Jackson v. Onondaga County

• Decision Date: 20 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 05-CV-1393.,05-CV-1393.
• Citation: 549 F.Supp.2d 204
• Parties: Constantine L. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. ONONDAGA COUNTY; Anthony Callisto, Jr., Chief Custody Deputy, Onondaga County Jail; and Cheryl Spina, Deputy, Onondaga County Jail, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

549 F.Supp.2d 204

Constantine L. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. ONONDAGA COUNTY; Anthony Callisto, Jr., Chief Custody Deputy, Onondaga County Jail; and Cheryl Spina, Deputy, Onondaga County Jail, Defendants.

No. 05-CV-1393.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

March 20, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Constantinee L. Jackson, Pine City, NY, pro se.

Hon. Anthony Rivizzigno, Onondaga County Attorney, Kathleen M. Dougherty, Esq., Deputy County Attorney, of Counsel, Syracuse, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION and ORDER

THOMAS J. McAVOY, Senior District Judge.

This matter brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was referred to the Hon. George H. Lowe, United States Magistrate Judge, for a Report-Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(c).

The Report-Recommendation dated January 8, 2008 recommended that the Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted and Plaintiffs complaint dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. Plaintiff filed objections to the Report-Recommendation, essentially raising the same arguments presented to the Magistrate Judge.

When objections to a magistrate judge's Report-Recommendation are lodged, the Court makes a "de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After such a review, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Id.

Having reviewed the record de novo and having considered the issues raised in Plaintiffs objections, this Court adopt the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Lowe for the reasons stated therein. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

GEORGE H. LOWE, United States Magistrate Judge.

This prisoner civil rights action, commenced pro se by Mr. Constantinee L. Jackson ("Plaintiff) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has been referred to me for Report and Recommendation by the Honorable Thomas J. McAvoy, Senior United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(c). Liberally construed, Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that, in February and March of 2004, two employees of the Onondaga County Jail — Chief Custody Deputy Anthony Callisto, Jr., and Deputy Cheryl Spina ("Defendants") — violated Plaintiffs rights under the First, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments when (1) Defendant Spina filed a false disciplinary report charging Plaintiff with assault, in retaliation for Plaintiffs having embarrassed her by calling her "ugly," causing Plaintiff to be convicted of that charge and illegally confined to the Special Housing Unit at the Onondaga County Jail for a period of forty-nine days without life's basic necessities, and (2) Defendant Callisto failed to prevent either the duration or conditions of that incarceration. (See generally Dkt. No. 1 [Plf.'s Compl.].)

Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. (Dkt. No. 52.) Generally, Defendants' motion is premised on the following alternative grounds: (1) Plaintiffs failure to allege facts plausibly suggesting any constitutional violations; (2) Plaintiffs failure to adduce evidence establishing any constitutional violations; (3) the principles of limited municipal liability established by Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and its progeny; (4) the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and/or (5) the doctrine of qualified immunity. (See generally Dkt. No. 52, Part 10 [Defs.' Mem. of Law].) For the reasons that follow, I recommend that Defendants' motion be granted, and that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is warranted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether a genuine issue of material¹ fact exists, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party.²

However, when the moving party has met its initial burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."³ The nonmoving party must do more than "rest upon the mere allegations ... of the [plaintiffs] pleading" or "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."⁴ Rather, "[a] dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."⁵

Where a non-movant fails to adequately oppose a properly supported factual assertion made in a motion for summary judgment, a district court has no duty to perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute,⁶ even if that non-movant is proceeding pro se.⁷ In the event the district court chooses to conduct such an independent review of the record, any verified complaint filed by the plaintiff should be treated as an affidavit.⁸ (Here, I note that Plaintiffs' Complaint contains a verification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 174⁹) In any event, to be sufficient to create a factual issue for purposes of a summary judgment motion, an affidavit must, among other things, not be conclusory.¹⁰" An affidavit is conclusory if, for example, its assertions lack any supporting evidence or are too general.¹¹ Finally, even where an affidavit (or verified complaint) is nonconclusory, it may be insufficient to create a factual issue where it is (1) "largely unsubstantiated by any other direct evidence" and (2) "so replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities that no reasonable juror would undertake the suspension of disbelief necessary to credit the allegations made in the complaint."¹²

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)

To the extent that a defendant's motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is based entirely on the plaintiffs complaint,¹³ such a motion is functionally the same as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). As a result, "[w]here appropriate, a trial judge may dismiss for failure to state a cause of action upon motion for summary judgment." Schwartz v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir.1968) [citations omitted], accord, Katz v. Molic, 128 F.R.D. 35, 37-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("This Court finds that ... a conversion [of a Rule 56 summary judgment motion to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint] is proper with or without notice to the parties.").

Moreover, even where a defendant has not advanced such a failure-to-state-a-claim argument on a motion for summary judgment, a district court may, sua sponte, address whether a pro se prisoner has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.¹⁴

For these reasons, it is appropriate to briefly summarize the legal standard governing Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). It has long been understood that a defendant may base such a motion on either or both of two grounds: (1) a challenge to the "sufficiency of the pleading" under Rule 8(a)(2);¹⁵ or (2) a challenge to the legal cognizability of the claim.¹⁶

Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Such a statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."¹⁷ The purpose of this rule is to "facilitate a proper decision on the merits."¹⁸ A complaint that fails to comply with this rule "presents far too a heavy burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [plaintiffs] claims."¹⁹

The Supreme Court has long characterized this pleading requirement under Rule 8(a)(2) as "simplified" and "liberal," and has repeatedly rejected judicially established pleading requirements that exceed this liberal requirement.²⁰ However, it is well established that even this liberal notice pleading standard "has its limits."²¹ As a result, several Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions exist, holding that a pleading has failed to meet this liberal notice pleading standard.²²

Most notably, in the recent decision of Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court, in reversing an appellate decision holding that a complaint had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, "retire[d]" the famous statement by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1968-69, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).²³ Rather than turning on the conceivability of an actionable claim, the Court clarified, the Rule 8 standard turns on the "plausibility" of an actionable claim. Id. at 1965-74. More specifically, the Court held that, for a plaintiffs complaint to state a claim, his "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative...