Jackson v. Langley, 161
Decision Date | 10 October 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 161,161 |
Citation | 66 S.E.2d 899,234 N.C. 243 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | JACKSON et al. v. LANGLEY et al. |
M. R. McCown, Tryon, and J. Lee Lavender, Old Fort, for plaintiffs, appellees.
J. T. Arledge, Tryon, and James B. Dixon, Marion, S. C., for defendants, appellants.
The sole question involved in this appeal is whether John Alfred Langley, Jr., took a vested or contingent remainder in his mother's estate under the terms of her will. The court below held, in effect, that his interest in the estate was contingent upon his attaining the age of 25 years, and having died before attaining that age, the estate never vested in him. We do not concur in this construction or interpretation of the will.
The law favors the early vesting of estates and when a will, like the one under consideration, contains no limitation over in the event of the death of the devisee or legatee, in the absence of an express intention to the contrary, the estate will vest at the time of the death of the testator. Robinson v. Robinson, 227 N.C. 155, 41 S.E.2d 282; Priddy & Co. v. Sanderford, 221 N.C. 422, 20 S.E.2d 341; Coddington v. Stone, 217 N.C. 714, 9 S.E.2d 420; Weill v. Weill, 212 N.C. 764, 194 S.E. 462; Satterfield v. Stewart, 212 N.C. 743, 194 S.E. 459; Mountain Park Institute v. Lovill, 198 N.C. 642, 153 S.E. 114; Taylor v. Taylor, 174 N.C. 537, 94 S.E. 7; Dunn v. Hines, 164 N.C. 113, 80 S.E. 410.
Moreover, the devise of property to a trustee for a designated period, to manage and control the property as to both corpus and income, does not prevent it from vesting in the beneficiary. Page on Wills, 3rd Ed. Vol. 3, Section 1261, at page 701; Plitt v. Peppler, 167 Md. 252, 173 A. 35, 109 A.L.R. 1; Hooker v. Bryan, 140 N.C. 402, 53 S.E. 130; Coddington v. Stone, supra.
It is likewise said in 69 C.J., Wills, Section 1674(6), page 595: Also in 57 Am.Jur., Wills, Section 1226, page 809, in discussing this question, it is said: 'The circumstance that a testamentary benefaction is given through the intervention of a trustee will, of course, preclude the immediate vesting in the beneficiary of the legal title to the subject matter of the gift, although such beneficiary may become vested with an equitable interest in fee upon the death of the testator.'
Furthermore, the mere fact that John Alfred Langley, Sr., the trustee, was given the right to use the income from or corpus of the trust estate for his own benefit in the event certain enumerated emergencies arose, did not in any way affect or delay the vesting of the estate in John Alfred Langley, Jr., to any greater extent than if the trustee had been given a life estate with the power to use the corpus, or any part thereof, for his own use.
The overwhelming weight of authority, including our own decisions, supports the view that in such cases the estate vests in the ultimate beneficiary upon the death of the testator, subject to be divested of such portion thereof as may be required to meet the authorized needs of the life tenant or other designated person. Page on Wills, 3rd Ed., Section 1264, page 705; Perry v. Rhodes, 6 N.C. 140; Brinson v. Wharton, 43 N.C. 80; Williams v. Smith, 57 N.C. 254; Myers v. Williams, 58 N.C. 362; Lehnard v. Specht, 180 Ill. 208, 54 N.E. 315; Braley v. Spragins, 221 Ala. 150, 128 So. 149; Woodman v. Woodman, 89 Me. 128, 35 A. 1037; Barker v. Ashley, 58 R.I. 243, 192 A. 304; Buxton v. Noble, 146 Kan. 671, 73 P.2d 43; Downs v. Downs, 243 Wis. 303, 9 N.W.2d 822.
In the case of Myers v. Williams, supra, certain slaves were bequeathed to the father, as trustee, for the benefit of his children, but with the further provision that the father was not to be accountable to his children for the proceeds from the labor of the slaves until the children became 21 years of age. The Court said:
In Fuller v. Fuller, 58 N.C. 223, the Court quoted with approval from page 157 of Smith's 'Original View of Executory Interests', as follows: 'When the testator gives the whole of the intermediate income of real estate, or of personal estate, to the person to whom he devises or bequeaths such estate on the attainment of a certain age, but the attainment of that age does not form a part of the original description of the devisee or legatee, the interest is vested in right before that age, even though there is no prior distinct gift--no express gift, except at that age--it being considered that the testator merely intended to keep the devisee or legatee out of the possession or enjoyment until he should have become better qualified to manage, or more likely, to take due care of the property.'
The instant case in every essential part is on 'all fours' with Coddington v. Stone, supra, except for the provision...
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