OF STEAMBOAT ROCK.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from district court, Hardin county; B. P. Birdsall, Judge.

Action to recover damages for the breach of a contract of employment. From a judgment in plaintiff's favor, defendant appeals. Affirmed.H. L. Huff and Geo. W. Ward, for appellant.

Albrook & Lundy, for appellee.

WATERMAN, J.

Plaintiff sues to recover for the breach of a written contract, under which she was employed to teach for a period of 34 weeks, beginning September 7, 1896, in the intermediate department of the public school in defendant district. She alleges that she was wrongfully discharged by defendant's board of directors on the 26th day of November, 1896; and after this time, although she held herself willing and ready to perform her part of the contract, defendant refused to permit her so to do. Plaintiff further avers that, in the matter of her discharge, she appealed from the action of defendant's board of directors to the county superintendent, and that his decision was in her favor; that defendant appealed from this ruling to the superintendent of public instruction, and this latter official affirmed the holding of the county superintendent. The answer consists of several counts or divisions. In the first division, the contract, plaintiff's discharge, and the appeals as averred, with the decisions of the two officials named, are admitted, but it is claimed that plaintiff was rightfully discharged, for reasons given in the other counts. Count 2 of the answer was withdrawn, and counts 3 and 5 present only incidental matters, which are not in dispute. This leaves for our consideration counts 4 and 6, which we shall briefly summarize. In the first of these divisions, it is averred that, after plaintiff's discharge, defendant's board tendered her a place to teach in the higher department of its schools, at the same compensation to which she was entitled under her contract, but that she refused to accept the same. The sixth division makes claim that plaintiff did not preserve proper discipline on the part of the pupils, and used improper methods of punishment, and in both of these respects violated her contract. It is further averred that the matter of her claimed breach of contract was not passed upon in either of the appeals mentioned. This answer was attacked by both a motion and demurrer. These were submitted, by consent, together, and were directed in great part at the same matter. Since the parties chose to waive matter of form, we need not notice it. Haworth v. Newell, 102 Iowa, 541, 71 N. W. 404. Regardless of the manner which was pursued, we shall consider the attack made upon this pleading. A phrase in count 1 averring plaintiff's breach of contract was assailed, but we need not notice it separately; for the principle that should apply is fully stated in what we have to say further on. One ground of the attack on the answer is that it attempts to avoid, without confessing, plaintiff's cause of action. By an amendment to count 1 of its answer, defendant admits plaintiff's right of recovery, “unless it sustains its affirmative defense set out in the other counts of the answer.” It is sufficient if the confession be by implication. Runkle v. Insurance Co., 99 Iowa, 414, 68 N. W. 712. Though contained in only one division, by its express terms this confession is made a part of each, and by implication it admits plaintiff's wrongful discharge.

2. The matter in division 4,...

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