Jackson v. Intl. Union of Operating Engrs.
| Decision Date | 04 June 1948 |
| Citation | 307 Ky. 485 |
| Parties | Jackson v. International Union Of Operating Engineers et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
1. Master and Servant. — An employer, whose contract with union required employment of only union members in good standing and discharge of union members not in good standing, did not breach contract by acceding to demand of union's business agent to remove member from job, notwithstanding that union failed to give employer written notice, where contract merely provided that written notice should be sufficient notice to authorize removal.
2. Master and Servant. — Where unions through bargaining agents had right to contract for employees and employer, and contract was entered into, employer could not thereafter question reason or authority.
3. Pleading. — A pleading must be construed most strongly against pleader.
4. Notice. — "Notice" is a medium of information which, if conveyed, is sufficient notice and is not a question of diligence but of knowledge of essential facts.
5. Master and Servant. — Where contract between employer and union required employment of only union members in good standing and discharge of union members not in good standing and defined member in good standing as member not delinquent in payment of union dues and not under penalty or discipline invoked by union, employer upon whom demand was made by union's business agent for removal of member from job could assume that member was not in good standing and could reasonably act on such demand.
6. Parties. — The statute permitting one or more persons to sue or defend for all if question involves a common or general interest authorizes a representative, generally interested class to sue or defend for an unincorporated body, if suable. Civil Code of Practice, sec. 25.
7. Parties. — In union member's action against parent and local unions and members thereof for damages for loss of employment, question whether there was a "common or general interest" within statute permitting one or more persons to sue or defend for all was not involved on special demurrers that unions were voluntary associations and not suable. Civil Code of Practice, sec. 25.
8. Parties. — The statute permitting one or more persons to sue or defend for all if question involves a common or general interest of many persons applies to common-law actions as well as to suits in equity. Civil Code of Practice, sec. 25.
9. Parties. — In union member's action against parent and local unions and members thereof for damages for loss of employment, representative members of unions and authorized business agent would be required under statute to defend for unions and all members, notwithstanding that unions were voluntary associations. Civil Code of Practice, sec. 25; KRS 446.010; Const. sec. 208.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court.
S.J. Stallings and Charles B. Zirkle for appellant.
Cohen & Fisher and Lawrence S. Grauman for appellees.
Before Henry L. Brooks, Judge.
Affirming in part, reversing in part.
Appeal from a judgment sustaining special demurrers of Union defendants and general demurrer of defendant Cross & Son, Inc., employer, to Jackson's petition. The first were the International Union of Operating Engineers affiliated with A.F. of L., and members thereof, and its Local Union No. 181, and members, by and through J.E. Pirtle as business agent of the parent and local Unions. The petition named C.W. Christensen and ten other persons (including Pirtle), "individually and as members having and holding interests in common with all other members of the Unions."
Appellant alleged the Unions were "each composed of hundreds of thousands of members, including the individual persons named; a membership so large it would be impracticable to bring them before the court within a reasonable time; that the question involved was of common and general interest to the members of both Unions, and plaintiff asked the right to prosecute his action against them." It was alleged that Pirtle was business agent of both the local governing authority of the organizations.
Jackson at all times complained of was employed by Cross & Son as an oiler. Prior to his employment the Unions had entered into agreement with his employer "whereby said Unions became the sole bargaining agent in the employment of operating engineers," and Cross & Son had bound itself by the following part of the contract:
Jackson alleges that while he was employed "Pirtle and other members of" the International, its affiliate, and the Local Union, willfully, knowingly and fraudulently conspired and agreed among themselves, without just reason or grounds to cause him to be discharged from working for Cross & Son, and thus to be placed in the position where he could not obtain like, or any employment. That in furtherance of the plan and purpose of the unlawful conspiracy, the Unions, through their business agent, "while acting in the scope of his authority, demanded of his employer immediate suspension," and that the employer acting upon the request suspended him on July 19, 1946, and refused to reemploy him; "that the Unions and Pirtle have willfully, etc. united to deprive him of his rights derived from the contract, and although a member of the Unions in good standing, the Company dismissed him without regard to removal procedure, as set out in the contract."
He said that prior to the action on the part of defendants his salary was $75 per week; that due to their actions he is refused employment by Cross & Son and was unable to secure similar work at like wages, because the "defendant Union organizations and Pirtle maliciously, arbitrarily and spitefully refused and still refuse to certify him as a member in good standing" in the Union organizations. He asked judgment for $1200 for actual loss of time, and for future loss of time, humiliation, embarrassment and willful actions of defendants the further sum of $25,000.
Both Unions filed special demurrers based on the ground that each was a voluntary association and not suable. Like demurrers were filed by the individual members of the Unions on the same ground. The judgment as to the Unions and individuals recites that "the plaintiff having filed no amended petition, and saying nothing further with reference to defendants `Unions' this action is dismissed." Appellant is here insisting: (1) Voluntary Associations, such as appellee labor Unions, can be sued in their own names under the laws of Kentucky; (2) the court should have permitted plaintiff to prosecute this suit as a class action; (3) the demurrer of Cross & Son should have been overruled.
We take up point (3) first. In appellant's brief it is stated that the contract was made for his benefit; that he was bound by its terms, and that the Union by proper proceedings could invoke a fine against him, thus removing him from membership, but this was not done and, therefore, he contends he was in good standing. Appellant suggests that it is important to note that part of the contract which required written notice to the employer, under which in order to remove him on the ground that he was not a member, the employer must have had written notice that the employee was no longer a member. The crux of Jackson's complaint (as to employer) is that Cross & Son "failed to follow the removal procedure provided in the contract."
We are unable to grasp the argument that Cross & Son breached the contract because the Union failed to give written notice. The fact is the contract only provided that written notice should be "sufficient notice" to authorize removal. The petition charges that Cross & Son had carried out the contract which the parties had entered into, and this was in full force and effect at all times. It is emphasized that the Unions, through its bargaining agents, had the right to contract for Jackson and Cross & Son, and if they did so contract Cross & Son had no right to question reason or authority. Day v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 295 Ky. 679, 175 S.W. 2d 347.
Applying the rule that a pleading must be most strongly construed against the pleader, it is doubtful if the petition states an actionable cause as against Cross & Son, who, as we read the petition, did only what they had agreed to do, acting upon demand of Pirtle while he was acting within the scope of his authority, as is specifically alleged. The contract provides for no notice to Jackson. Notice could be waived without prejudice to appellant. Notice is but a medium of information, which if conveyed is sufficient notice. Notice Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, Sec. 437; Sentry Safety Control Corporation v. Broadway & 4th Avenue Realty Co., 276 Ky. 648, 124 S.W. 2d 1051.
Cross & Son were in a position where they could reasonably act on the demand of the business agent. The contract defined a member in good standing as one who is not under penalty or discipline invoked by the Unions, or who had not paid dues. Cross & Son, when the demand was made, could not assume that...
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