Jackson v. Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility, MULTI-PURPOSE

• Citation: 700 A.2d 1203
• Decision Date: 19 August 1997
• Docket Number: 1996,MULTI-PURPOSE,No. 379,379
• Parties: Glenn JACKSON, Petitioner Below-Appellant, v.CRIMINAL JUSTICE FACILITY, and Laurie Sullivan, Records Supervisor, Respondents Below-Appellees. . Submitted:
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 1203

700 A.2d 1203

Glenn JACKSON, Petitioner Below-Appellant, v. MULTI-PURPOSE CRIMINAL JUSTICE FACILITY, and Laurie Sullivan, Records Supervisor, Respondents Below-Appellees.

No. 379, 1996.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Aug. 19, 1997.

Decided: Oct. 3, 1997.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Court Below--Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, C.A. No. 95M-09-003.

Glenn Jackson, Wilmington, pro se.

Mary Page Bailey, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, for appellees.

Bernard J. O'Donnell, Assistant Public Defender, Wilmington, court-appointed amicus curiae.

Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH and HARTNETT, JJ.

WALSH, Justice:

The appellant, Glenn Jackson ("Jackson"), filed this appeal from the Superior Court's denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus. The issue presented by this appeal is whether Jackson, who is serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole, is entitled to conditional release by the Department of Correction ("the Department") under 11 Del.C. § 4348 ("Section 4348"). We conclude that Jackson is not entitled to conditional release under Section 4348. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court's judgment.

I.

Jackson was sentenced in 1973 to two concurrent life terms in prison, with the possibility of parole, for first degree kidnaping and first degree rape. He also received additional prison terms for robbery and weapon offenses. After serving less than ten years on these charges, the Board of Parole ("the Board") granted Jackson parole in 1983, in accordance with 11 Del.C. § 4346 ("Section 4346"). In 1992, Jackson was convicted of delivering drugs, criminal trespass, and resisting arrest. His parole was deemed violated and he was returned to custody. Jackson has served his 1992 sentences ¹ and currently is incarcerated at the Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility on his 1973 sentences. In 1995, Jackson applied for parole, which the Board denied. Jackson's next parole hearing date is scheduled for December 1997.

After his parole was denied in 1995, Jackson filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Superior Court, asserting that the Department was required to set a conditional, or "short-term," release date for him pursuant to Section 4348. ² The Superior Court denied Jackson's application. This appeal ensued.

II.

In his opening brief on appeal, Jackson contends that he is parole-eligible under Section 4346 ³ and that conditional release is a form of parole. Jackson points out that, for purposes of determining his parole eligibility, the Board must treat his life sentence as a fixed term of 45 years. See 11 Del.C. § 4346(c). Jackson argues that the Department also is obliged to treat his life sentence as a fixed term of 45 years in order to calculate a conditional release date for him. Without a conditional release date, Jackson contends that he is excluded from most rehabilitative programs, including work release. Jackson asserts that, even if the Board denies him parole under Section 4346, he still is entitled to conditional release by the Department under Section 4348.

The State, on the other hand, contends that Jackson is not entitled to a writ of mandamus because he has not established that he has a clear legal right to a conditional release date. The State argues that the statutory parole scheme applicable to Jackson is unambiguous. It provides that an inmate in Jackson's position is entitled only to have the Department set a parole eligibility date--not a conditional release date. The State asserts that the parole and conditional release programs are two different programs and that, in order to be eligible for conditional release, an inmate, among other things, must be serving a fixed term of imprisonment. Because Jackson is serving a life sentence and not a fixed term, the State contends he is not eligible for conditional release.

After considering the parties' respective positions, the Court appointed Bernard J. O'Donnell, Esquire to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of Jackson's position. ⁴ The amicus asserts that conditional release is a form of parole and that the two forms of early release are authorized by statute, are virtually identical, and are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, it is argued, the statutes relating to parole and conditional release must be read in pari materia. The so-called parole statute, Section 4346, provides that a life sentence shall be treated as a fixed term of 45 years for purposes of calculating an inmate's parole eligibility date. Amicus agrees with Jackson's assertion that the 45 year term applied to calculate parole eligibility under Section 4346 also should be applied to calculate a conditional release date under Section 4348. Amicus concludes that under the existing statutory scheme, even if an inmate is denied parole under Section 4346, the inmate, nevertheless, is entitled to conditional release under Section 4348.

III.

In reviewing Jackson's petition for a writ of mandamus, the Superior Court concluded that Section 4348 is ambiguous. Specifically, the Superior Court determined that the phrase "shall, upon release, be deemed as released on parole" to be susceptible to different interpretations. The Superior Court further found that it was unclear, in any event, how Section 4348 "applies to Jackson, an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment." The trial court analyzed the legislative intent behind Section 4348 and concluded that the legislature intended for Section 4348 to be a "conditional release statute" and not a "parole statute." The court further concluded that Jackson was not eligible for conditional release. Thus, it denied Jackson's petition.

A.

In addressing a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo to determine whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in formulating or applying legal precepts. Zimmerman v. State, Del.Supr., 628 A.2d 62, 66 (1993). Principles of statutory construction require that undefined words in a statute be given their common, ordinary meaning. Id. at 68; Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., Del.Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 900 (1994). A statute is ambiguous only if it "is reasonably susceptible of different conclusions or interpretations." Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., Del.Supr., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1985). A statute also may be found to be ambiguous if a literal interpretation of the words of the statute would lead to unreasonable or absurd results that could not have been intended by the legislature. DiStefano v. Watson, Del.Supr., 566 A.2d 1, 4 (1989). Only if a statute is found to be ambiguous may a court then attempt to resolve the ambiguity by reconciling the statutory language with the legislative intent. Id. If there is no reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the words used, the statute is unambiguous, and the Court's role is limited to an application of the literal meaning of the words. Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d at 68; State v. Skinner, Del.Supr., 632 A.2d 82, 85 (1993).

In this case, we disagree with the Superior Court's conclusion that Section 4348 is ambiguous and thus subject to interpretation. Instead we find that the plain language of the statute compels the conclusion that Section 4348 does not apply to any inmate serving a life sentence, including those like Jackson who were sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. Consequently, we affirm the result reached by the Superior Court in this case, however, we do so on alternative grounds.

B.

Section 4346, entitled Eligibility for Parole, ⁵ essentially provides that an inmate becomes eligible to apply for parole after serving one-third of the sentence imposed by the court, such sentence to be reduced by good behavior and merit credits. ⁶ Stirparo v. State, Del.Supr., 310 A.2d 632 (1973). Release of an inmate on parole under Section 4346 is clearly a matter within the sound discretion of the Board and may be denied if the Board, in its discretion, determines that release of an inmate on parole would not be in the "best interest of society." ⁷ 11 Del.C. § 4347(c).

Unlike parole, conditional release ⁸ is nondiscretionary. Thus, if an inmate has accumulated sufficient good behavior and merit credits, then the Department must release the inmate from incarceration when the inmate reaches his short-term release date (i.e. the maximum period of incarceration less accumulated good behavior and merit credits). Conditional release simply does not require any judgment by the Board or the Department that the inmate's release would be in the best interest of society. In that sense, conditional release, unlike parole, operates almost automatically (unless waived by the inmate) and is mandatory.

Despite their obvious differences, however, parole and conditional release do share certain similarities. Both forms of early release permit the diminution of an inmate's time of confinement through earned merit and good behavior credits. See Richmond v. State, Del.Supr., 446 A.2d 1091, 1094 (1982). Furthermore, this Court previously has recognized that once an inmate achieves early release from incarceration, there is little practical difference between the consequences of release on parole under Section 4346 and conditional release under Section 4348. Id. Both the parolee under Section 4346 and the conditional release under Section 4348 remain within the jurisdiction of the Department and subject to the supervision of the Board until the inmate has either served the remaining time on his sentence or is earlier discharged. 11 Del.C. § 4347(i). Accordingly, an inmate's continued release under either program is conditioned upon the inmate's compliance with all of the conditions of supervision associated with his early release from confinement. See Spurlin v. Department of Corrections, Del.Supr., 230 A.2d 276, 277-78 (1967).

In light of the similarities between parole supervision and conditional release...