Jackson v. Morgan
| Decision Date | 09 May 1911 |
| Docket Number | 7,201 |
| Citation | 94 N.E. 1021,49 Ind.App. 376 |
| Parties | JACKSON v. MORGAN ET AL |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Rehearing denied October 13, 1911. Transfer denied February 15, 1912.
From Superior Court of Marion County (74,105); James M. Leathers Judge.
Action by George W. Jackson against Joseph R. Morgan and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Wilson S. Doan, Charles J. Orbison and J. C. Mathews, for appellant.
Howe & Batchelor, for appellees.
This action was brought by appellant to recover damages from appellees and from John H. Davidson, for alleged unlawful acts, in causing the breach of a contract between appellant and said Davidson.
The amended complaint is in one paragraph, and substantially alleges that on February 18, 1901, appellant entered into an oral agreement with defendant John H. Davidson, by the terms of which appellant was to assist said Davidson in conducting the state agency of the Northwestern Life Association of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the State of Indiana; that appellant was to keep the books of said agency, manage the agents for said company in Indiana, and was to receive, as compensation for said services, one-half of the gross profits of said agency; that said agreement was for the term of one year.
It is further alleged that at the time said oral agreement was made, Davidson had a contract with said association, whereby he was to receive as compensation for managing said agency all of the first year's premiums on policies of insurance written by him or his agents in said State, and in addition thereto he was to receive the sum of $ 100 a month, which was subsequently increased to $ 200 a month; that, in pursuance of said agreement, appellant entered upon his duties as manager of the agents and bookkeeper for said agency, and continued in such capacity until September 6, 1901, when without fault on his part, and by reason of the acts hereinafter set out, he was ousted from said agency, and was refused the right to engage in said business as provided by the terms of his contract, and said contract was broken and canceled; that during the time appellant was so engaged he loaned to said Davidson the sum of $ 454.22, with the understanding that said sum was to be repaid out of the first money coming to said agency after said loan was made; that the business office of said agency was in the city of Indianapolis, Indiana, in connection with the law offices of appellees Morgan & Morgan; that said appellees knew of the contract between said Davidson and appellant, and knew of the loan made to said Davidson, as aforesaid, and of the agreement with reference to its repayment; that appellees, on or about September 6, 1901, entered into a conspiracy with said Davidson to break the contract existing between appellant and said Davidson, and to oust appellant from any participation in said agency business, or in the profits thereof, and to exclude said plaintiff from the office of said agency and from the possession of all books, papers and collateral held by appellant; that said conspiracy was entered into by said parties for the purpose of injuring appellant, dispossessing him of his rights in said business and sharing in the profits thereof, for the purpose of benefiting said appellees and said Davidson, at the expense of appellant; that, in pursuance of said conspiracy, appellees on September 6, 1901, made an agreement with said Davidson, whereby Davidson was to pretend to owe appellees the sum of $ 900, and that to secure said debt Davidson was to turn over to said appellees certain collateral securities, containing data essential in the conduct and management of said business, held by the appellant for said agency; that Davidson did not owe appellees, and that said debt was a pretended debt, to give appellees the right to take possession of said securities, and thus deprive appellant of the data with which said business could be conducted; that appellees, acting with the knowledge and consent of Davidson, and in pursuance of said conspiracy, made a demand upon appellant for said securities, on account of said pretended indebtedness; that appellant refused to surrender possession of them, whereupon appellees, with the knowledge and consent of Davidson, and in pursuance of said conspiracy, instituted an action in replevin for the possession of said securities, and that the sheriff of Marion county took them upon a writ of replevin, and turned them over to appellees, who, acting with said Davidson, and with his knowledge and consent, excluded appellant from the office of said agency and from the effects and papers thereof, and from in any manner conducting the business thereof; that, in pursuance of said conspiracy, appellant was precluded from receiving his salary of one-half of the gross profits of said business, and from applying the receipts of said agency business to the payment of said loan; that the accrued profits and those about to accrue from the business of said agency were $ 3,000, and that by reason of the acts of conspiracy, appellant's share of said profits was extinguished, and he never received anything under and by virtue of his said agreement; that upon the trial of said action in replevin the court awarded the return of said securities to appellant, but at the time of said trial, and at the time of the award of possession of said securities, the life of said contract had been long extinguished, and said securities were of no further use or benefit to him in the conduct of said business. Judgment for $ 3,000 was demanded.
Appellant dismissed as to Davidson, and appellees filed their joint demurrer to the amended complaint, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them. This demurrer was sustained by the court, and constitutes the only error assigned and relied on for reversal.
Counsel for appellant say that the legal question presented by the error assigned is whether a person, with knowledge of a contract, and with the intention of injuring one of the parties thereto, or securing a pecuniary benefit thereby, who assists or induces the other party to the contract to violate or break it is liable in damages to the injured party.
Appellees deny that an action can be maintained against a third person for inducing or procuring one party to a contract to violate it, to the damage of the other party, except (1) where the relation of master and servant, strictly so called, is involved, and (2) where fraudulent, coercive or other unlawful means have been employed to procure the breach.
The first exception grows out of or is based on the English statute of laborers of 1349 ( , which was never in force in this country; and the second is limited to such actions as involve some unlawful means employed, and are comprehended within well-recognized rights of action for tort. Outside of the causes arising from strikes and boycotts, of which there are many in the reports, being based upon another branch of the law of torts, the adjudicated cases involving facts similar to the case at bar are not numerous, and in Indiana the direct question presented is one of first impression; and the cases, both American and English, which may be considered in point, are far from being in harmony.
It was said in the case of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co. (1908), 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 746:
The appellant presses upon our attention the English case of Lumley v. Gye (1853), 2 El. & Bl. 216. This is a leading case, and has been extensively cited, as well as extensively criticised. Lumley was the lessee of the Queen's theatre, and had a contract with Johanna Wagner to sing at his theatre and not elsewhere during the period for which she was engaged. Gye, the lessee of Covent Garden theatre, with knowledge of the existing agreement, and during the term thereof, entered into a contract with Miss Wagner to sing at his theatre for a larger sum than that stipulated for in Lumley's agreement. After Lumley had enjoined Miss Wagner from singing elsewhere, he brought an action in three counts against Gye. In the first he set out his contract, and charged defendant with knowledge thereof, and, with the malicious intention of injuring plaintiff, while the agreement was in force, successfully enticed and procured Miss Wagner to refuse to perform. The second was for enticing and procuring her to refuse to perform after the granting of the injunction. The third alleged that Miss Wagner, for hire, had become plaintiff's dramatic artiste, and that defendant, with knowledge, maliciously enticed and procured her to depart from said employment. The general finding of the majority of the court was that an action would lie for inducing a breach of contract, even though no illegal means were employed to bring about the breach, if it was done for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting defendant at the expense of plaintiff. The judges, upon the hearing, being divided, their judgments were delivered seriatim. It was held, upon different theories, that the action was maintainable, Coleridge, J., alone dissenting. He states the proposition involved as follows: "In order to maintain this action, one of two propositions must be maintained; either that an action will lie against any one by...
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