Jackson v. Keske, 68-433

Citation20 Ohio St.2d 89,253 N.E.2d 778
Decision Date10 December 1969
Docket NumberNo. 68-433,68-433
Parties, 49 O.O.2d 389 JACKSON, a Minor, Appellant, v. KESKE et al., Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Syllabus by the Court

A nonresident upon whom process is served pursuant to Section 2307.383, Revised Code, is amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts of Ohio in personam for a tortious act in Ohio, notwithstanding such person was a resident of this state when the act was alleged to have been committed.

The plaintiff, an Ohio resident, claims that she was injured by tortious acts which were committed in Ohio by the defendants. They were then residents of Ohio. Subsequent to the alleged torts, and prior to the filing of this action, the defendants became residents of two other states. The plaintiff sued, causing process upon the defendants to be issued and served pursuant to Section 2307.383, Revised Code. The Court of Common Pleas sustained the defendants' motion to quash service. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the plaintiff has appealed to this court.

Jack N. Turoff, Cleveland, for appellant.

Meyers, Stevens & Rea and Richard F. Stevens, Cleveland, for appellees.

SCHNEIDER, Judge.

The General Assembly has authorized the courts of Ohio to 'exercise personal jurisdiction over a * * * (nonresident) * * * as to a cause of action arising from the * * * (nonresident's) (c)lausing tortious injury by an act * * * in this state * * *.' Section 2307.382, Revised Code.

'When personal jurisdiction is authorized by Section 2307.382 of the Revised Code (1) service of process may be made * * * on the Secretary of State * * * (as) the statutory agent of such * * * (nonresident) * * *.' (Section 2307.383, Revised Code); and, (2) 'any action or suit may be brought in the county wherein the plaintiff resides or where the cause of action or any part thereof arose.' (Section 2307.384, Revised Code.)

In accordance with the definition contained in Section 2307.381, Revised Code, we have substituted 'nonresident' for 'person' in the foregoing quotation of the so-called 'long-arm' statutes, our reading of which indicates what there tenor is insistent that the circumstances at the time when jurisdiction in personam is sought to be obtained, not when the cause of action arose, actuate their utility.

Only the phrase, 'who acts directly or by an agent.' which appears in Section 2307.382, Revised Code, after and as the modifier of the word, 'person,' and which we have omitted from our quotation of that statute indicates a contrary conclusion. However, the purpose of the inclusion of the phrase at that point was to obviate any construction that a principal might escape the net of the process which ensnared his agent as a result of a transaction or transgression in this state in furtherance, or within the scope of, his principal's business here.

In view of our assessment of the case, we have no cause to rely on the rule imposed upon us by Section 1.11, Revised Code, that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed in furtherance of their purpose. Thus, it is not incumbent upon us to review the manifest purpose of 'long-arm' statutes. (See Seilon, Inc. v. Brema S. p. A. (N.D. Ohio), 271 F.Supp. 516, 518; Note 35 Cin.L.Rev. 157, 158-62; Pizzedaz, Ohio's Long-Arm Statute, 15 Cleve.-Mar.L.Rev. 363, 364.)

Our statutes authorize jurisdiction over a nonresident who commits a tortious act in Ohio on the grounds that he acted in Ohio. Such person has far less contact with this state than had the appellees in the instant case, who not only acted here but also resided here at the time they committed the alleged tort. We will not, therefore, indulge the inference that the General Assembly intended to confer upon our courts the authority to assume jurisdiction in personam over a tortfeasor with less contacts with Ohio than the appellees, but not...

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6 cases
  • Harmon v. Eudaily
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Delaware
    • 5 Septiembre 1979
    ......at 410.         The same result was reached in Jackson v. Keske, 20 Ohio St.2d 89, 253 N.E.2d 778 (1969), despite long-arm statutes which defined "person" ......
  • Eudaily v. Harmon
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • 4 Septiembre 1980
    ...277 N.Y.S.2d 146, 223 N.E.2d 570 (1966); Kinchla v. Baumner, N.H.Supr., 114 N.H. 818, 330 A.2d 112 (1974); Jackson v. Keske, Ohio Supr., 20 Ohio St.2d 89, 253 N.E.2d 778 (1966). III. The defendant also argues that § 3104 may not be applied to him because it was enacted subsequent to the all......
  • Poindexter v. Willis
    • United States
    • Court of Common Pleas of Ohio
    • 16 Enero 1970
    ...enacted a Long Arm Statute similar to that of Illinois. Section 2307.382 and the annotated cases thereunder. See also: Jackson v. Keske, 20 Ohio St.2d 89, 253 N.E.2d 778. Also, unquestionably, Ohio requires the father to support his illegitimate In accordance with all of the foregoing, this......
  • Jurko v. Jobs Europe Agency
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 30 Enero 1975
    ......        Judgment affirmed.         JACKSON......
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