Jackson v. Independent School Dist. No. 16 of Payne County
| Decision Date | 08 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 16,Nos. 53985,53993,16,s. 53985 |
| Citation | 648 P.2d 26,1982 OK 74 |
| Parties | 5 Ed. Law Rep. 597, 1982 OK 74 Patricia J. JACKSON, Appellant-Appellee, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 16 OF PAYNE COUNTY, Oklahoma, and Gerald Bradshaw, Harold Sare, Elizabeth T. Shindell, James E. Baker, and Delores Lambert, in their official capacities as members of the Board of Education of Independent School Districtof Payne County, Oklahoma, Appellees-Appellants. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of Payne County; Ray Lee Wall, Judge.
Patricia J. Jackson, a probationary teacher, appeals from a declaratory judgment by the trial court that 70 O.S.Supp.1977 § 6-103.2 does not require notification, admonishment and time for correction of alleged teaching deficiencies before a probationary teacher may be nonreemployed based on the Superintendent's recommendation. The Board of Education appeals from a determination by the trial court that it must state reasons or findings for its decision to nonreemploy the probationary teacher at the conclusion of a due process hearing. The appeals were consolidated.
AFFIRMED.
Fagin, Hewett, Mathews & Fagin by Ronald E. Stakem, Oklahoma City, for appellant-appellee Patricia J. Jackson.
Winfrey D. Houston, Stillwater, for appellees-appellants Independent School Dist. No. 16 of Payne County, Okl., et al.
The issues presented are whether: 1) a board of education may fail to renew the contract of a probationary teacher on the basis of alleged teaching deficiencies if the teacher does not receive written notification of the deficiencies and an opportunity to correct her job performance, and 2) a local board of education is required to state reasons or findings for its decision to nonreemploy a probationary teacher at the conclusion of a due process hearing.
Patricia J. Jackson, appellant, (teacher) was employed as a probationary teacher 1 by the Stillwater Board of Education (Board) to teach sixth grade at the Middle School. In accordance with 70 O.S.Supp.1977 § 6-102.2, the Board published an evaluation policy. The teacher was evaluated three times on specified forms by her immediate supervisor, the principal of the Middle School, during the 1977-1978 school year. Three grading categories were provided on the form (A-area of strength; B-professionally competent, and C-area of concern). The principal did not give an A rating to any of the teachers under his supervision. The teacher received B ratings, the highest rating given any teacher during the school year in twenty-five categories on the November 9, 1977 evaluation. However, a subsequent form was completed by the principal on November 14, 1977, because the teacher stapled permission slips on the clothing of several students who had failed to return the signed consent forms for a class field trip. The teacher received B ratings on the January 17, 1978 evaluation form. The superintendent did not witness the teacher's performance at any time during the year. However, her contract was not renewed by the Board based on the recommendation of the Superintendent, who refused to disclose any specific reasons for her nonreemployment. In response to a request for reasons of nonreemployment, the Board's counsel stated the reason was sub-standard professional performance. The teacher requested a hearing and after the hearing the Board affirmed the Superintendent's action but failed to state reasons or findings for its decision. 2 The teacher filed a declaratory judgment action. The teacher sought a determination by the trial court that the Board breached her contract or, in the alternative, committed ultra vires acts in violation of 70 O.S.Supp.1977 §§ 6-103.2 and 6-103(A). The teacher also alleged a violation of her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 The court found that the teacher was not afforded due process because of the failure to state reasons or findings or to disclose the evidence upon which its decisions are made and awarded damages of $1,000.00 and an Attorney fee of $1,250.00; but it held that § 6-103.2 was inapplicable because the principal had no reason to believe the teacher would be nonreemployed. The teacher and the Board appealed and the causes were ordered consolidated.
The teacher does not seek a review on the merits of cause for dismissal, rather her appeal is limited to a very narrow procedural perspective. 4 The teacher asserts that 70 O.S.Supp.1977 § 6-103.2 establishes as conditions precedent to a decision by a board of education to nonreemploy 5 a probationary teacher that: 1) the teacher must be admonished concerning performance which may lead to dismissal followed by administrative assistance and 2) given an opportunity to improve over a period not to exceed two months. The Board contends that § 6-103.2 is inapplicable because the principal had no reason to believe that the teacher's conduct would lead to nonreemployment; 6 and that the Superintendent and Board of Education, pursuant to 70 O.S.Supp.1977 § 6-103.4, had authority to nonreemploy a teacher without either admonishment by the principal, or allowing reasonable time for improvement. 7
This question turns on a matter of statutory construction. The statute states that "Whenever a superintendent of a school district determines that cause exists for the dismissal or nonreemployment of a teacher he shall submit a recommendation in writing to the board of education of such school district." 8 The local board of education may also determine on its own volition not to reemploy a teacher. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the Legislature as expressed in the statute. 9 The purposes of the admonishment statute are to prevent arbitrary and unreasonable evaluations by principals and to provide assistance for teachers with remedial classroom problems. The enforcement of the admonishment statute as a condition precedent would preclude evaluation for one-third (1/3) of the school year because the second evaluation must be by February 10; and further, it would vest the principal with sole authority to arbiter the teacher's performance. Meaningful access to the superintendent and the board by students and parents would be precluded by such an arrangement.
Had the Legislature intended that the admonishment statute § 6-103.2 be employed as a condition precedent to nonreemployment, this intention would have been clearly expressed in the statute. It is apparent that there was no legislative intent that the statute apply to the superintendent. The statute is devoid of ambiguity. There is no room for construction or provision for further inquiry when the statute plainly speaks. 10 Because the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear, no occasion exists for the operation of rules of construction and its evident meaning must be accepted. 11
The Board contends that the trial court erred when it determined that the teacher was not given reasons or findings upon which the Board's decision was made.
The teacher counters that 70 O.S.Supp.1977 § 6-103.4(E) 12 requires that she be afforded all procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions, including a statement of reasons or findings for the decision not to reemploy her.
Historically, there has been a distinction drawn between a right and a privilege for the application of the due process clause. The distinction seems to have been discarded in favor of the concept of entitlement which is based on expectations derived from independent state law. Entitlements have become synonymous with state fostered justifiable expectations which are not equated with a right when given but which are protected by due process when curtailment is threatened. 13
Title 70 O.S.Supp.1977 § 6-103.4(B) entitles a probationary teacher to a due process hearing. Although the statute does not expressly state that findings must be made, the State Board of Education Policy Bulletin and Guide for Implementing Teacher Hearing Procedures provides that the right to a due process hearing entitles the teacher to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard; granted a reasonable time to prepare for the hearing; be heard before a fair and impartial tribunal; advised of the decision reached by the board and a general explanation of the basis upon which the decision was reached, 14 and a written transcript of the proceedings.
Notice is a jurisdictional requirement as well as a fundamental requisite of due process. Due process requires adequate notice and a realistic opportunity to appear at a hearing in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The right to be heard is of little value unless adequate notice is given, and due process is violated by the mere act of exercising judicial power upon process not reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of an action. Procedural due process of law contemplates a fair and open hearing before a legally constituted court or other authority with notice and an opportunity to present evidence and argument, representation by counsel, if desired, and information concerning the claims of the opposing party with reasonable opportunity to controvert them. 15
The purpose of any due process proceeding is to afford the opportunity to each person to present evidence and arguments in a forum which provides fair and equal justice. It seems not only fair, courteous, and an exercise of due process, but an efficient administration of justice for notice to be given 16 concerning what deficiencies resulted in the teacher being nonreemployed. ...
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