Jackson v. Littell
Decision Date | 14 July 1908 |
Parties | ABIGAIL JACKSON et al., Appellants, v. ARCHIBALD V. LITTELL |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. -- Hon. J. H. Slover, Judge.
Reversed and remanded (with directions).
J. N. & A. C. Southern for appellants.
(1) If the testator devise a fee simple or generally to the first taker with an absolute power of disposal in him, and there is neither by express words or implication a mere life estate created in the first taker, all subsequent grants in the will must fail, because repugnant to the first grant and because it conflicts with a settled rule of law. Roth v Rauschenbush, 173 Mo. 592; Grace v. Perry, 197 Mo. 564; Green v. Sutton, 50 Mo. 186; Gannon v Pauk, 200 Mo. 75. (2) The title to the real estate conveyed by the deed would be valid, even though in construction of the will from the "four corners" the estate devised to Catharine Littell should be held to have been a life estate, because there was a power of sale or conveyance by deed added, and it is not denied that such deed was executed by Catharine Littell and delivered to all the plaintiffs. This doctrine is sustained by all the authorities.
John W Clements for respondent.
(1) There is no principle of law more fully established in this State than that "the cardinal rule in the interpretation of a will is that the intention of the testator as gathered from the whole instrument shall control." McMillan v. Farrow, 141 Mo. 55. And that the intention of the testator "is not to be gathered from single words, passages or sentences, but from a consideration of the whole instrument taken together in its general scope and design." Russell v. Eubanks, 84 Mo. 82; Turner v. Timberlake, 53 Mo. 371; Gaines v. Fender, 57 Mo. 342; Smith v. Hutchison, 61 Mo. 83; Allison v. Chaney, 63 Mo. 279; Long v. Timms, 107 Mo. 512; Watson v. Watson, 110 Mo. 164; Murphy v. Carlin, 113 Mo. 112; Redman v. Barger, 118 Mo. 568; Lewis v. Pitman, 101 Mo. 281; Munro v. Collins, 95 Mo. 73; Harbison v. James, 90 Mo. 411; Bean v. Kennuir, 86 Mo. 666; Smith v. Bell, 6 Peters 68; Anderson v. Hall and Crawford v. Hall, 80 Ky. 91. The intention of the testator, Archibald Littell, deceased, as gathered from the entire will, unquestionably was to give his wife, Catharine Littell, only a life estate therein, coupled with the power of sale, with the remainder over to the devisees named in the will and in the proportions named in the will. (2) "The power of sale, or disposal superadded to a life estate, if not exercised does not enlarge the life estate into a fee; and in such case the remainder over is valid and at the death of the life tenant takes effect in the remainderman." Harbison v. James, 90 Mo. 411; Ruby v. Barnett, 12 Mo. 3; Reinders v. Koppelmann, 68 Mo. 482; Russell v. Eubanks, 84 Mo. 83. (3) Nor is it necessary that the life estate be created in express terms. If it is the clear intention from the whole will that the first taker is to have but a life estate, then the added power of disposition will not convert the estate into one of absolute ownership. Lewis v. Pittmann, 101 Mo. 281; Redman v. Barger, 118 Mo. 568; Russell v. Eubanks, 84 Mo. 82; Schorr v. Carter, 120 Mo. 409. (4) The widow, Catharine Littell, in the exercise of her "privilege of selling or conveying by deed," given her by the terms of the will of testator, was in a sense the trustee of the remaindermen, and as such trustee it was her duty to exercise good faith. Rose v. McHose's Executors, 26 Mo. 590; Burford v. Aldredge, 165 Mo. 419; Underwood v. Cave, 176 Mo. 1.
This is an action begun in the circuit court of Jackson county to construe the last will and testament of Archibald Littell, deceased. The case was tried upon the following agreed statement of facts:
C. C. Latimer.
In an instruction given by the court of its own motion, it construed the said will as follows:
"Under...
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