Jackson v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 27 June 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. CV410-291
• Parties: YUSEF JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. AL ST. LAWRENCE (Chatham County Sheriff Complex); McAUTHUR HOLMES; LT. L. JOHNSON; CPL S. CRITTENTEN, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

YUSEF JACKSON, Plaintiff,

v.AL ST. LAWRENCE (Chatham County Sheriff Complex); McAUTHUR HOLMES; LT. L. JOHNSON; CPL S. CRITTENTEN, Defendants.

Case No. CV410-291

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION

Dated: June 27, 2011

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Proceeding pro se and using a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form complaint, Chatham County, Georgia jail inmate Yusef Jackson sues his jailers for violating his right to practice his religion. Doc. 1. He has completed his in forma pauperis (IFP) filings, so under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) the Court will now screen his case¹ for claims subject toimmediate dismissal as frivolous, malicious, or legally insufficient. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (courts must identify "cognizable claims" filed by prisoners or other detainees and dismiss claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2) (allowing dismissal on the same four standards provided by § 1915A as to any prisoner suit brought "with respect to prison conditions"); Mack v. Yost, 2011 WL 1740151 at * 1 (3rd Cir. May 6, 2011).²

Jackson complains that he and other Muslim inmates are being "harassed," discriminated against, and "dehumanized" in several ways. Doc. 1 at 5. He requests an injunction (though he does not use the term) requiring the jail

to provide an area being in the form of a fifty six[-]cell unit just as the Christian[s] who are provided with two units of this size, better known as Christian Dorms. Also s[e]t aside an appointed area in every unit from one to six for Muslims to offer their obligatory five congregational (Salat) prayers daily. Provid[e] Muslims with [an] extra blanket to pray on and extra towel to cover urinal. Also a place in every unit to perform (Al [Jumu'ah]) Friday's Day of Assembly. Plaintiff is also suing the Chatham County Sheriff Complex for the sum of two million dollars for prejudice and discrimination, pain and suffering.

Doc. 1 at 6 (parentheses omitted). Plaintiff does not cite to any constitutional provision, much less the Religious Land Use andInstitutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l.

It is well settled that "the courts may not serve as de facto counsel for the litigant or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Baker, 406 F. App'x 416, 422 (11th Cir. 2010). Still, pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings construed liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). And if they present the substantive elements of a claim and argue all but the label one might otherwise use to identify the claim, then courts may recognize them. Baker, 406 F. App'x at 422 (district court, in granting state prisoner's petition for federal habeas relief, properly treated prisoner's claim as one alleging violation of substantive due process through Confrontation Clause error, notwithstanding that prisoner's petition did not specify whether he claimed violation of procedural due process, substantive due process, or both; prisoner's claim, subsequent pro se reply brief, and counseled memorandum all mentioned and discussed concepts of substantive due process and Confrontation Clause violations).

As noted, Jackson "cites" only 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (which is printed onthe face of the form complaint he's used) but no law or any particular constitutional provision. Under the Baker prism, he at best may be said to allege official impingement of his First Amendment right to practice his religion. The same must be said for an Equal Protection Claim (i.e., Christians receive more accommodations than Muslims).

Meanwhile, Congress increased legal protections for religious practices under the RLUIPA. Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410, 415 (2d Cir. 2009); Corouthers v. Flowers, 2011 WL 1321833 at * 3 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2011). But that statute has its own complications (some noted below), Jackson has not cited it, and the Court draws the line at recognizing more sophisticated claims for pro se litigants who cite no law at all. See GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) ("among the cardinal principles of our Anglo-American system of justice is the notion that the legal parameters of a given dispute are framed by the positions advanced by the adversaries, and may not be expanded sua sponte by the trial judge.") (quotes and cite omitted), overruled in part on other grounds, Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).

Consistent with the legal standards set forth below, the Court will "green-light" for the moment the minimum claims that Jackson appears to raise ~ his right to practice his religion under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and his Equal Protection claim. See Williams v. Book, 2011 WL 2173743 at * 2 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 2, 2011) (because inmate mentioned RLUIPA but did not press a claim under it, court analyzed his religion-based claims under the Free Exercise Clause, but noted no viable RLUIPA claim even if raised).

I. GOVERNING LAW

Jackson's imprisonment limits his First Amendment right to practice his religion. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-49, (1987). To be in prison is to suffer a reduction in rights as "justified by considerations underlying our penal system." Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). Those reductions are valid if "reasonably related to legitimate security interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987).

On top of that, it is the inmate's burden to show that a regulation or practice or policy impinges his First Amendment right. In fact, the inmate must "overcome the presumption that the prison officials actedwithin their broad discretion" in acting or failing to act in the manner an inmate alleges here. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 232 (2001) (emphasis added), quoted in Hayes v. Tennessee, 2011 WL 2148416 at * 3 (6th Cir. Jun. 1, 2011). Once he overcomes that presumption his claim is assessed under the Turner test:

1) whether there is a "Valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it,"

2) "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates,"

3) the "impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally," and

4) the "absence of ready alternatives."³

Kohn v. Coleman, 2011 WL 2294147 at * 4 (D.S.C. May, 4, 2011) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90) (footnote added); see also Williams, 2011 WL 2173743 at *3; Sayed v. Profitt, 2011 WL 924476 at * 3-4 (10th Cir. Mar. 18, 2011) (Islamic prisoner could perform partial ablution at sink in his cell, and thus correctional facility's regional coordinator of faith programs did not substantially burden Islamic prisoner's First Amendment rights by refusing to permit him to shower outside pod-time prior to Jumu'ah services; prisoner could properly wash his feet, hands, mouth, nose, face, head, ears, and neck in sink, as required for partial ablution).

With an equal protection claim,

"a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and [that] (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis." Sweet v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311,1318-19 (11th Cir.2006); see also Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that "the equal protection clause prohibits only intentional discrimination.").

Muhammad v. Sapp, 388 F. App'x. 892, 899 (11th Cir. Jul. 21, 2010). The key element here is intent. The Muhammad court cited withapproval Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2008) ("the equal protection clause prohibits only intentional discrimination.") and Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 815-16 (8th Cir. 2008) (prisoner's equal protection claim failed because he had not shown that the prison's decision to serve kosher entrees and not halal entrees was motivated by intentional or purposeful discrimination); see also Muhammad, 388 F. App'x. at 899 (prison officials did not violate Equal Protection Clause by providing Jewish inmates with kosher diet and not providing Muslim inmates with halal diet; facts viewed in light most favorable to Muslim inmate did not establish that prison's decision to serve kosher meals but not halal meals was the product of intentional discrimination).

II. ANALYSIS

A. First Amendment Claim

Jackson is not complaining that the Jail is affirmatively impinging on his right to a religious practice or custom, as seen in cases like Zargary v. City of New York, 412 F. App'x 339, 2011 WL 293976 at * 2-3 (2nd Cir. Feb. 1, 2011) (even if "ready alternatives" to the challenged policy existed,city's policy of requiring all new prison inmates to be photographed without hats or other head coverings as part of its prisoner intake procedure did not violate prisoner's First Amendment rights insofar as it required her to briefly remove a headscarf she wore as part of her religious observance as an Orthodox Jew; policy was reasonably related to the City's unassailable interests in identifying prisoners and maintaining prison and prisoner safety and security), and Riggins v. Clarke, 403 F. App'x 292, 294 (9th Cir. 2010) (state corrections officials' enforcement of policy requiring that all prisoners use name under which they were committed to custody before any other official or religious name on all incoming and outgoing correspondence did not violate prisoner's First Amendment rights, as such policy was justified by legitimate penological interest in orderly and efficient administration of prison mail).

Rather, h...