Jackson v. Norris

• Citation: 426 S.W.3d 906,2013 Ark. 175
• Decision Date: 25 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 09–145.,09–145.
• Parties: Kuntrell JACKSON, Appellant v. Larry NORRIS, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

2013 Ark. 175

426 S.W.3d 906

Kuntrell JACKSON, Appellant

v.Larry NORRIS, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee.

No. 09–145.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 25, 2013.

Limitation Recognized

West's A.C.A. § 5–4–104(b)

J. Blake Hendrix; and Bryan A. Stevenson and Alicia A. D'Addario, Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Justice.

This court affirmed Kuntrell Jackson's capital-murder and aggravated-robbery convictions and his sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87, 194 S.W.3d 757 (2004). This court subsequently affirmed the Jefferson County Circuit Court's denial of Jackson's petition for writ of habeas corpus, concluding that even though he was only fourteen years old at the time he committed the crimes, Jackson's mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 378 S.W.3d 103,cert. granted,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 548, 181 L.Ed.2d 395 (2011), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Miller v. Alabama, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that Arkansas's sentencing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” because it imposed upon Jackson a mandatory sentence of life without parole despite his having been under the age of eighteen at the time he committed the crime of capital murder. Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, we reverse the denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and issue the writ. We further remand the case to the Jefferson County Circuit Court with instructions that the case be transferred to the Mississippi County Circuit Court. We also instruct that a sentencing hearing be held in the Mississippi County Circuit Court where Jackson may present for consideration evidence that would include that of his “age, age-related characteristics, and the nature of” his crime. Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2475. Further, we instruct that his sentence must fall within the statutory discretionary sentencing range for a Class Y felony.

Jackson was convicted of capital murder. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5–10–101 (Repl.1997) provides in full as follows:

(a) A person commits capital murder if:

(1) Acting alone or with one (1) or more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit rape, kidnapping, vehicular piracy, robbery, burglary, a felony violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, §§ 5–64–101–5–64–608, involving an actual delivery of a controlled substance, or escape in the first degree, and in the course of and in furtherance of the felony, or in immediate flight therefrom, he or an accomplice causes the death of any person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or

(2) Acting alone or with one (1) or more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit arson, and in the course of and in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight therefrom, he or an accomplice causes the death of any person; or

(3) With the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of any law enforcement officer, jailer, prison official, fire fighter, judge or other court official, probation officer, parole officer, any military personnel, or teacher or school employee, when such person is acting in the line of duty, he causes the death of any person; or

(4) With the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of another person, he causes the death of any person; or

(5) With the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of the holder of any public office filled by election or appointment or a candidate for public office, he causes the death of any person; or

(6) While incarcerated in the Department of Correction or the Department of Community Punishment, he purposely causes the death of another person after premeditation and deliberation; or

(7) Pursuant to an agreement that he cause the death of another person in return for anything of value, he causes the death of any person; or

(8) He enters into an agreement whereby one person is to cause the death of another person in return for anything of value, and the person hired, pursuant to the agreement, causes the death of any person; or

(9) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, he knowingly causes the death of a person fourteen (14) years of age or younger at the time the murder was committed, provided that the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older at the time the murder was committed. It shall be an affirmative defense to any prosecution under this subdivision (a)(9) arising from the failure of the parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis to provide specified medical or surgical treatment, that the parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis relied solely on spiritual treatment through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of an established church or religious denomination of which he is a member; or

(10) He purposely discharges a firearm from a vehicle at a person, or at a vehicle, conveyance, or a residential or commercial occupiable structure he knows or has good reason to believe to be occupied by a person, and thereby causes the death of another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

(b) It is an affirmative defense to any prosecution under subdivision (a)(1) of this section for an offense in which the defendant was not the only participant that the defendant did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, command, induce, procure, counsel, or aid in its commission.

(c) Capital murder is punishable by death or life imprisonment without parole pursuant to §§ 5–4–601–5–4–605, 5–4–607, and 5–4–608. For all purposes other than disposition under §§ 5–4–101–5–4–104, 5–4–201–5–4–204, 5–4–301–5–4–308, 5–4–310, 5–4–311, 5–4–401–5–4–404, 5–4–501–5–4–504, 5–4–505 [repealed], 5–4–601–5–4–605, 5–4–607, and 5–4–608, capital murder is a Class Y felony.

Thus, the statute provides for a mandatory sentence for persons convicted of capital murder of either death or life without parole. See alsoArk.Code Ann. § 5–4–104(b) (Repl.1997) (providing that “[a] defendant convicted of capital murder ... shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole”); Ark.Code Ann. § 5–4–615 (Repl.1997) (providing that “[a] person convicted of a capital offense shall be punished by death by lethal injection or by life imprisonment without parole”). In this instance, Jackson was ineligible for the death penalty. Miller, ––– U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2461 n. 1 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988) (plurality opinion)). There are no provisions in the capital-murder statute providing a lesser sentence for persons under the age of eighteen.

In Miller, the United States Supreme Court stated that “[b]y removing youth from the balance,” Arkansas's mandatory sentencing scheme for capital murder “prohibit[s] a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionally punishes a juvenile offender.” Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2466. The Court explained that “[s]uch mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.” Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2467.

In recapping its analysis, the Court wrote as follows:

Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.

Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2468 (citations omitted). In Jackson's particular case, the Court observed that Jackson's conviction was based on an “aiding-and-abetting theory” and that “his age could well have affected his calculation of the risk” posed by his friend's possession of a weapon. Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2468. The Court also noted “Jackson's family background and immersion in violence.” Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2468. The Court concluded that the “Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders,” because by “making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.

The Court observed that given “children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penally will be uncommon.” Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. Nevertheless, the Court did “not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in homicide cases,” but it did “require it to take into account how children are different, and how...