Jackson v. Jarratt

• Decision Date: 23 July 1932
• Citation: 52 S.W.2d 137,165 Tenn. 76
• Parties: JACKSON v. JARRATT et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

52 S.W.2d 137

165 Tenn. 76

JACKSON v. JARRATT et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 23, 1932

Appeal from Circuit Court, Shelby County; H. W. Laughlin, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Law by William Jackson against J. W. Jarratt, wherein an original petition was filed for a writ of mandamus prayed to be directed to H. W Laughlin, Circuit Judge.

Writ of mandamus granted in accordance with opinion.

W. C Rodgers, of Memphis, for plaintiff.

Charles L. Neely, of Memphis, for defendants.

CHAMBLISS J.

This is a compensation case, heard before Judge H. W. Laughlin Circuit Judge. It is here on a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging, in substance, that the case was regularly heard during the January term, on the 17th day of March 1932, and decision announced by the trial judge on the following day, but that the judgment was not then spread of record on the minutes; that the January term expired on the 19th day of March, and on the 2d day of April of the succeeding term, opening on the 21st day of March, upon an order being made for the entry of the judgment nunc pro tunc, as of the day of its announcement in the preceding term, a motion for a new trial and time for filing a bill of exceptions was made and overruled, on the ground that it came too late; the term having expired, and the court being without jurisdiction. It was charged that the effect of the entry of this nunc pro tunc order at this time, and the overruling of the motions, was to deprive petitioner of his right of appeal. This court ordered the issuance of an alternative writ.

The answer of Judge Laughlin shows that the "judgment was rendered by him in the sum of $45.00," on the 18th day of March, and that "on that date the original court file shows judgment for the plaintiff for $45.00 and costs." He says, further, that he keeps a docket known as "Judge's Bar Docket," in which is put down all actions taken by him, and this contains, as of March 18th, the entry, "From yesterday, judgment for the plaintiff for $45.00."

The answer further shows that no motion for a new trial was entered during the January term, but that on March 23d "a paper purporting to be a motion for a new trial was filed with the Clerk and noted on the docket. The motion was called up for hearing and the court announced at that time that judgment had been given in the January term, and that he was without jurisdiction to entertain the motion." The answer then proceeds:

"After the entry of the nunc pro tunc decree, which was on the 2nd day of April, 1932, the plaintiff attempted to and did file what purported to be a motion for a new trial, which was filed April 6, 1932. On the hearing of this motion, the Judge again announced the same action he had taken previously, and that was that this cause came on this day to be heard on motion for a new trial, whereupon the Court declined to entertain said motion, but exactly the same action was taken when the proposed motion of March 23rd was called on the motion docket. The minutes, as alleged in the bill, had not been signed at the time of the filing of the petition for the mandamus. Everything was done in regular course, and the Court refused to entertain the motion because it was not made in the January term in which the judgment had been announced in the cause. No motion had been made and no order had been presented to extend the term or submit a motion for a new trial."

Counsel for petitioner say that: "The only question involved in this matter is the construction of section 8980, new Code, or section 4847, Shannon's Code, [which reads, A rehearing can only be applied for at the term of the Court at which the decree sought to be affected is rendered] and particularly the word 'rendered,' as used therein. *** Is the judgment 'rendered' when announced, or when spread upon the minutes?"

"Rendered" means expressed or announced in a conclusive manner and with decisive effect, certainly so when at the same time notation of it is made on a judgment docket, or other more or less permanent memorandum record kept by the Judge for the purpose. "The rendition of judgment, and the entry of judgment, are different and distinct, each from the other. The former is the act of the court, while the latter is the act of the clerk of the court. *** To render judgment is to return or give judgment; and it can not be said, in our opinion, that the phrase, in any of its forms, includes the idea of making a written entry or record of a judgment." Anderson v. Mitchell, 58 Ind. 594; Gray v. Palmer, 28 Cal. 416.

Insisting that the word "rendered" in the statute means "entered on the minutes," counsel for petitioner relied on expressions in recent opinions of this court ( Feldman v. Clark, 153 Tenn. 373, 284 S.W. 353; England v. Young, 155 Tenn. 511, 296 S.W. 14; Shipley v. Barnett, 161 Tenn. 437, 32 S.W.2d 1022) to support this insistence.

The expressions relied on are without the determinative significance suggested. In all of these cases an entry of the judgment had been made, and the court was passing on the situation thus presented. The terms "rendered" and "entered" were used without consideration of, or reference to, any distinction in meaning, or effect, as between the terms.

In Ency. of P. P. vol. 2, p. 249, it is said:

"The prevailing rule construes a statute requiring an appeal to be taken within a defined statutory period after the 'rendition' of the judgment as mandatory (citing numerous authorities), and requires the time to appeal to be computed from the date of the actual rendition, and not from the entry."

And, again, "A judgment is 'rendered' within the meaning of such statutes, when ordered or pronounced by the Court, and not when entered in the judgment book." Citing Gray v. Palmer, 28 Cal. 416; State v. Meacham, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 31; Anderson v. Mitchell, 58 Ind. 592, supra; and Buck v. Holt, 74 Iowa, 294, 37 N.W. 377.

In Rawles Bouvier Vol. III, p. 2880, it is said, "A judgment is 'rendered' when the Court makes an order therefor," citing State v. Biesman, 12 Mont. 11, 29 P. 534.

These and other definitions and holdings would seem to support the view that the word "rendered," used in our statute above quoted, means announced or ordered. However, we are constrained to hold that the right to move for a new trial, and an appeal, was erroneously cut off under the undisputed circumstances of the case before us.

Conceding that the strict definition of the word "rendered" is as above stated, we are of opinion that its use in our statute contemplates that the rendition of the judgment will be carried into binding and effective form by entry upon the minutes, consistently with our numerous holdings that the Court speaks authoritatively only through its records. For example, Fraker v. Brazelton, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea) 280, 281; State v. True, 116 Tenn. 313, 95 S.W. 1028.

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