Jackson v. Miller
| Decision Date | 17 March 1989 |
| Citation | 776 S.W.2d 115 |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Bill D. JACKSON and Joyce Christian, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. George E. MILLER, a/k/a Elija Dylan, and Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Defendants/Appellants. 776 S.W.2d 115 |
Shannon D. Faulkner, III, Poore, Cox, Baker, Ray & Byrne, Knoxville, for defendants-appellants.
Jess D. Campbell and Stephanie A. Walsh, Knoxville, for plaintiffs-appellees.
The question presented by this appeal is whether a release included an action for loss of consortium. The trial judge held it did not. We affirm.
Plaintiffs, Bill D. Jackson and Joyce Christian, suffered physical injuries in an automobile accident in Knox County, Tennessee. Christian and Jackson received $70,000 and $72,000, respectively, from Auto-Owners Mutual Insurance Company, and executed releases. Each plaintiff's spouse also suffered physical injuries in the accident; however, those claims were not settled.
The language of the release in question provided as follows (Jackson sample):
RECEIVED OF AUTO OWNERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, HEREINAFTER CALLED THE COMPANY, THE SUM OF Seventy-Two Thousand and no/100 ($72,000.00) [i]n full settlement and final discharge of all claims under the above numbered policy for injuries to William D. Jackson, Knoxville, Tennessee, arising out of the ownership or operation of an uninsured automobile by George Edward Miller, 8400 Middlebrook Pike and any alias, which occurred on or about the 20th day of March, 1986, at Kingston Pike, Knoxville, Tennessee.
/s/ William B. Jackson
This 22nd day of Dec., 1986.
(emphasis added).
After the settlements both plaintiffs and spouses filed suits in Knox County Circuit Court seeking damages--the plaintiffs for loss of consortium and the spouses for their physical injuries. Motions for summary judgment were filed on the grounds the plaintiffs had released the loss of consortium actions. The court overruled the motions and at the trial, the jury awarded each plaintiff a judgment of $25,000 for loss of consortium, in addition to judgments of $121,000 and $212,000 for Jackson's and Christian's spouses, respectively. Following the judgments, in accordance with the court's prior order and the parties' agreement, the judge conducted a hearing to determine whether the releases executed by the plaintiffs barred their actions for loss of consortium. The trial judge held the causes of action for loss of consortium were not barred and defendant appealed.
Appellant, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, argues that the cause of action for loss of consortium is merely another element of injury to an individual, no different from other elements such as medical expenses, loss of earning capacity, or pain and suffering. Appellant reasons the release in question discharges all claims for injuries to plaintiff, including loss of consortium as an element of injury.
Consortium is defined as:
'the conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of each to the company, cooperation, affection and aid of the other in every conjugal relation'....
[l]oss of consortium is a right of action separate from that of the husband for his damage, ... loss of services is a part of the loss of consortium....
Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127, 132 (6th Cir.1973). Despite being a separate claim from that of an injured spouse for other damages, loss of consortium is also a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one's spouse give rise to and establish the claim. Dunn v. Alabama Oil & Gas Co., 299 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn.Ct.App.1956).
We disagree with Appellant that loss of consortium is an element of injury no different from other elements such as medical expenses. It is a cause of action separate from plaintiff's action for bodily injury, based on losses to plaintiff caused by physical injuries to plaintiff's spouse. However, the question remains whether loss of consortium is an "injury" within the meaning of the release. The authors of Corpus Juris Secundum discuss the various meanings of "injury":
INJURY
A generic term, which, in ordinary modern usage, is of very broad designation, having more than one meaning, for, as indicated in the following subdivisions, it may have a legal import as well as numerous and comprehensive popular meanings. The exact signification of the word "injury" has been considered and discussed by courts on numerous occasions, and their rulings are not always harmonious, since it is often difficult to lay down any actual definition of what constitutes an injury, because it is always a question of compound facts. In the broad sense, the term includes injury to person, property, reputation, and rights.
The word "injury" has numerous and comprehensive popular meanings, which, however, may be grouped under two general heads: It may indicate a hurt, as distinguished from the infliction of the hurt; or it may indicate the infliction of a hurt, as distinguished from the hurt inflicted.
... the word "injury" in a legal sense connotes "wrong," implies violation of a legal right, and, as in the popular sense, it may sometimes be used to indicate either the invasion of a right or the damages resulting from such invasion, the word being frequently used indiscriminately in these two different senses.
43A C.J.S. Injury at 765-67 (1978).
The trial court held the language of the release was ambiguous, saying, (emphasis added). After so holding, the court found the releases were not effective to bar recovery for the claims for loss of consortium for plaintiffs.
Because the release is a contract, rules of construction for interpreting a contract are used in construing a release. 76 C.J.S. Release Sec. 38 (1952). Ambiguous language in a contract is construed against the drafter. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 678 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tenn.1984).
The cardinal rule for interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties and give effect to the intention consistent with legal principles. Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Regal Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578 (Tenn.1975). In ascertaining the intention of the parties and what was within their contemplation, the Court should consider all of the surrounding circumstances. See Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Jackson, 181 Tenn. 453, 181 S.W.2d 625 (1944); Barretsville Bank & Trust Co. v. Bolton, 182 Tenn. 364, 187 S.W.2d 306 (1945). If a contract is plain and unambiguous the meaning thereof is a question of law and it is the Court's function to interpret the...
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